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ABSTRACT 
Kant’s Doctrine of Religion as Political Philosophy 
Phillip Wodzinski 
Advisor: Susan Shell, Ph.D. 
 
Through a close reading of Immanuel Kant’s late book, Religion within the Boundaries of 
Mere Reason, the dissertation clarifies the political element in Kant’s doctrine of religion 
and so contributes to a wider conception of his political philosophy.  Kant’s political 
philosophy of religion, in addition to extending and further animating his moral doctrine, 
interprets religion in such a way as to give the Christian faith a moral grounding that will 
make possible, and even be an agent of, the improvement of social and political life.   
The dissertation emphasizes the wholeness and structure of Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason as a book, for the teaching of the book is not exhausted by 
the articulation of its doctrine but also includes both the fact and the manner of its 
expression: the reader learns most fully from Kant by giving attention to the structure and 
tone of the book as well as to its stated content and argumentation.  The Religion 
provides the basis not only for a proposed reenvisioning of the basis of existing religious 
creeds and practices, but along with this a devastating critique of them in particularly 
moral terms.  This, however, is only half of what constitutes Kant’s political philosophy 
of religion; Kant goes beyond the philosophical analysis of the social-political context of 
religion and pursues, alongside this effort, a political presentation of philosophy which is 
intended to relieve the reader’s anxieties concerning the tension between philosophy and 
political life that it is in the interest of the partisans of the church-faith to encourage. 
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1.  From Critique to Doctrine: Introduction 
Keeping in mind even such candidates as Francis Bacon’s Wisdom of the Ancients, 
Giambattista Vico’s New Science, and Friedrich Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo, it is difficult to 
think of a work by a modern philosopher more striking in its oddness than Immanuel 
Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.1  In it, the popular and cliched 
picture of the ponderous epistemological Kant diminishes as the author writes of eastern 
religions, Jewish trinitarianism, Iroquois catechumens confounding Jesuit missionaries, 
virgin conception, and the mechanism of world history.  He decries the encroachments of 
papal ecclesiastics, presents the marks of the true church in terms of the concepts of the 
understanding, and laments the universal sinfulness of man.  Furthermore, the author 
treats the reader to a Hobbesian-themed ecclesiology, an encomium to sincerity, an 
account of true and false service to God, and numerous clever interpretations of scripture.  
More important than all these curiosities, however, is the striking possibility that this very 
strange book, the published version of his doctrine of religion, is a major, perhaps the 
major, part of Kant’s work in political philosophy. 
The goal of the present study is to illuminate the political element in Kant’s 
doctrine of religion.  I shall argue that the Religion is not at all theological or exclusively 
moral in nature but constitutes Kant’s political philosophy of religion, which, in addition 
to its ostensible purpose of clarifying, extending, and even vivifying his moral 
philosophy, reinterprets and represents religion in such a way as to reground the Christian 
 
1 Unless otherwise noted, all translations are mine from volume six of Kants Gesammelte Schriften, edited 
by the Königliche Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin, 1902-), although I have made use of 
the suggestions of the Greene-Hudson and the diGiovanni translations. 
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faith for moral-political purposes.  The effort of regrounding is necessary to make 
possible the vision of political life in which politics and morality are not at odds with 
each other; the chief obstacle of this vision is religion – or, more properly stated, church-
faith.  The political philosophy of the Religion springs from an initially moral-individual 
consideration of what determines whether man is good or evil2; the resulting presentation 
of the moral components of human nature is projected in terms of a moral existence that 
must be contextualized in terms of both a nonhuman moral legislator (while not 
compromising the autonomy of morality itself) and of man’s social existence with other 
men – with a consequent philosophy of God restricted to moral considerations and, much 
more importantly, an ecclesiology that is not ultimately tied to, and explicitly designed to 
shed, any historical revelation.  In thus presenting a religious culmination of his 
investigation into morality Kant at the same time offers a critique of existing Christian 
faith and religious practice, a critique which has an intended and essential connection to 
social-political life. 
In supporting this claim, I shall rely on Religion within the Boundaries of Mere 
Reason as the expression of the doctrine of religion3 and as a whole and unified book, for 
the teaching of the book is not merely the doctrinal content as expressed but includes 
both the fact and the manner of its expression: the reader learns most fully from Kant by 
 
2 Even the initial consideration is cast in terms of the global context of moral decline in all of civilization, 
and is pursued with the question of whether the human species itself is by nature good or evil. 
 
3 A collection of Kant’s lectures on the doctrine of religion may be fruitfully compared to the Religion in 
terms of content, rhetorical character, and context.  In focus the lectures are more limited and in 
presentation they are more carefully, or at least more rigidly, ordered.  For a study of the lectures 
themselves, see Wood, Kant’s Rational Theology. 
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giving attention to the structure and tone of the book as well as to its stated content and 
argumentation.  The present study will take apart the whole and represent it in the 
following manner in order to make clear its doctrinal content and its rhetorical strategy: 
Underlying the work are reminders of Kant’s labors in the Transcendental Dialectic of 
the Critique of Pure Reason to make problematic the claims of speculative rational 
theology.4  In the Religion, as in Kant’s writings as a whole, this is tied to an expanded 
realm of claims on behalf of practical moral faith, which, too, leaves behind the 
transcendent claims of theology – traditional problems of which are taken up and 
considered in the Religion in more purely moral terms.5  By presenting, in light of these 
previous steps, a philosophy of practical-moral (that is, without benefit of revelation) 
religion in terms of human sociality, and comparing it with historical manfestations of 
revealed faiths, the Religion provides the basis not only for a proposed reenvisioning of 
the basis of existing religious creeds and practices, but along with this a devastating 
critique of them in particularly moral terms.6  But this is only half of what constitutes 
Kant’s political philosophy of religion; Kant goes beyond the philosophical analysis of 
politics through a presentation of religion and pursues, alongside this effort, a political 
presentation of philosophy which is intended to relieve the reader’s anxieties about the 
 
4 Chapter two takes up and explores this connection of the Religion with the Critique of Pure Reason. 
 
5 A lengthy consideration of this layer of the Religion is found in chapter three below. 
 
6 The roots of religion in human nature, the resulting necessity of church-faith, and the history, critique, and 
reform of church-faith are all discussed in chapter four. 
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seeming tension between philosophy and political life that it is in the interest of the 
partisans of the church-faith to encourage.7 
In short, Kant’s political philosophy of religion originates from his critique of 
reason and is an extension of that critique8 into matters of faith and the resulting practices 
such that the reader may view in a new light, and perhaps see as problematic from his 
original perspective, the history of his church, the basis of his faith and religion, the 
meaning of historical revelation as communicated by scripture, the purpose and efficacy 
of cultic and sacramental practice, and the psychology of the priest.  Throughout the 
Religion the reader encounters Kant’s re-presentation of these things, and will find that 
the intention of this representation is, in addition to the clarification of Kant’s moral 
teaching, the regrounding of historical Christianity for social-political, as well as moral 
purposes. 
But perhaps there is already an objection to thrusting such importance onto the 
Religion.  For several reasons – it is shorter in length, order, formality, and repute – the 
book has an unclear place in the Kantian corpus.  Readers, paying inordinate attention to 
the critical component of Kant’s philosophy (whether it be concerned with theoretical 
knowledge or practical activity), may be tempted to construct the edifice of a system 
around them and to treat the rest of his works as less than relevant: under this attitude, if 
someone is somehow able to work through the Critique of Pure Reason and put it down, 
 
7 This second aspect of Kant’s political philosophy of religion is treated in chapters five and six below. 
 
8 This should remind the reader of Kant’s talk of the “age of critique” at the beginning of the Critique of 
Pure Reason.  Even religion is to be subjected to this critique, writes Kant long before the publication of 
the Religion.  The extent to which the critique (and reinterpretation) of religion is a matter of political 
philosophy, one might conclude that to this extent all of Kant’s philosophy is as well. 
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he certainly would not be tempted to trespass beyond the Critique of Practical Reason 
and the Critique of the Power of Judgment.  Such an attitude is dispelled if one notes the 
subtitle of the Religion in light of Kant’s distinction between critique and doctrine.  In the 
third critique Kant makes clear that his project is far from complete, for whereas the 
“entire critical enterprise” is completed, the “doctrinal” enterprise has not yet been begun.  
Following his division of philosophy into its theoretical and practical components, this 
second enterprise will “consist of” a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of ethics.  
The work of critique is to “investigate whether and how our powers allow us… to 
produce a doctrine”. 9  A comparison of the first and second critiques with what seem to 
be their primary doctrinal counterparts, the Metaphysical Starting-Grounds of Natural 
Science and the Metaphysics of Ethics, is illustrative of the difference.10   
The overall purpose in bringing up this rather pedantic series of points is to 
indicate the importance of the doctrine of religion as it stands with the more often touted 
first (and second, and third) critique.  Kant’s philosophy begins with critique but ends in 
doctrine,11 and so the doctrine of religion may well be not only the conclusion but the 
 
9 KU 5.170, 176 (Pluhar trans.).  Cf. KrV A11/B25-A12/B26. 
 
10 A difficulty for us emerges from this distinction, for with the existence of a work titled Metaphysics of 
Ethics comes the possibility that it, not the Religion, supplies the needed doctrinal effort pertaining to 
practical philosophy.  The latter would seem to be a practical doctrinal work but subordinate to the former, 
whose concluding section has the following title: “Doctrine of Religion as the Doctrine of Duties to God 
Lies beyond the Boundaries of Pure Moral Philosophy” (6.486).  Leaving aside the question of primacy, 
one can see the relative importance of the Religion to Kant’s enterprise in light of its doctrinal content. 
 
11 This characterization of the book as doctrinal is not wholly satisfactory, however, for the Religion 
contains a great deal of what must be called critique, both explicit and implicit.  Can the book still be called 
doctrinal and not critical?  If it is doctrinal, the work of criticism has already been done, and so to call 
Kant’s effort in the Religion at all critical is to miss his intention.  The answer to this hesitation is to 
observe that whatever criticism of religion is present in the Religion, it is not critique in the strict technical 
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intention of Kant’s project.12  Certainly God, theology, and religion are still pressing 
concerns for Kant in the writing of his very late works, such as the Opus Postumum. 
Another objection to our initial suggestions is the suspicion that a book about 
religion should not be taken to be the presentation of political philosophy.  After all, if we 
consider the subject matter, the Religion would seem to be a theological (or, if we look a 
little more closely, an ethical13) rather than a political book, even more so if we keep in 
mind the full title.  Another quick look, this one in the direction of other books written in 
the two generations prior to Kant, offer a clear answer: books such as Hobbes’ Leviathan, 
Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise, Locke Treatise on Civil Government, several of 
Hume’s works, and Rousseau’s Emile and On the Social Contract – not to mention 
Machiavelli’s works in general – are works of political philosophy that take up religion as 
a central theme, or the central theme, so much so that early modern political philosophy 
has been described as anti-theological as much as anti-Aristotelian.14  A full half of 
Leviathan treats of Christianity as it is rightly and then wrongly employed in relation to 
political life, and its largest chapter by far is devoted to the theme of “Ecclesiastical 
Power.”  The “chief thing” Spinoza sets out to “demonstrate” in his Treatise is that “not 
 
sense just cited in the third critique.  Rather, in the course of a doctrinal exposition, both already-existing 
critique and the presently-adumbrated doctrine are combined as a means of criticism. 
 
12 That the problem of religion is a lifelong concern of Kant’s is evident from his 1774 letter to Johann 
Caspar Lavatar, written quite some time prior to the conception of the Religion (10.175-80).  The focus of 
this letter is purely moral and not at all political. 
 
13 This, of course, is another objection, and a stronger one, the response to which may be found in chapters 
three and four below. 
 
14 See, for example, Strauss, “What is Political Philosophy?”, esp. p. 44, and Manent, An Intellectual 
History of Liberalism, ch. 1. 
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only can this freedom [to judge and to worship] be granted in keeping with piety and the 
peace of the Republic, but moreover it cannot be removed unless along with that same 
Peace of the Republic and piety”.15  The first half of Locke’s Treatise is an interpretation 
of the Bible with an eye toward the explication of political power in the second half, and 
to this could be added several other works of Locke, such as the “Letter on Toleration” 
and The Reasonableness of Christianity.  All three of these treatments are attempts to 
reinterpret biblical revelation with an eye toward a more liberal political life.  Rousseau 
brings with him, most easily seen in On the Social Contract, an endorsement of the 
attempts of his predecessors but also a concern about the full effects of their success.  In 
short, many of the early modern political philosophers viewed religion as the key to 
political and philosophical liberalization precisely because it was also the obstacle to 
these things and for that matter the very reason for them.  That Kant takes up religion and 
considers it in light of political life, and does so in a book that seems a hybrid of political 
philosophy and philosophy of religion, is not a surprising continuation of a consistent 
pattern in early modern philosophy. 
 For that reason the reader finds in the Religion an abundance of considerations of 
religious wars, the relationship of churches to civil laws and government rule, and the 
civic bonds that are formed or at least reinforced – or threatened – by religion.  While all 
the considerations are not explicitly political, their subject matter cannot be considered 
long in abstraction from political life.  Furthermore, and more importantly, the reader 
 
15 Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, trans. Yaffe, preface. 
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finds in the Religion the most provocative and troubling account of human nature in all of 
Kant’s writings, and this depiction of the problems caused by, as well as the solution to, 
this nature are of obvious importance to political life.16  In addition, the author offers the 
book as a solution to a theologico-political problem and, as a result, makes himself 
exactly this kind of problem in offending the religio-political authorities and bringing 
upon himself condemnation and censorship. 
 With the observation that Kant is continuing a tradition of philosophical concern 
with religion comes the question as to why he feels the need to do so.  The theologico-
political problem seems to have been solved by Machiavelli and his successors, and only 
time is necessary in the practical completion of what had been begun.  Kant’s task with 
regard to religion would then not seem the same as that of his modern forerunners, but he 
faced theoretical and practical problems that remained after the early modern success.  
The theoretical problem is that the absence of the religious element of human existence 
seems to leave out part of the account, as one can see even in the reforms proposed by 
Locke and Rousseau in particular; there is the possibility that the early modern view of 
man is too reductive and thus eliminates, or at least denigrates too severely, some 
 
16 Kant’s connection of politics and religion is clear not only from the Religion but also from the later 
Metaphysics of Ethics.  The doctrine of right, Kant’s most explicitly and extensively political work in a 
manner differing from that of the Religion, deals more than once with the role of religious bodies in 
political life and with the regulation of religion by the government.  The doctrine of virtue, in turn, 
concludes with a précis of the Religion.  (See particularly 6.324-28, 367-69, and 486-91.)  Several of 
Kant’s essays, including “Toward Eternal Peace” and “The End of All Things”, the latter of which is 
discussed at length in chapter six below, reveal this connection as well. 
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constitutive element of human nature without attempting to rehabilitate or moderate it.17  
The practical problem is that Europe, despite some possible moderation due to the 
Enlightenment as well as the Reformation, was still Christian and thus still vulnerable to 
theologico-political strife.   
 This fact permeates the Religion.  The reader is reminded of “the so-called 
religious struggles, which have so often shaken the world and sprayed it with blood” 
(6.114); told that, without “true enlightenment”, churches will continue to operate on the 
basis of a “degrading means of compulsion” instead of a “free faith” (6.123n); shown that 
the history of Christianity, “so far as the beneficial effect which we rightly expect from a 
moral religion is concerned, has nothing in any way to recommend it” (6.130); informed 
that only “political interest” has suppressed further continued “violent outbreaks” and 
“scenes” of “bloodthirsty hatred” between Christian sects (6.131); and told that wherever 
“popery” is the rule of a church, “the church finally lords over the state, not indeed 
through force, but through influence over minds” and “through pretense” which gains for 
the subjects “the habit of hypocrisy” which “undermines, unnoticed, the integrity and 
loyalty of the subjects” (6.180).  It turns out, as we shall see in detail below, that the very 
problems of human nature that religion is meant to resolve are exacerbated by the church-
faiths that are meant to convey but instead obscure that religion. 
Whether a solution may be expected at all, even if almost infinitely in the future, 
is not clear.  Part of the difficulty in working for a solution to the problems caused by 
 
17 Furthermore, though less to the point here, in the light of his own moral-philosophical enterprise, as an 
examination of the preface to the first edition of the Religion will show, the human moral picture is not 
complete without what the Religion provides. 
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churches and the faiths they proclaim is that wars of religion may well serve to prevent 
even more disastrous circumstances.  Yet, at least in the Religion, Kant does appear as a 
thelogical chiliast, although he recognizes the apparent ridiculousness of this position as 
well as its strictly political counterpart: he proposes that a “world ruler” who will 
eventually “bind all together” (6.122).  Because of the danger in initiating this condition 
without the proper moral and social cultivation, however, Kant warns against an 
immediate and violent revolution and instead provides the basis for a gradual reform 
(6.121).18 
This introduction to our study of Kant’s book on religion has noted its connection 
to early modern political philosophy in its stance toward religion but has not commented 
on its concurrent radicality or its own novelty in comparison to more traditional (and 
more speculatively theological) treatments of religion.  For this reason, even granting the 
philosophico-political core of the Religion, one fruitfully compares it to some of its more 
strictly theological predecessors.  A comparison of Kant’s definition of religion with that 
of Thomas Aquinas, for example, results in a blend of similarity and departure.  Kant’s 
definition is as follows: religion is “the cognition of all our duties as divine commands” 
 
18 This would seem to match the expectation, or lack thereof, expressed a few years later in “Toward 
Eternal Peace.”  In this work, Kant asks how nature promotes the human purpose of eternal peace, and how 
this is accomplished according to the three aspects of public right, the third of which is “international 
right”: “… the desire of every nation (or its ruler) is to establish an enduring peace, hoping, if possible, to 
dominate the entire world.  But nature wills otherwise.  She uses two means to prevent people from 
intermingling and to separate them, differences in language and religion, which do indeed dispose men to 
mutual hatred and to pretexts for war.  But the growth of culture and men’s gradual progress toward 
greater agreement regarding their principles lead to mutual understanding and peace.  Unlike that peace 
that despotism (in the graveyard of freedom) brings about by vitiating all powers, this one is produced and 
secured by an equilibrium of the liveliest competing powers” (8.367, Humphrey translation, my emphasis).  
The doctrine of religion very likely sets the stage for that growth and gradual progress.  Such a 
development makes unnecessary a united world government or even a single world church.  Cf. 6.34n. 
  11  
(6.153-4).  The advantage of this definition, as Kant explains in a long footnote, is that, 
with it, “some erroneous interpretations of the concept of religion in general are 
obviated” (6.153n).  The obviation of errors is helpful for two reasons.  First, the 
definition puts forth a concept of religion which has no need of theoretical statements 
about God (for instance, regarding the knowledge of His existence), since, as the critique 
of pure reason (and thus of theology) shows, man is limited by a “lack of insight into 
supersensible objects.”  The definition of religion is thus the fruit of the critique of 
speculative theology given in the critique of pure reason.  Second, with this new 
definition, religion will no longer suffer the “erroneous representation” consisting in 
“particular duties” to God which appear to be “works of courtly service,” rather than in 
the properly religious “ethico-civil duties of humanity” (6.154n).  Rather than toward 
cultus, that is, religion should direct men purely toward ethics.  These two stated 
advantages to Kant’s redefinition of religion provide the core of his doctrine’s limitations 
on the claims of religious observation and practice.  They also presuppose a critique of 
theology. 
It is perhaps surprising to us that Aquinas treats the phenomenon of religion as a 
virtue rather than a system of beliefs, and, furthermore, that his consideration of religion 
is found under the explication of the cardinal virtue of justice rather than under the 
theological virtue of faith.  Midway through his analysis, we find the following passage, 
which can be used as a challenge to Kant’s restriction of the meaning and purpose of 
religion: 
  12  
                                                
Religion is neither a theological nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue, since it is a 
part of justice, and observes a mean, not in the passions, but in actions directed to 
God, by establishing a kind of equality in them.  And when I say “equality,” I do 
not mean absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay God as much as we 
owe Him, but equality in consideration of man’s ability and God’s acceptance.19 
 
Rather than an attempt to sway God’s favor, religion (and particularly its element of 
worship) is thus the means by which man admits his utter inability to give to God His 
due.  Rather than an attempt to seize supernatural power by a perversion of natural 
means, acting in accord with the virtue of religion is a man’s expression of impotence in 
the face of the Divine.   
 The Thomistic analysis of religion is introduced by a consideration of the 
meaning of the word.20  Against claims that the virtue of religion directs man to neighbor 
as well as to God, Aquinas invokes Cicero’s statement that “religion consists in offering 
service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature than men call divine”.21  This statement 
stands in clear opposition to Kant’s own clarification of the (subjective) meaning of 
“religion” in that it leaves obscure the character of the service offered but unmistakeably 
through the mention of “ceremonial rites” admits the centrality of the cultus.  For 
Aquinas, or at least for Cicero, religion is at least as cultic as it is moral.  Further, in 
clarifying the etymology of the word (i.e. whether it comes from the notion of rereading, 
 
19 Summa Theologiae, II-II.81.5.  Cf. Josef Pieper, “The Limits of Justice”, in The Four Cardinal Virtues, 
pp. 104-13.  For a recent Thomist presentation of moral theology, see Servais Pinckaers, The Sources of 
Christian Ethics, especially part three, “Freedom and Natural Law.”  Because of its lengthy discussion of 
human freedom, a comparison between this book and Kant’s moral thought would be very useful. 
 
20 Summa Theologiae, II-II.81.1 
 
21 Aquinas is quoting Cicero’s (probably spurious) Rhetorica ad Herennium, II.53. 
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of choosing over again, or of retying a bond), Aquinas pushes further from Kant in 
stating that religion “denotes properly a relation to God.”22  If there is a God, he is to be 
worshiped, and worship may be understood as a kind of cultivation, and so cultus is 
justified.23  These differences between Kant and Aquinas – they even disagree when it 
comes to the importance of the internal over external acts of religion24 – point out the 
necessity of continuing to examine the question of the existence and character of an 
“essence above” man.  There is no other way of judging between the two positions 
without continuing to search for the answer to this question. 
 We see that Aquinas argues for the human necessity of religion, that it opens up 
man to God all the more and keeps him aware of his limitations and his indebtedness as a 
created being.  A human need is also met in Kant’s doctrine of religion, but in his 
presentation of the idea of the highest good, he merely provides support for man’s choice 
to live a moral life; it has nothing to do with assisting man in the grasping of a mysterious 
cosmos.  Let us remember that the dogmas of church-faiths are expected to be replaced 
with or redirected toward summonses to moral action.  What then takes the place of those 
 
22 Nevertheless, a few sentences later, he grants that religion “is referred to those things one exhibits to 
one’s human kindred, if we take the term religion in a broad sense…”  Further, “Every deed, in so far as it 
is done in God’s honor, belongs to religion” (S.T. II-II.81.4 ad 2), and so acts of religion clearly go beyond 
the merely ceremonial acts – which, in light of what they indicate to God and even more to us, Aquinas 
does not wish to consider as less important. 
 
23 S.T. II-II.81.1 ad 2-4. 
 
24 S.T. II-II.81.7: “in the Divine Worship it is necessary to make use of corporeal things, that man’s mind 
may be aroused thereby, as by signs, to the spiritual acts by means of which he is united to God.  Therefore 
the internal acts of religion take precedence of the others and belong to religion essentially, while its 
external acts are secondary, and subordinate to the internal acts.”  Kant would interpret John 4:24 much 
differently. 
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dogmas?   Does religion, as Kant defines it, fully satisfy the human need to grasp his 
relationship to the rest of the world and to act upon this relationship? 
A possible answer lies in Kant’s discussion of the sublime, which is the failure of 
the imagination to comprehend the “absolutely great,” such as the concept of infinity in 
mathematics or the vision of the starry heavens.  Another possibility is the mysteries of 
reason, or other such matter discussed in the second and third parerga of the Religion.  
For that matter we could also look to his praise of sincerity toward the end of the Religion 
(6.190), or of the moral law itself near the end of the Critique of Practical Reason,25 as 
possibities.  Such concepts, Kant writes, are both revolting and enticing because they 
frustrate any attempt at comprehension.  Even though they might be suitable 
replacements for more traditional and more defined conceptualizations of the divine, their 
very lack of definition or concreteness may prohibit many human beings from reaching 
for them as replacements.  The human propensity to anthropomorphize and to personalize 
a concept of the divine might well reveal in man a need that is not, and cannot be met in 
any substitute.  Kant does not seem willing to deny this recognition of and adherence to 
mystery, but he cannot countenance doing so with any claim of holding those to be true – 
which seems precisely the human need.  
This comparison with Aquinas serves, in addition to the historical observation of 
Kant’s intention to overturn the theological tradition in the cause of human freedom and 
morality, to force us to wonder at the cost of Kant’s success.  As the present study 
unfolds, and as the Religion itself unfolds, the reader – and not just the traditionally 
 
25 5.162-3. 
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religious reader but the reader interested in the human character and its possibly natural 
disposition to religious faith – should keep in mind the question of whether something 
crucial is lost in Kant’s moral reorientation of religion.  Is the “moral law within”, and the 
hope that Kantian religion provides in its support, a sufficient place in which human 
longing for divinity may rest, or is the post Kantian religious man left in a state of 
conscious or unconscious dissatisfaction?  Do the reorientation of the so-called 
sacraments, the demystification of the scriptures, and the demonization of the priest and 
the reformation of the churchman provide enough?26  Kant would probably respond to 
these questions by observing that he who asks them is too stubborn to see the 
persuasiveness of his critical enterprise or too morally weak to make of it what an honest 
man can.  Thus the reluctant critic of Kant’s doctrine of religion is forced to confront not 
merely it but rather Kant’s entire critique of reason, obviously something that cannot be 
taken up here.   
 The examination here proposed by Kant’s Religion requires the combination of 
two fields of inquiry, political thought and the doctrine of religion, which are often 
treated separately.  A selective account of the secondary literature on both Kant’s 
political philosophy in general and then the doctrine of religion in particular (though not 
necessary as political) will be useful in framing the present attempt to give an account of 
 
26 Obviously these are not directly political reservations regarding Kant’s doctrine of religion, they do call 
into question the overall truth of his account. 
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both.27  We shall begin by looking at some key discussions of Kant’s political 
philosophy, and shall then consider a sample of scholarship on the Religion. 
A. Interpretations of Kant’s Political Thought in Connection  
with His Doctrine of Religion. 
 
Scholarly treatment of Kant’s political philosophy faces the challenge offered by Hannah 
Arendt in her lectures on the subject, since he “never wrote a political philosophy.”  
Neither the later short writings on history (which Kant “himself did not take too 
seriously”) nor the Metaphysics of Ethics (which focuses too narrowly on philosophy of 
law) can be said to constitute the “Fourth Critique” that would provide the Kantian 
doctrine of politics.28  Arendt’s solution is to attempt, by uncovering the full implications 
of the account of reflection, to show that the Critique of Judgment “actually should have 
become the book that otherwise is missing in Kant’s great work” (p. 9). 
An article by Pierre Hassner and Howard Williams’s book on Kant’s political 
philosophy, by contrast, both first explore in detail the relationship of morality and 
politics in Kant’s work and ultimately turns to the essay on eternal peace.  In so doing 
they emphasize the importance of the Religion on that work, published three years later.29  
 
27 The account that follows is meant to be a representative sketch of various major interpretations without 
serving at the same time as a response to them.  
 
28 Arendt, pp. 7-8.  There is, further, the possibility (rejected by Arendt) that these works insofar as they 
“date from Kant’s last years” reflect “the decrease of his mental faculties, which finally led into senile 
imbecility” and so ought not be taken seriously for this reason, either  (p. 9).  
 
29 “The aim of perpetual peace cannot be achieved by political and legal means alone, so the success of 
Kant’s plan for perpetual peace depends on the moral progress of man.  Political and moral progress 
converge therefore on the same goal, a goal which Kant outlines most fully in his essay on Religion within 
the Limits of Reason Alone” (Williams 261).  Williams also helpfully, though he does not follow it up 
sufficiently, suggests that the Religion is “perhaps the most committed” of Kant’s works.  The character of 
that commitment will interest us in chapter five. 
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Williams attends chiefly to the Religion’s bringing together of morality and politics in 
terms of the movement toward international peace, and, especially in the discussion of 
ethical as opposed to juridical commonwealth, shows that the Religion makes explicit the 
political implications of chiefly moral works such as the Groundlaying and the Critique 
of Practical Reason.  Although both Hassner and Williams identify the Religion as 
informative regarding Kant’s political thought, the work still receives only a modicum of 
attention.  The suggestion is that the Religion would thus be as supplementary or 
secondary in political philosophy as it is in ethics.  Certainly Hassner in particular deals 
at length with the aspect of right in Kant’s political philosophy, and thus its connection to 
the political teachings of earlier moderns such as Locke and especially Rousseau, 
whereas the Religion itself dwells neither on right nor on rights very much.  It would 
seem, though, that a political teaching would naturally take up the matters addressed in 
the first half of the Metaphysics of Ethics, and so it seems problematic to cast the 
Religion as a work of Kant’s political philosophy: there is no “political teaching” in it if 
by this phrase we mean instruction on matters such as justice and right.  What both 
Hassner and Williams indicate, however briefly, in their studies, however, is that 
differences of religion (as well as of language) are “to some extent desirable and 
permanent even though they entail hatred and war” – and so are an unavoidable obstacle 
in the effort for peace.  For this reason, then, a religion within the boundaries of mere 
reason must, as “the gradually emerging, pacifying product” of enlightenment, 
“supervene” over all the different religious expressions of the world.30  Even if Hassner is 
 
30 Hassner, p. 611. 
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right  in locating the focal point of Kant’s political philosophy in the doctrine of right in 
the Metaphysics of Ethics and in “Toward Eternal Peace”, the Religion provides the basis 
of the international problem and its possible solution, and furthermore instructs on the 
role of religion in intranational, social, politics as well. 
 Before going any further, therefore, it is necessary to determine at least generally 
what is meant by “political philosophy”.  A quick response to the question would most 
likely be to point to Plato’s Republic, Aristotle’s Politics, or Hobbes’s Leviathan and to 
state that political philosophy is the attempt to address questions of justice and the best 
regime and the practicability of possible answers to those questions.  While this quick 
response is not wrong, one might supplement and deepen it by appealing to an essay on 
the question by Leo Strauss: 
In the expression “political philosophy,” “philosophy” indicates the manner of 
treatment: a treatment which both goes to the roots of and is comprehensive; 
“political” indicates both the subject matter and the function: political philosophy 
deals with political matters in a manner that is meant to be relevant for political 
life; therefore its subject must be identical with the goal, the ultimate goal of 
political action.  The theme of political philosophy is mankind’s great objectives, 
freedom and government or empire – objectives which are capable of lifting all 
men beyond their poor selves.31 
 
At the heart of this passage is a claim that becomes explicit in a different essay: 
The philosophers, as well as other men who have become aware of the possibility 
of philosophy, are sooner or later driven to wonder “Why philosophy?”  Why 
does human life need philosophy, why is it good, why is it right, that opinions 
about the nature of the whole should be replaced by genuine knowledge of the 
nature of the whole?  Since human life is living together or, more exactly, is 
political life, the question “Why philosophy?” means “Why does political life 
 
31 Strauss, “What is Political Philosophy?” , p. 10. 
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need philosophy?”  This question calls philosophy before the tribunal of the 
political community: it makes philosophy politically responsible.32 
 
From this point of view Strauss is led to suggest that the “deeper meaning” of the phrase 
is “the political, or proper, treatment of philosophy, or the political introduction to 
philosophy – the attempt to lead the qualified citizens, or rather their qualified sons, from 
the political life to the philosophic life.”33  Whether this meaning of political philosophy, 
the second sense of political philosophy as I have called it above, is present in Kant 
remains to be seen.34  Joseph Knippenberg, who also identifies “two aspects” of political 
philosophy – the “normative” aspect and the aspect which considers the relationship of 
philosophy to political life – begins his consideration of the political nature of Kant’s 
philosophy by noting that it is primarily the classical political philosophers and not 
moderns who observe that second aspect as such.35  We shall have to face this question in 
 
32 Strauss, “On Classical Political Philosophy”, pp. 92-93. 
 
33 Strauss, “On Classical Political Philosophy”, pp. 93-94. 
 
34 It should be noted that Strauss offers a distinction between political and social philosophy that, if one is 
to accept it, leads to the denial that Kant is a political philosopher, at least in the first sense.  Social 
philosophy “has the same subject matter of political philosophy, but it regards it from a different point of 
view.  Political philosophy rests on the premise that the political association – one’s country or one’s nation 
– is the most comprehensive or the most authoritative association, whereas social philosophy conceives of 
the political association as a part of a larger whole which it designates by the term ‘society’” (“What is 
Political Philosophy?”,, p. 13).  One might therefore justly claim that the Metaphysics of Ethics, if 
anything, contains Kant’s political philosophy and the Religion contains, at best, Kant’s social philosophy.  
For this possibility, see for instance the contrast Kant offers between a political state and an ethical 
community at 6.94-6. 
 
35 Meditations on the two aspects “are written by classical philosophers and are inspired by the life and 
death of Socrates.  Modern treatments of this theme are, needless to say, much less particular and personal 
appearing generally under the rubric of ‘theory and practice’” (Knippenberg, p. 155).  This difference 
between ancients and moderns is suggested as well by Strauss, whose comments on the “deeper meaning” 
of political philosophy appear in an essay devoted to classical political philosophy: “No difference between 
classical political philosophy and modern political philosophy is more telling than this: the philosophic life, 
or the life of ‘the wise,’ which was the highest subject of classical political philosophy, has in modern times 
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the course of our examination, but even if we cannot add to our notion of political 
philosophy the Socratic concern, even focusing on the question of theory and practice as 
one of the aspects of modern political philosophy certainly opens up Kant’s writings to 
further investigation. 
Also worth noting, especially in light of the comments from Strauss, is that some 
interpreters of Kant have gone beyond claiming a political teaching of Kant and focused 
instead on the political mode of his writing  -- although “political mode” for them does 
not always fit exactly with the object of Strauss’ focus.  Strikingly, a group of these 
scholarly works begin not by focusing on the Metaphysics of Ethics or “Toward Eternal 
Peace” or even The Conflict of the Faculties, but starting rather with the Critique of Pure 
Reason (and even earlier, with the so-called precritical writings).  These works, by 
bringing attention to the doctrine of method, have done the invaluable service of rescuing 
the Critique of Pure Reason from existence as a strictly “epistemological” work.  Hans 
Saner (whose book is praised by Arendt as “the only one worth studying”36), spends an 
entire volume of preparatory work on Kant’s political philosophy by concentrating on the 
political nature and tone of all of his thought.37  
 
almost completely ceased to be a subject of political philosophy” (Strauss, “On Classical Political 
Philosophy”, p. 91). 
 
36 Arendt, p. 7. 
 
37 Saner’s book, translated into English as Kant’s Political Thought: Its Origins and Development, is more 
accurately titled in English as Kant's Path from War to Peace, Volume One: Opposition and Unity: Paths 
to Kant’s Political Thought.  Saner focuses extensively on this path throughout Kant’s career, showing how 
the themes of war and peace are woven together by the time Kant writes the Anthropology.   
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It is even more strange, therefore, that these very scholarly treatments either treat 
the Religion very lightly (Saner)38 or not at all (Knippenberg and Clarke).39  This absence 
raises the question of whether the Religion is a necessary object of study at all, since we 
also have the Conflict, which does present the bulk of the argument of the Religion.  It 
differs from the earlier work both in having a more upfront and streamlined presentation 
of the doctrine and in giving the philosophy-theology dispute more centrality. 
Although not entirely attentive to the theology-philosophy question, the work of 
Sharon Anderson-Gold has advanced the thesis of Williams by delving further into the 
Religion and displaying the social element of radical evil, which is present from the very 
beginning of Kant’s account, and linking it to his overall teaching on history and 
culture.40  Anderson-Gold focuses her attention in particular on Kant’s discussion of the 
 
38 Saner does treat the Religion (pp. 269-80) – he makes the provocative comment that “Conflict thus 
maintains the possibility of freedom and a minimum, at least, of its reality – just enough to let a man 
remember to what end freedom is a principle, what the principle of morality is, what faith is based upon, 
and what upholds the church” (p. 279) – but attends chiefly to faith in reason and faith in facts, which “are 
mutually exclusive and cannot coexist except in conflict” (p. 271).  He treats the philosophy-theology 
relationship more explicitly in his discussion of The Conflict of the Faculties (pp. 96-103, 302) – but it is 
important in the Religion as well, perhaps all the more so by being more obscure.  Of course, Saner may 
have planned further treatment of the Religion in the second volume of his project.  We do have this 
intriguing comment, however: “this seemingly senseless battle of religious parties has an unintended 
beneficial effect: not unlike war in a politically decayed world, it preserves the freedom that it would not 
mind suppressing.  Its task in the history of faith is to keep freedom alive, though in limited measure, until a 
united faith can agree with freedom and enter into it.”  (pp. 272-3) 
 
39 Although Clarke states that “Kant’s concern for freedom in the public use of reason is evident in almost 
all his writing on politics from the publication of What is Enlightenment? and onwards” (p. 64), his 
examples do not include the Religion.  The second half of his essay is a good treatment of The Conflict of 
the Faculties, and does take up the matter of his thoughts on religion overall, but curiously does not touch 
on the Religion as a book itself.  Similarly, Knippenberg, while examining the Conflict and many other 
writings carefully, as well as the situation caused in no small part by the Religion (see esp. pp. 166-7), does 
not mention it, let alone analyze its content. 
 
40 The “concept of radical evil offers a systematic means for evaluating the sources of our historical failures 
to realize human freedom… If evil is rooted in the sociocultural aspects of the human condition, it goes 
deeper than external institutions.  External institutions are the result of sociocultural processes that must 
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tendency to humanity, since it both is most closely tied to the concept of evil and also 
“represents the social and cultural dimension of human nature, the dimension through 
which freedom will historically develop” – thus identifying a link between moral evil, 
social-cultural institutions, and the historical development of freedom.  As a result, her 
“interpretation of radical evil, unlike others such as Michaelson’s, makes a strong 
connection between evil and our social condition.”41  Individual moral struggle is always 
part of a “larger struggle” within a “social context.”  In emphasizing that “moral 
development” has a clear “social orientation,” Anderson-Gold clarifies the political 
dimension of Kant’s doctrine of religion and thereby transforms him into a critical social 
theorist.42  This is among the most helpful accounts of Kant’s doctrine of religion in 
relation to social, if not political, philosophy. 
B. Interpretations of Kant’s doctrine of religion with respect to political thought 
 
The efforts of Emil Fackenheim to understand certain puzzles in the doctrine of religion 
provide the fountainhead of much of the subsequent work in Kant literature.  Beginning 
with the observation that Kant’s contemporaries, those “moral and religious humanists” 
inspired by his ethical writings, were stunned by the “essay on radical evil [which] 
 
become the subject of moral improvement.  By reconceptualizing the overcoming of evil as a social 
process, it is possible to build a bridge between Kant’s ethics and his philosophy of history” (Anderson-
Gold, p. 26)  Anderson-Gold is particularly helpful because she brings to light certain “interpretative gaps” 
for those who wish to apply Kantian ethics to society (p. 31). 
 
41 Anderson-Gold, pp. 35, 36. 
 
42 Anderson-Gold, p. 50.  This transformation has been attempted before but without giving due attention to 
the doctrine of religion: “while many socially oriented commentators attempt to provide communitarian 
applications for a Kantian ethic, their commitment to a secular foundation and their dismissal of the 
conception of radical evil make it difficult to provide a universal social and historical scope for their 
projects.” (p. 52) 
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certainly represents a shift in doctrine.”43  Dismissing the interpretation of the Religion as 
a work of necessity occasioned by political realities,44 Fackenheim argues that Kant’s 
“philosophy of religion” and his presentation of radical evil are necessary explorations in 
his moral philosophy.  “Kant’s shift to radical evil is made for a strictly philosophical 
reason, and this reason is, strangely enough, the need to give a full and adequate 
justification of moral freedom… [H]e finds it necessary to introduce the doctrine of 
radical evil so as to make freedom… intelligible.”45  After introducing an “important 
ambiguity” in the doctrine of freedom, Fackenheim argues to the conclusion that, 
“whereas, according to Christian doctrine, only God can redeem fallen man, Kant asserts, 
and must assert, that man can redeem himself… How this conversion [to the new man] is 
possible is utterly unintelligible… This revolution, then, is a sort of creatio ex nihilo… It 
too is an ultimate act of decision for which there is no higher ground.”46   In rejecting a 
primarily political motivation in the publication of the doctrine of religion by focusing on 
its purely philosophical intention, Fackeheim opens up for the reader the latent but 
undeniable darkness present in Kant’s account. 
The result of Gordon Michaelson’s monograph, although itself challenging a part 
of Fackenheim’s interpretation, continues Fackenheim’s project of focusing on the 
ambiguities of Kant’s doctrine.  Toward the beginning of his account Michaelson offers a 
 
43 Fackenheim, p. 20. 
 
44 Fackenheim, pp. 20, 195.   
 
45 Fackenheim, p. 21.   
 
46 Fackenheim, pp. 32-33. 
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helpful general statement about the character of the Religion itself, a “distinctive feature” 
of which is “the way Kant interweaves closely-defined details of moral philosophy… 
with sweeping generalizations about human nature.  The first two books of the Religion, 
in particular, amount to a Kantian treatise on human nature.”47  This would make the 
approach toward political considerations all the more clear.  Although Michaelson for the 
most part steers clear of political considerations himself, his reflections on Kant’s treatise 
on human nature lead the reader to provocative conclusions that will eventually 
contribute to the political nature of the teaching.  For example, Michaelson suggests that 
Kant’s “position is a kind of polite preview of the Freudian project, in the sense that… a 
presumably rational being turns out to be subject to a vast and powerful array of dynamic, 
hidden, and natural forces, forces that bind even the most intelligent and insightful person 
to his or her true motivations in public life.”48 
 
47 Michaelson 2002, p. 37.  Michaelson also helpfully observes that, because of the “extremely complicated 
terminological scaffolding” erected for the discussion of radical evil, “a piecemeal approach to Kant’s 
language” is necessary (p. 32).  Michaelson’s apparent swerve from Fackenheim’s interpretation appears 
later when he again mentions the “terminological scaffolding” that “can create the impression that the 
theory of radical evil is a somewhat isolated and highly technical component within Kant’s total ethical 
theory, a component that Kant momentarily sets off for special attention to fill out a picture potentially left 
incomplete” by his earlier moral-ethical works.  “But the theory of radical evil is not a corrective to the 
earlier ethical writings, but a crucial part of Kant’s larger vision of the creation of a moral universe” (p. 52).  
If this is a difference, both authors share a real attention to the philosophical core of the doctrine of radical 
evil. 
 
48 Michaelson 2002, p. 44.  And further, in a later passage: “The Kant of the textbooks often seems to 
provide us with a mathematically precise universe, dependable transcendental footholds, a theory of moral 
obligation firmly grounded in the moral law, and an ambitious authorship designed to explain how these all 
fit together.  Yet, as the account of radical evil suggests, the free will that is at the heart of Kant’s theory of 
human nature has the look of something raw and arbitrary – the look, that is, of something surprisingly 
close to the world that Ivan [Karamazov] describes” (p. 68).  Although conclusions such as these and the 
arguments that lead to them are both provocative and compelling, I am not so certain that “[r]adical evil can 
thus be viewed as the final result of Kant’s latent resentment against the body” (p. 69) – but this is worth 
looking further into. 
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John Silber opens his essay with the following assertion: “That Kant was a 
religious man there can be little doubt.”49  Yet Silber quickly clarifies that Kant’s “is 
essentially a religion of ethics” – so much so “that Kant could scarcely have written a 
book on religion without simultaneously illuminating and expanding his ethical 
theory.”50  Above all, Silber views Kant’s writings on religion, but particularly the 
Religion, as a further working-out of his more explicitly ethical writings.  Per Silber, 
what Kantian ethics treats statically, Kantian philosophy of religion treats dynamically; 
this explains the change in Kant’s understanding of the will with regard to evil and 
transcendental freedom.  Without the Religion, then, Kantian ethics would have remaine
too abstract and inapplicable to the historical and human world.  “The capital import
of the Religion in Kant’s ethics consists in the fact that the Religion offers us his only 
sustained analysis of the human will…”51  Thus the book is not so important for any 
normative content about religion or even ethics but rather for technical cla
From a different point of view, Allen Wood argues that “a full understanding” of 
Kant’s doctrine of moral faith “is necessary for any genuine appreciation of the outlook 
of the critical philosophy as a whole.”52  The significance of religion for Kant, according 
to Wood, is that in the writings on religion “Kant exhibits the critical philosophy itself as 
a religious outlook, a profound conception of the human condition as a whole, and of 
 
49 Silber 1960, p. lxxix. 
 
50 Silber 1960, p. lxxx. 
 
51 Silber 1960, p. cxxvii. 
 
52 Wood 1970, p. vii. 
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man’s proper response to that condition.”53  Because the doctrine of moral faith has its 
“foundations in the critical philosophy” itself, the “moral arguments” underlying the 
doctrine “constitute an integral part of the critical philosophy”54 – and are not a simple 
appendage or even a last-minute clarification.  Furthermore, Wood makes clear that 
Kant’s writings on religion have more than a theoretical goal, for moral faith sees the 
need for a “moral community” in addition to a “political state.”  Religion 
is derived from the social character of man’s highest end… Kant’s ‘philosophy of 
religion,’ then, in the strictest sense, is part of his social philosophy, and it is in 
his philosophy of religion that Kant gives decisive expression to the role of 
human community in his ethics.55 
 
For reasons of space, however, and because this aspect of Kant’s doctrine of religion is 
not immediately pertinent to his study, Wood refrains from examining this notion.  His 
concern with Kant’s writings on religion is chiefly with the basis in the critical 
philosophy of moral faith, and thus he argues that the Religion is a sort of culmination of 
Kant’s philosophical enterprise.  Wood himself takes a new direction in a later work, in 
which he offers a more socially-oriented presentation of the doctrine of religion as part of 
larger analysis of ethical life.56  He notes that “the most powerful historical force for 
good is an enlightened religious community”57 – and thus begins to show the influenc
 
53 Wood 1970, p. 2. 
 
54 Wood 1970, p. 9. 
 
55 Wood 1970, p. 191. 
 
56 Wood 1999.  At the conclusion of this more recent discussion, Wood raises important questions about 
religion in our own time and Kant’s probable reaction to it.  I treat these in chapter 7 below. 
 
57 Wood 1999, p. 283. 
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Anderson-Gold’s work.  Wood now argues that the “doctrine of radical evil is 
anthropological, not theological, in both its ground and its content.  Its basis is not 
religious authority but naturalistic anthropology… It is based on a shrewd perception of 
how people have made themselves in society – especially in modern bourgeois 
society.”58  Religion itself is nevertheless crucial, for its institutions can cause men – or 
prevent them – “to relate to one another on terms of extraordinary intimacy, self-
revelation, mutual influence, and mutual trust.”59  These recent development in 
interpretations of the doctrine of religion as part of Kant’s social-ethical though
marked a real development of appreciation in its relevance beyond appending his m
t. 
Between the publication times of Wood’s two books there appeared another 
crucial interpretation of the doctrine of religion.  Michel Despland, in his analysis of 
Kant’s “philosophy of religion,” makes a beginning claim similar to Silber’s – “There is 
no reason to doubt, and there are many reasons to believe, that Kant was in his own
religious man.”  To this Despland offers the suggestion “that Kant’s philosophy of 
religion is an effort to understand his own religion, to clarify its meaning, and to come 
into a more mature possession of [its] basic insight…”60  In other words, Kant’s writ
on religion are not only matter for public consumption but a sort of working-out for 
himself of his personal understanding not only of what religion is but of what it mean
 
58 Wood 1999, p. 291. 
 
59 Wood 1999, p. 316. 
 
60 Despland 1973, pp. 103-4. 
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However, it is essential to point out that it is not my intention to suggest that Kant 
                                                
him.  Despland’s suggestion of Kant as a religious man makes clear Kant’s nuanced 
understanding of the word “religion”; nevertheless, Despland reads Kant as a se
religious man who “returned [religion] to something like the original Latin and 
Ciceronian meaning of religio”61 and who “can be said to have criticized the Christian 
tradition (and even to have objected to many of its doctrines) from the inside…”  For th
reason, Despland concludes, “Kant’s philosophy of religion… could be presented as a 
Christian philosophy…”62  Rather than working merely from his own ethical principles
therefore, Kant is said to have contributed to Christianity by returning it to its original 
basis and on its own terms.  Despland’s thesis is significant to the present study becau
it asserts not only that Kant’s doctrine of religion reflects his own beliefs (that is, not 
merely his view of religion, but rather his religious beliefs) bu
s attempt to return Christianity to honest religiosity.63 
Elizabeth Galbraith makes a shift in approach with her suggestion that in the 
Religion K
.   
He seeks to raise both morality and theology to a higher level of significance in 
the progression towards religion, a fact which has been neglected in a great de
of Kant scholarship.  Therefore the Religion is not as independent an investigation 
of religion from a philosophical standpoint, as its title leads one to believe… 
 
61 Despland 1973, pp. 108-9. 
 
62 Despland 1973, p. 252. 
 
63 At play throughout Despland, and the other studies including the present one, is the problematic meaning 
of “religion.”  By the end of Despland’s study what we mean by religion and what Kant means by religion 
have been conflated intentionally. 
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sopher.  It is for this reason that I have chosen to call 
him a ‘closet’ theologian.64 
It would seem that Galbraith is suggesting Kant to be engaging in esoteric writing, a 
possibility to be examined below in chapter five.  Kant’s intention, contrary to the claim 
of Fackenheim, is thus “to defend the rational interpretation of religion, as a study 
belonging to the philosophy faculty, against authoritarian claims of priority of 
interpretation coming from biblical theologians in the theology faculty.”  Therefore, it is 
only to protect his philosophizing from censorship that Kant “defined it as a 
philosophical exercise.”65  There is something to Galbraith’s overall claim, but there 
remains an unclarity about what Kant is really up to, for she seems to argue that as a 
prudent philosopher he had to act like a theologian who was acting like a philosopher.  
Regardless, it is worth noting that Galbraith’s reading of Kant does emphasize this 
political aspect of Kant’s doctrine that studies explicitly concerned with politics do not.   
Onora O’Neill, echoing Heinrich Heine’s humorous claim, argues that Kant 
dispatched religion from his critical philosophy and then revived it – in order to placate 
the fears of his valet.  Behind this claim is the notion that Kant viewed religion as “the 
bridge across the great gulf” between the natural world and human freedom, a gulf 
created in part by the critical philosophy itself.66  Beginning “from an anthropocentric 
                                                
thought of himself as a theologian.  Rather, Kant engaged in theology whilst 
acting under the title of philo
 
 
64 Galbraith 1999, pp. 62-63. 
 
65 Galbraith 1999, pp. 65-66. 
 
66 O’Neill 1997, p. 271. 
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rather than a theocentric starting point”67 Kant’s critical philosophy thus turns to religion 
in the form of a “reasoned answer” to the question of “What may I hope?”68  By 
“reasoned answer” O’Neill means to say that, rather than supporting irrationalism, “the 
grounds of faith lie within the limits of reason.  [Kant] is, it seems, neither deist nor 
fideist.”69  In short then, according to O’Neill, Kant’s doctrine of religion is not an 
expression of his personal religious views (Despland) or a final working-out of ethical 
ideas (Silber); it is somehow a capstone to the critical philosophy (Wood), but its 
intention seems less directly moral than cognitive, although of course it would support 
morality. 
For the most part, however, prolonged attention is not given to the explicitly 
political element of the doctrine of religion, especially as it appears in the Religion.  A 
notable exception is the effort of Mark Lilla, who reads Kant as the successor to the line 
of thinkers of modern political philosophy.  This orientation provides a key to 
understanding the purpose of the writing and content of Kant’s Religion: religion is the 
“original problematic” of modern political philosophy.70  Lilla reads Kant as “a child of 
Rousseau but not a disciple”71 whose “novel view is that religion as a psychological 
phenomenon arises ultimately out of the needs of practical reason, and that fear, 
 
67 O’Neill 1997, p. 278. 
 
68 O’Neill 1997, pp. 278-9. 
 
69 O’Neill 1997, p. 279. 
 
70 Lilla 1998, p. 397. 
 
71 Lilla 1998, p. 402. 
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ignorance, and even sentiment only respond to that need… Man is religious because he is 
genuinely needy…”72  Kant’s understanding of religion is thus not theological but rather 
as a view of man as homo religiosus.73  The role of religion, particularly of Christianity, 
in political life has been at different points to support and to undermine the crucial virtue 
of hope,74 and thus Kant sees Christianity as beneficial to public life if it can be 
“repristinized” and universalized.75  So, according to Lilla, Kant’s doctrine of religion is 
first a reading of modern society’s ills through the lens of Christianity and second a 
proposed cure. 
From a cursory study of some of the secondary literature, the necessity of 
understanding Kant’s teaching on either politics or religion depends on the understanding 
of his teaching on the other.  There still remains much work to be done on Kant’s politics 
and doctrine of religion.  Even where scholars have succeeded in locating for Kant a 
convincing place in the history of political philosophy, further determination is possible.  
Most pressing is the need to address the remaining relative silence in the literature on the 
relation of Kant to political philosophy in the second sense mentioned above; Lilla’s 
discussion is suggestive but not exhaustive.  The present study intends to further these 
determinations by attending to the Religion in light of its character as a book – as itself a 
philosophical political act whose character and even existence are not accidental but 
 
72 Lilla 1998, pp. 409-10. 
 
73 Lilla 1998, p. 421. 
 
74 Lilla 1998, p. 419. 
 
75 Lilla 1998, p. 423. 
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themselves have something to teach about politics, philosophy, religion, authorship, and 
readership. 
C.  The Arrangement and Central Themes of the Religion 
The best way to begin to demonstrate the intention of Kant’s doctrine of religion is to 
examine the stated theme of the book on religion.  There are at least four ways in which 
Kant labels the purpose of the book: 
1. It is a “philosophical doctrine of religion” (6.10, 16) 
2. It is a “treatise dedicated to the definition of the concept of religion” (6.8) 
3. It is “to make apparent the relation of religion to a human nature…” (6.11) 
4. It is “the unification, or the attempt at it,” of reason and scripture (6.13) 
 
These are not necessarily identical.  A “doctrine of religion,” if we follow the distinction 
between doctrine and critique, would be the positive teaching that follows a critique.  The 
“concept of religion” and its definition might seem more clearly theoretical matters, 
while to investigate how religion is related to human nature would seem to be an 
anthropological effort.  Lastly, to attempt the unity of reason and revelation would seem 
to be a task of theology.  Despite the ostensible differences in these acts, the Religion is 
offered as all of them.  If so, a book of such a character would not allow one reading but 
several, inasmuch as several themes are being worked out simultaneously. 
 That this one book can have a fourfold argument is clear from another division 
that is suggested by the very arrangement of the book.  Owing to its publication history, 
and its prepublication history in that the first part originally appeared by itself, the 
Religion has four distinct starting points.  The oldest such starting point is the beginning 
of part one.  The first two editions of the Religion each carried its own preface, and the 
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preface to the first edition has a clear division within it in reflection of two sufficiently 
(or at least initially) unrelated topics of discussion.  As each of these four starting points 
offers its own distinct perspective to the book as a whole, the reader can pursue any one 
of them throughout, thus emphasizing some matters and ignoring or downplaying others.  
Only when the reader makes the effort first to see the various perspectives of the book 
and second to unite them into one does the full teaching of the Religion become manifest.   
 The second preface is a defense of the first edition of the book.  First, it claims to 
be a mere experiment in the relationship of rational religion to revealed religion, with the 
indication that believers should not take offense at what is a hypothetical enterprise.  
Then, Kant announces that one need not understand the critical philosophy in order to 
grasp the principles of his doctrine of religion, but rather that its conclusions are meant 
for everyone and should be incorporated into sermons.  We find here, then, a seeming 
contradiction between the claim that the doctrine of religion is a speculative experiment 
and the claim that its conclusions would be helpful for the common believer. 
 In the preface to the first edition, Kant first raises the question of how religion is 
related to morality.  Basically, religion follows inevitably from morality, though we 
might think otherwise.  The first half of the first preface thus offers the book on religion 
as an application of the critical philosophy to the concept of religion.  Most readers of the 
book on religion tend to focus on this theme alone.   
The second half of the first preface is less theoretical and more polemical or 
political.  It raises the question of the proper boundaries of operation for both the 
professor of philosophy and the professor of theology, and cautioning his readers about 
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the tendency of the latter spitefully to muscle his way into all branches of sciences so as 
to humble them.  Thus in the second part of the first preface Kant sets the groundwork for 
a dispute between the faculties of theology and philosophy, and also forces theology to 
admit that it thrives from conversation with philosophers.  Therefore, it is only fair that 
theologians give Kant a fair hearing, so much so that he argues that the book on religion – 
or one like it – ought to be used as the culmination of theological education.   
 Finally, in the introductory remarks to part one, Kant presents the question of 
whether the human race is headed toward or away from moral and physical corruption.  
Reading the doctrine of religion on this level, one focuses on human nature, evil, religion, 
and politics.  Part of the task is thus after explicating the various themes to determine 
how, or whether, they combine as parts of one doctrine: is there a principle theme among 
them under which the rest might be understood?   
Despite the varied themes of the Religion, in outline its main thread of 
presentation is not difficult to comprehend.  It has four major parts, each of which is 
divided at least once.76  The four parts themselves demonstrate the major thread of Kant’s 
argument in symbolic terms, taking on the theme expressed at the beginning of part one 
(i.e. the third beginning sketched above).  The following summary of these parts is an 
 
76 The first part is divided into four, with each leading to the next.  The other three parts, however, are 
divided into two, with the resulting components in opposition to each other.  For example, the first 
“section” of part two attends to the rightful claim of the good principle, while the second treats the rightful 
claim of the evil principle.  Part three has two “divisions,” the first of which is a philosophical presentation 
and the second of which is an historical presentation.  Finally, part four has two smaller “parts,” and 
discusses first the service of God and second the counterfeit service of God.  Parts two through four of the 
Religion are thus self-contained single reflections divided into two opposites so as to reveal more fully the 
consideration at hand.  This will prove a useful method. 
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attempt to characterize the main thread, but, in light of the nonlinear character of Kant’s 
writing in the Religion, the summary obscures many of the most intriguing elements of 
the work – but these are taken up at length later in the present study. 
Part one, titled “On the Indwelling of the Evil Principle against the Good; that is, 
on Radical Evil in Human Nature,” and originally published on its own as an article, is 
divided into four sections, along with a brief introduction and two separate remarks.  It 
begins with the troubling question of whether the human race is moving toward moral 
progress or decline but then shifts to asking whether man himself may be called good, 
evil, or neither.  The first step in answering this question, since it must be answered a 
priori, is to examine what happens in the adoption of maxims.  Having made the adoption 
of maxims central to his understanding of morality, Kant now attempts to give a more 
fundamental account insofar as he delves into what determines man to choose the 
maxims that he does.  Assuming that man is a free being, this determination cannot be 
traced to his natural inclinations but only to a mysterious and apparently unknowable 
“first ground.”   Thus ends the introduction to part one, but a remark precedes the main 
body of this part. 
In this remark, Kant makes several distinctions in order to clarify the rigoristic 
approach that part one will take, and in so doing introduces two notions that do not 
receive thematic treatment anywhere in the Religion but without which the book is not 
intelligible.  The first of these is “disposition” (Gesinnung), which is Kant’s attempt to 
identify and to characterize the “first ground” of taking up good or evil maxims.  The 
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second of these is “way of thinking” (Denkungsart) and would seem to mean something 
like attitude that springs from mental habit.   
Following this remark are the four divisions of part one.  The first of these takes 
up the “original tendencies” of animality, humanity, and personality, all of which are 
“elements of the determination of man” to good.  The second division, in contrast (but, as 
we shall see, not in real contrast), takes up the “propensity to evil in human nature” in the 
forms of frailty, impurity, and depravity – which corrupt both the disposition and the way 
of thinking and are thus compared implicitly to original sin of Christian theology.  Third, 
having set up a division each concerning the determination to the good and then to the 
evil in human nature, Kant surprises the reader (in light of his seeming alliance with 
philosophical pedagogues early in the introduction to part one) by following the latter 
position and heading the third division, “Man is by nature evil,” and using a morally 
ominous quote from Horace.  Here Kant introduces the notion of “radical innate evil in 
human nature” and dispenses with giving “formal proof” that it exists, instead giving 
many examples of it from human history.  He continues in the third division by turning 
from the “experiential” proof of evil and toward an a priori concept of it, and the point of 
examination is the incorporation of a moral and a sensuous incentive in maxims.  The 
subordination of the former to the latter results from a guilt that is on one hand always 
seemingly present and on the other surely originating from human freedom.  After this 
division’s elaboration on its predecessor, the reader might suspect that the fourth and last 
division will return to the first division in the form of a further consideration of good 
rather than evil, but instead Kant offers a further reflection on evil, this time on its origin.  
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By origin one can mean either according to reason or according to time, and while taking 
up the former as his focus Kant introduces a recurring meditation on the Bible, whose 
language reflects the difficulty of explaining the origin of evil. 
Part two, “On the Battle of the Good Principle against the Evil Principle for 
Lordship over Men,” is divided into a brief introduction, two sections (the first itself 
divided into three subsections), and a concluding remark.  The introduction recalls the 
claim in part one that evil is not the result of man’s sensuous nature and asserts that the 
chief error of the stoics resides in thinking otherwise.  Most immediately obvious about 
the treatment of the “battle” between the good and evil principles is that the two sections, 
one devoted to the good and the other to the evil, make use of legal terminology.  The 
first subsection in the discussion of the suit of the good principle recalls from the analysis 
of humanity from early in part one; reflection on humanity leads Kant to link the “ideal of 
moral perfection,” to which all men have a duty to aspire, with the (as-yet unnamed) 
Biblical Christ.  The second and third subsections raise questions about this 
personification of the ideal of moral perfection, the third being a lengthy investigation 
into the theological question of what is known by Christians as justification.   
Instead of providing a comparable abstract argument on behalf of the evil 
principle, section two offers a selective interpretation of salvation history.  The Christian 
Bible, including Genesis, offers a pictorial presentation of the historical evolution of a 
revolution in morality personified by (the still-unnamed) Christ.  Just before the 
conclusion of the body of part two, just as he did at the conclusion of part one but now 
even more strongly, Kant emphasizes the largely symbolic purpose of the revealed text 
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and claims that the stories are vehicles for the essential moral teaching at the heart of that 
text. 
Even though by the end of part two Kant has commented on the Bible and raised 
typical theological questions, the Religion has not yet discussed religion but instead 
seems to remain in the realm of morality.  Only with part three is Kant clearly talking 
about religion, and so one must ask how to understand the first two parts of the book, and 
especially the second.   
Part three, “On the Victory of the Good Principle over the Evil Principle and on 
the Foundation of a Kingdom of God on Earth,” provides the resolution of its predecessor 
by moving to the social or communal consideration of human evil and thus returning to 
the full implications of part one.  As soon as man is among his fellows he becomes 
further susceptible to radical evil, and so the ultimate solution to the problem of moral 
betterment is an ethical, as opposed to political, community.  The theme of part three – 
which has two divisions, first a philosophical presentation (split into seven subdivisions) 
and second a companion historical presentation – is the emergence and success of this 
community.  These are followed, as always, by a general remark.  The philosophical 
presentation relies on the language of Hobbes: just as there was a political state of nature, 
so is there an ethical state of nature from which man should exit in favor of an ethical 
community.  An ethical community differs from its political counterpart in having laws 
that dictate the morality rather than legality of actions and which deal with man’s inner 
character.  This necessitates the “concept of God as a moral ruler of the world” and thus 
means that the ethical community is primarily to be understood as a “people of God.”  
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Because human hands decrease in majesty all that they touch, the pure idea of an ethical 
community (as church invisible) is possible in the concrete only as a visible church, 
which, to the extent that it is true insofar as it reflects the invisible, has four marks by 
which it may be identified.  A further reflection of the weakness of human nature is that 
the visible church must originate from an historical revelation, best communicated by 
means of a scripture – but the presence and the limitations of this scripture lead to many 
difficulties of correct practice and belief.  The faith promoted by a church, i.e. “church 
faith,” has as its legitimate and necessary interpreter “the universal practical rules of a 
pure rational religion.”  All historical religions betray, in one way or another, at least 
grudging recognition of this ultimate criterion of scripture and thus doctrinal 
interpretation.  Finally, the goal of the visible church is the coming of the kingdom of 
God, that is, the eventual shedding of all historical and extramoral (“impure”) doctrinal 
considerations.  Even if this is at an “infinite remove” we can take heart if the kingdom of 
God is at least within us as individuals.  The historical presentation is a largely critical 
account of Christian history the main points of whose criticism are derived from the 
previous philosophical presentation.  The criticisms of Judaism in the historical account, 
it takes little effort to see, lead to the same criticisms of the Christianity of which it was 
the vehicle.  With this Kant brings us full circle to the present day and would seem to 
have ended the Religion, just as Hobbes might be expected to have concluded Leviathan 
with his presentation of the Christian commonwealth. 
Part four, “On Service and Anti-Service under the Lordship of the Good 
Principle, or on Religion and Popery,” reminds the reader of Hobbes’s presentation of the 
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“Kingdom of Darkness,” the most blistering attack on Christianity (or a certain kind of 
Christianity) in the book, even though it would seem unnecessary in light of the previous 
arguments in the book as a whole.  Like its predecessors, part four has a brief 
introduction and a general remark; it is divided into two parts, the first into two sections 
and the second into four.  The first half of part one takes up the service of God and the 
second takes up the anti-service of God.  Kant begins the first part by defining religion 
(using formulations tried out earlier in the book) by linking it to moral rather than cultic 
duty and then makes a distinction between natural and learned religion.  The two sections 
of the first part take up this distinction by studying Christianity according to each 
possibility.  It is not immediately clear why Kant writes this part, for much of it is present 
explicitly or implicitly in earlier parts of the book, although now Kant now writes about 
religion whereas before, in parts one and two, he was writing more abstractly, wherein 
neither man’s social existence nor religion a fully explicated have yet appeared in the 
book (except for the first parergon).  The second part of part four deepens the critique of 
impure church-faith and analyzes further the human nature which is prone to it.  The 
fourth of the four sections concludes (with the exception of the general remark) the 
Religion and is thus striking as it offers a discussion of conscience as a “guiding thread” 
in “matters of faith.” 
In addition to these four parts, each part has an appendix, called a parergon, that 
takes up material that cannot be properly treated in the context of the chapters 
themselves.  Examination of these remarks furthers the main discussion of each part, 
helps to clarify what Kant means by “within the boundaries of mere reason”, and also 
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contain some of his most suggestive thoughts about religion.  Finally, preceding the four 
parts and their appendices, two prefaces – one for each of the first two editions – begin 
the Religion.  As we have already noted, these two prefaces, which in a way are three due 
to the divisibility of the first, along with the opening of the first major part may be said 
each to constitute a different beginning into the argument of the many-layered Religion.  
This would suggest at least four layers to the Religion, or sufficient starting-points for 
four different readings of the Religion all of which must be bound up in one overall 
reading.  The method of the present dissertation is to take up each of these in turn and to 
follow it through to a preliminary conclusion and then to bind them up as suggested. 
D.  On the Procedure of the Present Study 
With these opening considerations in mind, the dissertation will take up, in chapters two 
through five below, four different strands in the argument of the doctrine of religion as it 
is found in the Religion book; these four chapters examine the teaching of Religion on 
theoretical reason, morality and moral theology, political life, and philosophy itself and 
how each of these relates to religion and to the Religion.  In laying out these four 
relationships I follow the lead of Kant himself as expressed in the various beginnings that 
introduce the book.  In each of these beginnings Kant means to isolate a particular theme 
for emphasis, but all of them must be read together if a coherent reading of the Religion is 
to emerge.  Chapters two and three are both provisional and necessary, provisional in the 
sense that they intend to bring out the major paths of argument in the Religion regarding 
reason and morality without pursuing every pertinent matter, and necessary insofar as 
these considerations are essential as the basis for the political teaching of the Religion, 
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the examination of which is the primary intention of the present study.  Chapter four, the 
first half of the heart of the dissertation, is an analysis, based in Kant’s thoughts on 
morality in the Religion but with a focus on his findings regarding human nature, of the 
relationship of religion and human nature insofar as the one manifests the other in 
political life.  Equally important is the content of chapter five, which examines the 
relationship of philosophers and theologians – a relationship that takes place in a political 
setting and which thus also is part of Kant’s political philosophy.  This twofold division, 
of chapters two and three on one hand and of three and four on the other, is thus a 
recognition both of Fackenheim’s assertion that the Religion is a philosophical rather than 
prudential work and of Cassirer’s opposite claim, for – as will be seen – the Religion is a 
working-out of the concept of radical evil as a solution to a lacuna in Kant’s critical 
philosophy as well as the basis of a previously-lacking analysis of political things, 
philosophy included.  Prior to chapter seven, which is a summary synthesis of these 
different themes and then the posing of critical questions to Kant’s doctrine of religion, 
chapter six provides an excursus in what might be considered the fifth part of the 
Religion, Kant’s short essay on “The End of All Things.”  In this essay will be found an 
elaboration of certain themes discussed in the previous chapters. 
 The reader might raise two general objections to the manner of investigation.  The 
first of these is the obvious, general, and deliberate isolation of the Religion from Kant’s 
other works; a fetishistic vacuum-packed interpretation of a book so obviously tied not 
only to other books but also to historical events is insufficient in bringing out the full 
meaning of the book.  One could surely profit from the context provided by a lengthier 
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display of how the books comes out of the critiques and of how it relates to the historical 
essays written so close in time to the Religion.  With such context comes the possibilty of 
seeing more clearly Kant’s overall intentions and the degree to which this book does or 
does not contribute to them.  This, however, is the task for another endeavor – and other 
writers have already made significant contributions to it – since the intention here is to 
read the Religion on its own terms and as a cosmos with its own separate effects on the 
reader.  Such an approach does not seem illicit in light of Kant’s own claims in the 
second preface about who can profit from reading it and in the first preface about its 
possible role even in seminaries. 
 The general procedure of the dissertation may also raise questions inasmuch as it 
breaks into separate parts an argument that Kant presents as a composite.  On occasion 
this procedure is clearly problematic, for it requires the suspension of consideration of 
passages in the Religion that are in sequential order.  For example, sections of part one of 
the Religion are discussed in chapter three of the dissertation, but other sections not until 
chapters four and five, and even more seriously, in some cases the same text is discussed 
in two different ways in different chapters.  This is not to suggest that Kant’s account is 
incoherent but rather to demonstrate that it is complex; the reasons for this complexity 
will become clear.  Although a unity of thought exists in the Religion, the presentation is 
not, or does not appear, so unified.  Considering passages slightly out of context (and yet 
always within the context of the book) helps the interpreter to avoid merely reiterating 
Kant’s explicit line of argument, while juxtaposing passages from different parts of the 
Religion that nevertheless have the same or similar theme helps to bring out more the 
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dialectical character of the work.  In order to avoid too much confusion, the previous 
section contained an overall sketch of the order of Kant’s arguments as they appear in the 
four parts of the Religion, and the conclusion will contain a synthesis of the invervening 
chapters that will, one hopes, tie everything back together again.  Ultimately there are 
very good reasons – philosophical, polemical, and pedagogical – for Kant’s seemingly 
muddled presentation, and if this dissertation is at all successful, it will assist the reader 
in returning to the Religion as it exists with a fuller understanding of the parts.  
 
 
  45  
rated 
                                                
2.  Sublated Knowledge: The Religion and Theoretical Reason 
 
The meaning of the title is the first question faced by the reader of the Religion.  
Answering this question entails revisiting that part of the Transcendental Dialectic 
pertinent to (as Kant’s criticism of) speculative theology, after which it would seem 
(especially when the reader keeps in mind Kant’s still earlier dismissals of what might be 
called mysticism and fideism) that no religion could withstand the critique: if there is no 
scientific knowledge about God, it seems unlikely that much meaningful practice could 
be devoted to Him.77  This chapter, therefore, without going into matters of religion 
itself, looks to Kant’s criticism of speculative theology in the first critique as reite
throughout the Religion in order to begin to see any remaining relationship between 
reason and religion.  As in the earlier work, Kant’s critical treatment of human 
knoweldge with respect to God leads first to the impairment of theology as a science and 
then to a practical use of reason that preserves the importance of God.78 
A likely first reaction to the word “reason” in the title may be concern that Kant 
embraces the very errors that were exposed by the first critique; a “religion within the 
boundaries of mere reason” might suggest a return to early modern natural theology, 
already demolished by David Hume as well as by Kant, or even to rational theology in 
the manner of St. Anselm, a modern version of which is taken apart in the Critique of 
 
77 One should not assume too quickly that Kant undertook the critique of speculative theology from a desire 
to destroy religion.  Bielfeldt (pp. 152-4) amplifies Kant’s claim that he is protecting faith from the 
skepticism and dogmatism that result from such theology, at the obvious cost of religion. 
 
78 For a detailed account of pertinent texts leading up to the Religion, see Lawrence, pp. 312-31. 
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Pure Reason.  Unless Kant is using these words with some nuance, he would seem to 
reverse the philosophical progress he and his predecessors had made.   
Kant uses the new preface as a clarification of the title,79 in response to the charge 
that “doubts also have been expressed in regard to the intention hidden beneath it” 
(6.12),80  but instead of giving word-by-word definitions of the title he offers a remark at 
some length about two “experiments”81 that he has conducted in the Religion and which 
underscore the importance of reason in his presentation of the doctrine of religion.  
Before turning to this preface for help, then, it is necessary to come to a basic notion of 
what the individual words of the title might mean. 
 Kant does not define “reason” in the Religion and seems to use the word with a 
variety of meanings or at least with varying degrees of determinacy,82 but the most 
 
79 Karl Barth writes that the “title does does not at all imply that religion exists solely within the limits of 
reason.  It does, however, state that religion at all events is to be contemplated also within the limits of 
reason alone, and secondly that within the limits of reason alone religion too is to be contemplated.  In this 
it must be borne in mind that ‘reason alone’ must in no circumstances be confused with ‘pure’ reason, the 
capacity for the knowledge of ideas, but stands in contrast to the reason illuminated by revelation, the 
reason which believes positively and concretely.” (Barth, p. 164) 
 
80 From the start, then, Kant introduces to the readers of the second edition that doubts or objections have 
been raised about his intentions.  That he chooses not to identify the nature of the problem could provoke 
the reader to attempt to find it himself and further does not guarantee that the subsequent explanatory 
remark will fully satisfy the scrupulous readers of the first edition.  Whether the suspicion is largely 
focused on the title (as the grammar of Kant’s sentence suggests) or on the work as a whole – and whether 
either is justified – remains to be seen. 
 
81 The word Versuch has several possible shades of meaning, more than one of which Kant seems to 
suggest at the same time.  A Versuch is an attempt, an experiment, or a trial.  The related noun, Versucher, 
“tempter,” does not appear in the Religion, but Versuchung, “temptation,” does (6.44). 
 
82 In its most basic meaning reason may be said to be an intellectual faculty which in its operation abstracts 
from all experience (6.12).  With it comes the ability to make comparisons (6.12).  It seems to be naturally 
prone to extending itself into “extravagant ideas” (6.52) and can be the disguise of an “invisible enemy” 
(6.57).  Reason has a tendency to make connections between things that may not be connected, in order to 
satisfy its need for unity (6.64-5n, 6.74n, 6.109, 6.176-7).  A man marked by his reason seems to have 
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important and the most common notion of reason operative in the Religion is that of 
practical reason – the will, that by which man has a free and moral existence.  This would 
seem to follow from the argument of the Critique of Pure Reason, which, although it 
made clear that rational theology as pursued was not tenable, put forth support in favor of 
a moral faith which takes its lead precisely from reason.83  Moral faith, and perhaps the 
religion by which it is held or through which it is expressed, is therefore not in direct 
opposition to reason.84 
 The programmatic statement in the first critique that Kant “had to sublate 
knowledge in order to make room for faith” indicates that the real opposition is between 
faith and knowledge.  Knowledge in the strict sense pertains to theoretical rather than 
practical reason, and the problem emerges when, as often happens because of the 
tendency of reason, something is wrongly held to be true on the basis of a theoretical 
claim of knowledge.  To control reason in this regard is the goal of the Critique of Pure 
Reason.  Kant does not treat this as a completely settled issue, however, for since one 
need not have worked through a critique of pure reason to understand the basic principles 
of the Religion,85 he makes certain to lay out in various sections of the book the tendency 
 
nothing or little to do with faith in miracles (6.85).  It is capable of tying itself into antinomies (6.116).  It 
seems to have a theoretical function as well as a separate practical function (6.110, 6.118, 6.183).   
 
83 See especially Critique of Pure Reason, A631/B659-A642/B670.  For a brief account of reason in Kant’s 
thought as it develops toward the writing of the Religion, see O’Neill, pp. 274-77. 
 
84 According to Lawrence, “Instead of being the antithesis of reason, true faith is nothing but reason itself 
transformed and purified through the critical expulsion of its speculative hubris” (p. 314).  For a preview, 
see 6.109-14. 
 
85 See especially the following: “Only common morality is needed in order to understand this book 
according to its essential contents, without getting into the critique of practical, even less of theoretical, 
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of reason in its theoretical operation to trespass beyond the boundaries by which it should 
be limited.  Along with this he presents examples of this tendency in historical religious 
contexts.  We therefore begin with a consideration of Kant’s negative teaching regarding 
the role of theoretical reason in matters of faith.  Drawing out this implicit theme of 
theoretical reason will allow us to link this book to Kant’s overall project of critique, the 
importance of which link is clear from the following passage in the Critique of Pure 
Reason: 
Our age is properly the age of critique, and to critique everything must submit.  
Religion and legislation commonly seek to exempt themselves from critique, 
religion through its sanctity and legislation through its majesty.  But in doing so 
they arouse well-deserved suspicion and cannot lay claim to unfeigned respect; 
such respect is accorded by reason only to what has been able to withstand 
reason’s free and open examination.86 
 
The tenor of this proclamation makes the consideration of theoretical matters, not 
necessarily political in themselves or perhaps even having political ramifications, public, 
historical, and thus political.  Even if one does not engage in direct criticism of religious 
practice in public life, if he does critically engage with the theoretical principles of that 
practice he has already begun. 
To see what Kant means by “religion” one must either have read the second 
critique87 or wait until part four of the Religion,88 where he supplies what might be a 
 
reason” (6.14).  (But see 6.108).  Compare the following: “Natural religion… is a pure practical concept of 
reason, which, regardless of its unending fruitfulness, yet presupposes only so little ability of theoretical 
reason that practically one can convince each man of it sufficiently, and everyone can expect at the least its 
actuality as duty” (6.157). 
 
86 KrV, Axi note (Pluhar trans.).  Reference might also be made to 6.132, top. 
 
87 See 5.129 and the surrounding text. 
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surprising definition and then an explanation of it.  The first part of part four begins with 
this definition: “Religion is (subjectively considered) the cognition of all our duties as 
divine commands” (6.153-54).89  The author offers a footnote explanation, as if to admit 
the reader’s justified confusion: “Through this definition many mistaken meanings of the 
concept of a religion in general will be prevented” (6.153n).  One advantage of this 
definition is “that in it, as concerns the theoretical cognition and profession, no assertoric 
knowledge (not even of the being-there of God) is demanded, because with the defect of 
our insight into supersensible objects this profession could be feigned” (6.153n).90  Here, 
despite the disclaimer in the preface to the second edition that knowledge of the critical 
philosophy is not necessary to the understanding of the Religion, is a connection to the 
critique of speculative reason.  The human ignorance of “supersensible objects” makes 
impossible any honest claim to “assertoric knowledge” as the basis or content of religion.  
In a way, of course, this is hardly surprising if the reader has been prepared for it by the 
stated mission of the Critique of Pure Reason, which is “to sublate knowledge in order to 
make room for faith” (KrV Bxxx).  To some hopeful religious readers, perhaps, this 
 
 
88 Although the definition is not provided until the beginning of book four, it is preceded by several 
rudimentary or implicit formulations, for instance at 6.84, 98-99, and 103. 
 
89 The qualification, “subjectively considered,” suggests that this definition cannot stand alone as the full 
explanation of what Kant means by “religion”.  One could supplement this definition with, and compare it 
to, the following claim made later in part four: the “doctrine of divine bliss”, rather than the “pure doctrine 
of duty… perhaps expresses best the meaning of the word religio (as it is at this time now understood), in 
an objective sense” (6.182; cf. 6.103, bottom).  Although the definition from a subjective consideration 
provides the terms by which the overall argument of the book is conducted, clearly the subjective and 
objective considerations are shown to correspond. 
 
90 Not to be discussed until the next chapter are the elaboration of this first advantage and the statement of 
the second, these having more to do with morality and dependent upon more than has yet been discussed.  
(For another advantage, see 6.108-09.) 
 
  50  
                                                
appeared to mean that reason would clear the way for irrational or even antirational 
religious faith, or mysticism,91 but part of the force of the Religion is slowly to remove 
that hopefulness.  Aside from some awareness of what would constitute a “divine 
command,” then, Kantian religion will have everything to do with ethics or morality and 
nothing to do with biblical faith or cultic actions. 
 There is no explanation in the Religion of what Kant means by “boundary”, 
although a passage from the Critique of Pure Reason is helpful.  Late in the Critique, in 
the first chapter of the Doctrine of Method, there is a discussion of the stages of 
examination which reason must undergo – first the dogmatic, then the skeptical, and last 
the critique itself of reason: 
What through this critique we prove from principles – and do not by any means 
merely conjecture – are not merely limits of reason but the determinate 
bound[arie]s of reason; i.e., what we thus prove is reason’s ignorance not merely 
in some part or other but in regard to all possible questions of a certain kind… 
Our reason is by no means a plane spread out indeterminately far, whose limits 
one cognizes only in a general way.  It must, rather, be compared to a sphere 
whose radius one can find from the curvature of the arc on its surface… from 
which in turn one can reliably indicate also the sphere’s content and boundary.  
Outside this sphere (the realm of experience) nothing is an object for reason… 
[KrV, A761-2; Pluhar] 92 
 
 
91 An earlier work of Kant, Dreams of the Spirit-Seer, deals with some of this. 
 
92 See also the following, from the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics: “Boundaries (in extended 
things) always presuppose a space that is found outside a certain fixed location, and that encloses that 
location… Our reason, however, sees around itself as if it were a space for the cognition of things in 
themselves, although it can never have determinate concepts of those things and is limited to appearances 
alone… As long as reason’s cognition is homogeneous, no determinate boundaries can be thought for it.  In 
mathematics and natural science human understanding recognizes that something lies beyond it to which it 
can never reach, but not that it would itself at any point complete its inner progression… But metaphysics, 
in the dialectical endeavor of pure reason (which are not imitated arbitrarily or wantonly, but toward which 
the nature of reason itself drives), leads us to the boundaries…” [4.352-3 (Hatfield trans.)] 
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The notion of the boundaries of reason recalls the Socratic science of ignorance, with the 
critique of reason leading to the certain conclusion that in some matters reason will exert 
itself in vain and face error or frustration.  The geometrical imagery used here to illustrate 
real and concrete boundaries reappears in the discussion of the experiments in the second 
preface of the Religion, to which we now return.93   
With this basic explication of the title, we now turn to the second preface, which 
is concerned first with two “experiments” that will help to clarify the title and thus more 
fully the relationship of religion and reason.  After this examination we shall elaborate on 
the tendency of theoretical reason to extend itself beyond its boundaries and to see the 
negative effects in particular in matters of religion and theology.  To accomplish this the 
study will examine three sets of text: the note, added in the second edition, to the first 
parergon; the second and third parerga, which deal with miracles and mysteries; and the 
first part of Religion part four. 
A.  Experiments with Reason and Revelation: The Second Preface 
The preface to the second edition is meant to respond to criticisms of the first edition, 
most prominently the question regarding the intention of the title.  Instead of an 
explanation, the author offers a remark about two experiments or tests that are to be 
performed in the Religion.  The first of the two experiments is to offer a comparison of 
revelation and “the pure rational religion”.  The means of comparison are derived from 
two facts, first that “revelation can at least grasp also the pure rational religion in itself” 
 
93 We should also note that Kant’s use of “Grenzen” in the title of his book, which ties back to the 
discussions in the KrV and Prolegomena, further indicates that the Religion is not simply a moral 
catechism for the nonphilosopher.  For further consideration of the difference between boundary and limit, 
see both Cherkasova and Palmquist. 
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and second that the converse is not true (6.12).  The reasoning behind these premises is 
clear from the way in which they are stated, for while it is not necessary for a revealed 
doctrine to contain everything also held by a rational religious doctrine, revelation, as 
comprised in part by what is historical, and thus derived from experience, may contain 
but cannot be contained by the teaching of reason, which faculty abstracts from 
experience.   Kant is able to set for himself the first experiment: “to consider the former 
as a wider sphere of faith, which contains the latter, as narrower, in itself” (6.12).94  
Revelation, the wider sphere, contains in itself the narrower sphere of rational religion; 
that we are to imagine them as “concentric circles” not external one to the other indicates 
again that rational religion as a whole is to be found as a part of revealed religion.  Even 
if this claim does not appear to be problematic at first glance, neither does it seem 
obviously true, for it suggests that revealed faiths have at their core a rational principle; 
some adherents to religions might make this claim,95 but for the claim to come from the 
 
94 This experiment, I suggest, is largely performed in the first division of part three of the Religion, and this 
indicates the primacy of that part of the book with respect to Kant’s intention. 
 
95 It seems no great blow to orthodoxy to suggest that, for example, the existence of God on one hand and 
the life of Christ on the other are not subject to the same kind of theological treatment.  St. Thomas 
Aquinas indicates this by virtue of his placement of these topics in their respective positions in the Summa 
Theologiae.  That God exists can be known by natural reason without recourse to revelation, whereas the 
key points of Christian dogma (i.e. Trinity and Incarnation) cannot be known by reason but instead are held 
by faith and made less offensive to reason by means of analogy.  For all this ostensible agreement between 
Kant and Aquinas on the practical result of how to treat the subject matter of revelation and the subject 
matter of reason alone, a closer examination shows that in principle – and thus in practice as well – these 
two thinkers are opposed.  We are able to say, in light of Kant’s critique of speculative theology, that, while 
Kant and Aquinas may have similar notions of revelation (views on the truth or possibility of that 
revelation momentarily ignored), they are far apart on what is meant by “rational religion.”  Thomistic 
natural theology, i.e. the first dozen questions of the Summa, is not possible for Kant: this is the kind of 
knowledge that he finds necessary to sublate.  (We could also note that even this “natural theology” in the 
Summa is directed, in the sed contra of each articulus, by means of quotations not from Aristotle but from 
the Bible.) 
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mouth of an eighteenth-century philosopher it is surprising.  The reader is somewhat less 
surprised, if he is aware of basic distinction such have been made above, by Kant’s 
labeling of rational religion as a “sphere of faith”.  At this point emerges geometrical 
language that evokes the more technical discussions of boundaries in Kant’s earlier 
works.  With the next comment Kant goes further, for in stating that within the narrower 
circle “the philosopher thus holds himself a teacher of pure reason (from mere a priori 
principles), and here thus must abstract from all experience”, he firmly places the 
philosopher within the boundaries of rational religion – and thus, up to its non-historical 
point, within the boundaries of revelation.  Not only reason but also the philosopher, the 
exemplar, perhaps, of reason, is bound within limits when it comes to religion.  We can 
thus expect Kant to avoid examining such matters of historical revelation as the miracles 
of Christ and the mysteries of Trinity and Incarnation, for reason and the philosopher 
who uses it have no right to investigate or criticize them.   
 But, as the description of the second experiment suggests, perhaps we have 
spoken too soon about the philosopher remaining within the narrower circle of rational 
religion.  The “standpoint” acquired from the first experiment allows a second, according 
to which Kant, proceeding from what is “held” to be a revelation and at the same time 
“abstracting” from the pure rational religion, holds up for comparison the “fragments”96 
of the first  to the moral concepts of the second.  Such a comparison will enable Kant to 
 
96 The reader might be brought to think about the recently published Fragments of Reimarus, to which Kant 
refers at 6.81n. 
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“see whether this does not lead back to the same pure rational system of religion…”97  
The clear implication is that historical revelation is not necessary for genuine religion,98 
provided one had access to the moral concepts that are communicated in the rational 
religion.  The conclusion to the experiment is that “between reason and scripture is not 
mere compatibility but rather unity”; if one has the direction of moral principles he will 
also come upon, in some way, the Bible.  This conclusion comes by way of the following 
reductio, the statement of which is very revealing: 
If this is not so, so one would either have two religions in one person, which is 
absurd, or one religion and one cultus, in which case the latter is not (as is 
religion) a purpose in itself, but rather only has worth as a means, both would 
often have to be shaken together, in order to combine them for a short time, but 
immediately as oil and water they separate again from one another and allow the 
morally pure (the rational religion) to float above.  [6.13] 
 
First, Kant is explicit from the start about the respective value of religion as opposed to 
cult, a view that becomes increasingly important as the Religion progresses.  Second, and 
more important, he describes the difficulty of maintaining a proper relationship between 
the two if we are forced into accepting that the second experiment has failed: a 
combination of the two elements is necessary but oft-repeated and short-lived.  (The 
image of the “purely moral religion” floating to the top is a clear indication of which 
Kant holds to be the more valuable.  The reader may be tempted to look into whether 
Kant’s image of shaking and rest somehow fits as an analogy of his own efforts in 
thinking and writing about religion.) 
 
97 This second experiment is largely performed in the second division of part three and in part four. 
 
98 It would be useful to keep this in mind as Kant presents the “true church” and its independence of, at 
least in ultimate intention, from historical revelation.  See especially Religion 3.1.4-5 and 7. 
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While setting up the relationship of rational and revealed religion, and thus 
seemingly also reason and faith, Kant brings us back to our larger present concern: he is 
considering the rational religion “not at all with a theoretical intention”: one must be 
careful also to keep separate the respective claims of theoretical and practical reason, as 
the former we have been led to see cannot be reliable in matters of religion.  If we keep 
this in mind, then we can overcome the opposition of faith and reason, for faith is 
opposed not to reason but reason to claims of knowledge.  The task is thus to let moral 
concepts do their work and to keep religion away from claims of theoretical knowledge.  
 These two experiments provide much of the argument and the methodology of the 
Religion, and they appear explicitly in several passages.  In part three, in the discussion of 
the dependence of every church on historical revealed faith, Kant cautions against a too-
quick denial that a church “in perfect harmony with moral [rational] religion” may be the 
result of a “special divine dispensation” (6.105).  This is borne out fully later in part 
three.  Early in part four, as a preface to the discussion of Christianity as a natural and a 
learned religion, Kant writes the following: 
But every [religion] must, in part at least, even the revealed religion, also contain 
certain principles of the natural.  For revelation can be added in thought to the 
concept of a religion only through reason; because this concept itself, as derived 
from a combination under the will of a moral lawgiver, is a concept of pure 
reason.  Thus we shall consider a revealed religion on the one hand as natural and 
on the other hand as learned religion, we shall examine it and be able to 
distinguish what or how much is due it from the one source or the other.  [6.156] 
 
A bit later, in the discussion of popery as rule, he writes the following, which links back 
very nicely to the second preface: 
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Now there is a practical cognition which, if it rests singly on reason, and needs no 
historical doctrine, still lies as close to every man, even the most stupid, as if it 
was written literally on his heart: a law, which one only needs to name in order to 
agree with everyone about its intention, and which leads with itself unconditional 
binding force99 in everyone’s consciousness, namely that of morality; and what is 
more, this cognition either already itself leads alone to faith in God or at least 
determines His concept as a moral lawgiver, thus guiding it to a pure religious 
faith, which is not only in the grasp of every man but rather also worthy of respect 
in the highest degree; indeed, it leads thereto so naturally that if one wishes to 
make the experiment, he will find that it can be queried from every man fully and 
entirely without it having been taught to him. 
 [6.181-2] 
 
The moral law, the law of reason, is the test by which one may examine the validity of 
the content of any historical revelation.  Thus even in the soul of the individual believer is 
the potential for reason to act as experimenter or tester.  We find this suggestion at the 
conclusion of the second preface as well, for, after justifying his proposed experiment by 
appealing to the example of “the late Michaelis” (6.13), Kant mentions two reviews of 
the first edition.  The second review is of interest because it brings to the fore the 
relationship of the Religion to the more theoretical works of the critical philosophy.  To 
Greifswald, who charges that the Religion is of interest only to readers of Kant’s pre-
existing “system” and thus to a very few of even educated men (6.13), Kant answers that 
“It requires only common morals to understand about this book its essential contents, 
without going into the critique of practical, still less theoretical, reason …” (6.14).  
Again, the truth of the moral law, the law of reason, is sufficient to do reason’s critical 
work upon itself, which includes its limiting its own tendency to extend itself to the 
transcendent. 
 
99 The word for “binding force” is Verbindlichkeit, the basic notion of which was very important in earlier 
works like the Groundlaying of the Metaphysics of Ethics and has just as much importance in the Religion.  
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B. Beyond the Boundaries: On the Role of the Parerga 
 
Further help in clarifying the relationship of faith, reason, and science is found in a note, 
added in the second edition, to the general remark that closes part one.  The purpose of 
the note is to explain the special character of the general remarks which are appended to 
each of the four parts of the book.  The remarks are noteworthy in that, judging from the 
inscriptions that could be assigned to them – “Concerning Effects of Grace”; “Miracles”; 
“Mysteries”; “Means of Grace” –  they seem to have nothing to do with Kant’s stated 
purpose or subject matter.  Based upon what he has written thus far, Kant appears to have 
no business concerning himself with these matters, as he makes clear by admitting that 
the contents of these remarks are “so to speak, parerga to religion within the boundaries 
of pure100 reason” (6.52). 
 The name “parergon” seems to indicate the character rather than the context of the 
remark, for it may be taken to convey here its basic sense of appendix or appendage.  
After all, Kant begins this note by stating that a general remark is “hanged onto” each of 
the four parts.  This appears to be confirmed a few sentences later, where Kant uses the 
Greek word as a parenthetical gloss to the word Nebenschaft: “sideline affair”.  On the 
other hand, a sideline affair is not merely something appended but perhaps a concern 
different from the one to which it is attached.  These parerga are thus not simply to serve 
as footnotes, but as actually separate matters that still can been seen to have genuine 
relevance to the argument of the main parts of the book.  With this in mind, the reader is 
 
100 Kant replaces “blossen” with “reinen” here. 
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free to reflect on the extended meanings of the word “parergon”, which include 
“secondary purpose”, “unhappy addition”, “useless remedy”, and (in painting) 
“subordinate object or accessory”.101  Furthermore, when he uses the word as a 
parenthetical gloss for “sideline affair”, Kant is speaking not of these appended segments 
of the book but rather an act of thinking.  These latter observations should indicate to the 
reader that the general remarks, odd relationship to the main parts of the book 
notwithstanding, indicate something crucial about religion within the boundaries of mere 
reason even if they do not belong to it.  It does appear strange to discuss what one should 
not take up because of one’s self-imposed limitations, and so to portion off certain parts 
of a book not at the end but after each part, is a provocative authorial choice.  There 
would seem to be little use for an appendix that is restricted territory unless it were used 
to reveal something either about the territory or about the restriction, or perhaps even that 
the restriction is not so firm as to be heeded.  This ambiguity is brought to light at the end 
of Kant’s initial sentence about the general remarks: “they do not belong within the 
boundaries but bump against them” (6.52).  The language suggests that something is 
unwilling or unable to let the boundaries be as they are.  And in fact this something is 
reason itself. 
 
101 These are meanings supplied by Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon. 
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The manner102 in which this fact is presented suggests that reason is the cause of 
its misfortunes and the only possible guard against them.  Reason desires to “satisfy” its 
“moral need”, and so turns to “overflowing ideas”.  The immediate context provides no 
indication about what is meant by this moral need, but it is at the heart of the doctrine of 
religion as a whole.  As we shall see in the following chapter’s discussion of the preface 
to the first edition, Kant finds in man the need to see the outcome of moral acts.  
Although man needs nothing other than the moral law to show what ought to be done or 
not done, he still needs something beyond the moral law that reveals the outcome of the 
moral act.  Eventually this leads to the idea of the highest good in the world, which “is 
(practically considered) not empty; because it remedies our natural need to think all our 
deeds and nondeeds taken together in a whole as some end-purpose, which can be 
justified by reason, which otherwise would be a hindrance to moral resolution” (6.5; cf. 
6.109).  But, as noted, reason turns not just to the idea of the highest good but to other 
“overflowing ideas” as well (6.52).  In the present context Kant speaks of reason 
extending itself to these ideas but without taking them as its own and yet without making 
a claim against their “possibility or actuality”.  There is something desirable and useful in 
 
102 The characterization, particularity by personifying language, of reason is reminiscent of the Canon of 
Pure Reason in the Critique of Pure Reason: “Human reason is humiliated by the fact that, in its pure use, it 
accomplishes nothing and indeed needs a discipline to restrain its own extravagances and prevent the 
deceptions that these engender for it.  But, on the other hand, human reason is elevated and acquires self-
confidence through the fact that it can and must exercise this discipline on its own…” (KrV A795/B823)  
See also KrV A797/B825: “Reason is impelled by a propensity of its nature to go beyond its use in 
experience, to venture outward – in a pure use and by means of mere ideas – to the utmost bounds of all 
cognition, and to find rest for the first time in the completion of its sphere…”  A third example is from KrV 
A828/B856: “even after all the ambitious aims of a reason roaming beyond the bounds of experience have 
been defeated, we are still left with enough in order to have cause to be satisfied from a practical point of 
view” (Pluhar translation). 
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the ideas, provided reason observe the distinction between a “reflective faith” and a 
“dogmatic faith” in them.  Faith103 is dogmatic, and seen by reason to be insincere or 
presumptuous, when it claims to be knowledge concerning matters that are transcendent 
and thus out of reason’s theoretical reach.   
Unfortunately, because the ideas cannot be brought into religion itself without 
harm,104 they are best left in the hands of a reason operating with reflective faith, as 
something that remains inscrutable but still helpful in overcoming moral impotence.  If 
reason itself trespasses its boundaries, if it gives in to the ideas bumping against these 
boundaries, “with this all use of reason comes to a halt” (6.53).  At this point Kant offers 
the briefest of statements why the effects of grace, for example, cannot be taken up into a 
maxim without causing this halt of reason.  The cause is twofold, one theoretical and the 
other practical.  The practical difficulty, the core of which is to be taken up in the next 
chapter, is that, insofar as it entails doing something by doing nothing, the idea of effects 
of grace contradicts itself.  The theoretical difficulty is that, asserted here but argued 
elsewhere not only by Kant but also to devastating effect by Hume, we cannot extend our 
use of cause and effect beyond objects of natural experience.  If this is so, then we cannot 
 
103 Faith, also not defined in the Religion, is distinguished from knowledge and opinion in section three of 
the Canon of Pure Reason, KrV A820/B848-A830/B859.  See especially A822/B850, where Kant lists 
these three as levels of assent (“holding-to-be-true”) and identifies faith as that level in which “assent is 
sufficient only subjectively and is at the same time regarded as objectively insufficient” (Pluhar trans.).  A 
few pages later (A827/B855-A828/B856), Kant distinguishes not between reflective and dogmatic but 
between moral and dogmatic faith. 
 
104 Turning from reflective faith to dogmatic faith, (1) effects of grace can be perverted into enthusiasm, (2) 
miracles into unbelief, (3) mysteries into illuminatism (initiate-delusion), and (4) means of grace into 
thaumaturgy (wanderings of a reason that has gone out beyond its limits, that is, for a supposedly moral 
[God-pleasing] intention).  Kant underscores the element of dishonesty in these tendencies as well, listing 
(1) supposed inner experience, (2) alleged outer experience, (3) apparent illumination of the understanding 
in regard to the supernatural, and (4) risky attempts to influence the supernatural. 
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take a phenomenon and determine whether its cause is grace or nature.  We must thus 
conclude by admitting the impossibility of a theoretical cognition of the effects of grace. 
So concludes the explanatory note added in the second edition.  It clarifies but 
does not replace the lengthier and more particular treatment of transcendent ideas as 
found especially in the second and the third parerga, to which we now turn.105 
C. The Relation of Reason to Miracle and Mystery 
While the first parergon has examined the effects of grace and then offered a general 
explanation of the function of the parergon itself and its three successors, the second 
deals with the more particular topic of miracles, a weak point in revealed religion much 
exploited by Kant’s predecessors.106  It follows Kant’s treatment, in part two, of the 
traditional doctrine of justification, and it is explicitly connected to part two through the 
latter’s rejection of the necessity or even desirability that miracles be thought to 
accompany the personification of the good principle.  The immediate reason for this 
rejection is a moral one, for to request a miracle as a bona fide amounts to a confession of 
“moral unbelief” or “a lack of faith in virtue” – “because only faith in the practical 
validity of the idea that lies in our reason has moral worth” (6.62-3).   
Likewise, much of the treatment of miracles in the parergon itself is from a moral 
perspective.  The clarification of the meaning of the word “miracles”, as “occurrences in 
the world, of whose causes the laws of effect are and must remain absolutely unknown to 
us”, is explicitly presented in practical terms of “what they are for us, that is, to our 
 
105 For a further and provocative introductory discussion of the parerga, see Michalson, pp. 126-8. 
 
106 See especially chapter six of Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise and section ten of Hume’s Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding. 
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practical use of reason” (6.86).  Here, perhaps because of the cover he has given himself 
by declaring himself on foreign territory, Kant writes bluntly: “If a moral religion… 
ought to be grounded, so must all miracles, which history links with its inauguration, 
themselves make the faith in miracles in general finally dispensible”, or the faithful 
would express this lack of moral faith (6.85).107  But then, in a move common to much of 
the Religion, Kant makes a concession to human nature and its way of thinking.  If the 
introduction of the new moral religion as a replacement of, or a transformation from, a 
religion of cult and observance requires for its “introduction” in “history” to be escorted 
by miracles, this is morally acceptable provided they be discarded as soon as possible.  
So there is a morally useful and even necessary function to faith in miracles, but it is not 
part of the moral religion itself.  Again Kant backs off prudently from the denying the 
possibility that the earthly existence of the “teacher of the one and only religion”, 
presumably the Kantian-Christian religion, is a collection of miracles – but our reason 
cannot make a judgment on this except to exclude it as necessary for “knowing, having 
faith, and professing” the true religion (6.85).   
The parergon continues to view the profession of miracles from a moral-practical 
rather than a theoretical perspective, particularly in terms of how “rational men”, whether 
 
107 In support of this statement Kant quotes the words of Christ from John 4:48.  Christ has just returned to 
Cana, where at his last appearance he turned water into wine, and is asked by a royal official to heal his 
dying son.  It is difficult to understand Christ’s response, for although the context would suggest that Kant 
is not quoting carefully, Christ seems to be saying what Kant suggests – but the reader of John’s Gospel is 
surprised because the request for the healing is not the request for proof of the validity of Christ’s teaching 
or way of life but rather (based upon previous experience) a reasonable desire for his help.   
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“wise governments” or spiritual leaders,108 see to the relationship that the public has with 
faith in miracles.  They allow for the possibility that miracles occur, but they do so “in 
theory” but not “in practice”.  At first this may seem that Kant is going against his own 
position by favoring a theoretical rather than practical grasp of miracles, but the 
distinction here is not between theoretical and practical reason but rather between holding 
out the (extremely) vague possibility of the reality of miracles and of making that 
possibility somehow related to the “business” (Geschäft, the word translated just above as 
“practice”) of one’s everyday life: to say that “in theory” one has faith in miracles means 
only to say that he does not assert their impossibility, while to claim them in his 
“business” is to rely on miracles as a supplement or even replacement for his moral 
agency.  After a clarification of the meaning of the word, Kant distinguishes between 
theistic and demonic (which is itself distinguished into satanic and angelic) miracles, he 
takes up theistic miracles for a consideration that briefly touches on questions of 
theoretical knowledge. 
 Insofar as we can conceive of God as creator and ruler of the world according to 
the order of nature we can form a “general concept of the causal laws of miracles”.  This 
seems merely to say that to the extent that God orders nature He is somehow responsible 
for all that happens in it, even if the causes and effects are unknown to us.  There is 
nothing controversial in this because “immediate” and “independent” cognition of the 
laws of nature are available to us.  If we depart from our general concept by suggesting 
 
108 Geistliche is commonly translated as “clergyman”, but since Kant also uses the word Klerus, and so I 
have reserved “clergyman” or “clergy” for the latter word.  “Spiritual leader” is not a very happy 
translation of the former. 
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that God permits nature to deviate from its own laws, we face the difficulty that we have 
no conception at all of that law by which God permits the allegedly miraculous 
occurrences.  Because it cannot rely on the previously articulated laws of nature and also 
has nothing with which to replace them, “here reason is crippled” (6.86).  All that can be 
said by reason, therefore, is limited to the “general moral law” that all of God’s doings 
are good (although this is at best a “negative criterion” by which one is enabled to judge 
the divinity of the proposed miracle: a miracle cannot be thought to be from God if, for 
example, a father was asked to put to death his innocent son – and we are provided with a 
foretaste of the critical force of Kant’s biblical hermeneutics).  “In his business, therefore, 
it is impossible for one to count on miracles… But as for miracles of a good kind: they 
are so used by people in business as mere phrases” (6.87).  Like the natural scientist 
inquiring into the causes of natural laws, so to the man charged with his own moral 
betterment is unable to determine what are natural and what are supernatural causes nor 
how to cause them himself (6.88). 
 With this the parergon concludes, but in the second edition Kant adds a footnote 
that is longer than any paragraph in the body itself of the parergon.  Of anything written 
in the second parergon this footnote may be the most illustrative of the relation between 
religion, miracles, and reason.  From a consideration of the claimed equivalence between 
the ignorance of the man who has faith in miracles and the ignorance of the natural 
scientist who struggles to understand the world, Kant is led to meditate on an “inner 
phenomenon of human understanding” (6.88n) regarding miracles and then to conclude 
with a warning about miracles more sharply stated than anything preceding it.  It is 
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furthermore a useful text because it focuses not on miracles so much as on the attitude of 
those who hold them and of those who promote faith in them. 
 The claim of equivalence is a “common excuse” given not only by those who 
want by means of magic to fool the credulous but also by those who more generally want 
to make the credulous to have faith.  The reasoning is that, if scientists themselves admit, 
on occasion, to ignorance in grasping some phenomenon in the world, there is no reason 
why others cannot do the same: if a scientist is ignorant of the cause of gravity and yet 
holds gravity to be true, so may the faithful be ignorant of the cause of an apparently 
miraculous occurrence and yet hold the miracle to be true.  Yet, Kant responds on behalf 
of the scientist, we do have sufficient cognition of the laws of the forces (i.e. the cause of 
gravity) “so as to order experiences under them” (6.88n).  Unlike an alleged miracle, a 
natural phenomenon like gravity occurs in certain conditions, and can be predicted and 
explained when occurring or about to occur.  Even though going beyond, or above, a 
grasp of the magnetic forces and whatever else creates the effect of gravity themselves 
may not be possible, but the effects themselves always act in accordance with 
determinate laws.  One cannot make a similar claim about miracles without relinquishing 
the name “miracle”. 
 From this, Kant is able to grasp “an inner phenomenon of the human 
understanding” according to which new natural wonders either exhilarate or deject us.  If 
an occurrence is unexpected, new, or in seeming violation of human knowledge, it can 
still exhilarate if it is held to be natural, for reason then has the hope of “nourishment”, of 
coming upon further laws of nature.  If such an occurrence appears in the form of a 
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miracle, reason is dejected because its old cognitions are invalidated without 
replacement, and reason thus finds itself in a magical world where it has no function and 
no way of navigating it.  This has severe ramifications for the moral life, for if one’s 
moral tendencies are affected but lack indication as to whether the moral agent himself or 
something inscrutable outside him is responsible, then he is left without the ability to act 
morally on his own.  The conclusion to the discussion of miracles is thus as follows: 
But these are experiences; for us they are thus nothing other than natural effects, 
and ought also never to be judged other than natural effects; for this the modesty 
wants in the claims of reason; but to go out beyond these limits is presumption 
and immodesty in claims; however often one passes off evincing, in the assertion 
of miracles, a humble and self-relinquishing ways of thinking.  [6.89n] 
 
This is the most restrictive, negative, statement in the whole parergon.  The mystery – to 
use the subject of the next parergon – of the causes of certain phenomena is not 
necessarily divine. 
 Kant devotes the third parergon to an explanation of the meaning and relevance of 
mysteries.  The parergon follows upon the philosophical and historical presentations of 
religion in part three, and fittingly so insofar the historical presentation of Christianity as 
moral religion echoes the teaching of the second parergon that the inauguration of the 
moral religion may well require miracles that can be dispensed with later (6.129).  A 
“moral and soul-saving faith”, Christianity nevertheless required “in a holy book miracles 
and mysteries”.  To the paragraph whence these quotations are drawn is attached a 
lengthy footnote that uses the “mysterious history”109 of Christ’s resurrection and 
 
109 The “mysterious history” is contrasted by Kant with the “public history” that precedes and includes the 
death of Christ, and so in the footnote the reader is presented with the preliminary distinction that 
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ascension as an example of what “cannot be used, its historical worthiness 
notwithsanding, toward religion within the boundaries of mere reason” (6.128n).  Now 
the reader may not be surprised by this because of what is already said about the 
difference between a religion and revelation, the former which is based in moral reason 
which abstracts from experience and the latter which is based on experience and history, 
but Kant’s dismissal does not end with the historical character of the resurrection and 
ascension stories.  Rather, and more importantly, religion within the boundaries of mere 
reason cannot include such claims about Christ because it is too much to bear for 
“reason’s faith about the future” insofar as reason accepts the concept of material 
existence: the resurrection and ascension are problematic in light of the psychological 
materialsm by which personality can be maintained only if embodied and of the 
cosmological materialism which limits wordly existence to spatial determination.  On the 
other hand, reason finds some comfort in a hypothesis that is spiritual rather than 
material, a hypothesis which holds that a person may live while his (former) body is 
buried and that man in his spiritual nature may reach heaven without having to undergo 
spatial travel to it.  This difficult footnote is one justification for the third parergon’s 
examination of mystery following the body of part three.110  On several occasions in the 
 
determines what is to be considered a mystery (i.e. what is not for public profession) and what is not to be 
considered a mystery in Kant’s sense.  See the discussion below of Kant’s explanation of the word 
“mystery”. 
 
110 Another justification appears a few pages later in another footnote, this one commenting on a phrase 
from 1 Corinthians 15:28.  Kant presents a way in which it might be understood, provided it be abstracted 
from its “mysterious” aspect, which “stretches above all boundaries of possible experience” and thus 
belongs to the “holy history of humanity” and cannot be grasped for practical purposes (6.153n).  Part two 
of the Religion contains another pertinent text, in which Kant addresses the possibility and significance of 
virgin conception and birth from a practical rather than theoretical point of view. 
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Religion, then, Kant has mentioned and dealt with mysteries but without directly facing 
them or their relation to reason. 
 Largely because of its sometimes unclear dialectical method, in which Kant raises 
and then drops various candidates for the label of mystery, the third parergon is perhaps 
the most difficult section of text in the Religion.  From the point of view of traditional 
theological speculation, however, it is also perhaps the most alluring.  The reader may get 
the sense that Kant, treating some of these matters only because historical Christianity 
has imparted them, and thus reluctantly, is at the same time allowing himself to make 
observations that would be intriguing to theologians if only he would write out his 
thoughts less sketchily.  Our purpose in looking at the third parergon, however, is not to 
develop the theological considerations any further but rather to examine further 
reflections on the relationship of reason, knowledge, and religion. 
 The parergon as a whole appears to be a continuation of the restrictions Kant has 
set earlier, as can be seen from the start with Kant’s clarification of what the word 
“mystery” should be taken to mean.  This clarification itself is grounded on the 
distinction between the theoretical and the practical, between knowledge and faith – and 
reason’s difficult navigation between these dichotomies.  All the ways of faith that 
pertain to religion, in other words all historical faiths that have the moral faith at their 
core, have at their “inner quality” a mystery.  Because this observation is made apropos 
ways of faith insofar as they relate to religion, and thus practical reason, Kant puts close 
together what traditional theology might wish to keep further apart.  A mystery, or at 
least a mystery of this kind, is “something holy, which indeed can be known by every 
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individual, but yet cannot be made known publicly, that is, universally imparted” (6.137).  
The manner of knowing by the individual cannot then be the knowing that comes from 
the act of theoretical reason, or else the matter in question would be communicable.  This 
restriction is even more clear from the explanation of what is meant by “holy” and 
“mysterious”, for holiness refers to its ability to be “cognized internally for practical use” 
and mysterious is glossed to mean “not for theoretical use” (6.137). 
 The practical character of what Kant wants to call a mystery is visible in its very 
origin, for mystery springs from a “need of practical reason” (6.139): man is aware of his 
moral duty but unable to see that or how the final purpose of morality is to be 
accomplished, and so must have faith in the direction of a “moral ruler of the world” who 
is seeing to this accomplishment.  Again we are cautioned that the existence or the nature 
of this moral ruler is beyond our reach, for the need of practical reason is only to “know” 
what this ruler is “for us as moral essences”.  As he writes in a footnote, “in regard to that 
which only God can do, for which to do something ourselves would overcome our ability 
and also our duty – there can be only a real, namely holy, mystey (mysterium) of religion, 
from which”; knowing and understanding this rather than having insight into it might be 
the extent of its use.  (6.139n.).  Such a limitation would suggest the foolishness of 
theological speculation on such a matter as the Christian doctrine of the Trinity – but we 
are surprised by, and, because of its cleverness, pleased by, Kant’s presentation of this 
very thing. 
  70  
                                                
 It is several pages before Kant gets to writing about Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit,111 and this fact, combined with the attempt to show that the Trinity is neither a 
necessarily mysterious doctrine nor an especially Christian one, makes obvious that Kant 
is writing on one of the most difficult theological notions in a nonthelogical manner.  
Because of the brilliance and interest of how he does write, though, the reader is by this 
time not likely to be displeased. 
 Kant begins his discussion of the Trinity by linking it to the need of reason; 
although morality needs no assistance in determining for us our duty, in order to see that 
duty done we seem to need to have faith in a holy legislator, a moral protector, and a just 
judge.  Regarded in this way, faith in God as a Trinity in light of how He relates to man 
“contains no mystery” (6.140).  Kant notes that, even it is only with the Christian faith 
that it has been imparted publicly, the faith in God as a Trinity can be found “in the 
religion of most civilized peoples”.  Because the moral need to have faith in a world ruler 
is as common as practical reason, this note should not come as a surprise.  But this 
concept of trinity is further available to human reason from the arrangement of power 
found in juridical and even ethical (this distinction is explained in chapter four below) 
communities: the Truine God is mirrored by, or perhaps mirrors, the political doctrine of 
separation of powers.  If this were not so, “one cannot easily provide the ground why so 
many ancient peoples came into this idea, if it is not that it is, that it lies in universal 
human reason, when one wishes to think of a rule of a people and (by analogy with it) a 
 
111 Even at that point, at 6.145f, it is from a moral perspective, and it concludes with the sharp caution about 
holding to it with anything more than this perspective.  See the final sentence of the parergon (6.147), the 
content and tone of which are further reason to place this discussion in the safety zone of a parergon. 
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rule of the world” (6.140n).  The reader can see faith in a divine trinity everywhere in 
historical faith, from Zorastrianism, Hindu, and Egyptian faiths to those of the Goths, 
Christians, and (it is shakily if humorously suggested) Jews (6.141n).  The truine object 
of faith is therefore not a mystery, at least as regards the relationship of that trinity to men 
as moral essences.  In fact, its presence in the various faiths has largely contributed, by 
virtue of its moral core, to the purification of the immoral elements of those faiths. 
 But of course traditional theology has maintained the doctrine of the Trinity as 
much less (if at all) a practical idea than as a true though mysterious revelation of the 
inner life of God as He is in Himself.  This is a “mystery climbing above all human 
concepts”, and to hold such a doctrine to be true is to limit it to the particularity of a 
church-faith (6.142).   
 Three mysteries “revealed to us through our reason” – the call, satisfaction, and 
election – are explained in moral terms, the only terms by which they are useful for 
religion within the boundaries of mere reason, for as to how or why these things are “God 
has revealed nothing to us, and can reveal nothing to us, because we would not 
understand it” (6.144).  Everything that we do need is available from the revelation of 
reason and scripture which are understandable to all men. 
 Kant’s teaching on mystery is that it is present at the heart of every religious faith 
and ought not to be removed, for it is the embracing of this mystery, the mystery of 
man’s moral vocation and its connection to God, that is the meaning and purification of 
religion.  It belongs in a parergon, and is in fact the exemplification of Kant’s working 
within the boundaries of mere reason, because in its teaching it does not result in a 
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rationalization or demystification of the concept but in fact a preservation of the soul of 
religious belief.  That it is not necessarily the notion of mystery held by an orthodox 
Christian does not compel us to assert that Kant has no sense of mystery.  In his 
discussion of mystery he reveals more clearly than anywhere else that faith need not be 
regarded by modern men as superstitious self-delusion.  The ramifications for reason are 
familiar: theoretical boundaries for the sake of moral exertion. 
D. Kant’s Rationalist Position and Methodology 
 
The introductory paragraphs to the first part of part four provide the last substantial 
reflection on the impossibility of reconciling religion and speculative reason.  Part four as 
a whole takes up the service of God in religion and the anti-service of God in popery, 
with the first of its two parts examining “service of God in religion in general”: here is 
the location of Kant’s definition of “religion”, discussed above.  Part four also provides 
the most detailed and most sustained analysis of Christianity in the Religion.  Our main 
purpose in turning to it now is as a conclusion to our opening thoughts on the Religion, as 
to how it treats the relationship of religion and reason.  The character of the introductory 
paragraphs of Religion 4.1 is such that the reader can observe Kant’s implicit reflections 
on the attitude and methodology according to which he thinks through and presents the 
argument of the Religion.  Our earlier discussion of the note concluding the first parergon 
has made a preliminary contribution to this observation. 
 Immediately after his definition of religion, which in its articulation removes, 
among others, the error of claiming theoretical cognition (assertoric knowledge), Kant 
makes several divisions.  Revealed religion is that according to which the adherent must 
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recognize a command to be divine before realizing his duty, whereas natural religion is 
that according to which the adherent first cognizes his duty and only then as a command 
of God.  A rationalist holds that only natural religion is necessary, and a pure rationalist 
holds the same position while allowing for a revelation provided it not be thought 
necessary for religion.  A naturalist is someone who denies the “actuality of all 
supernatural divine revelation”, while a supernaturalist “holds that faith in this is 
necessary for universal religion” (6.154-5).  Which is Kant?  He is obviously not a 
supernaturalist.  His denial of the theoretical cognition of revealed doctrines is not 
necessarily the same as a denial of the actuality of that revelation, so it seems also safe to 
conclude that he is not a naturalist.  The most likely label that he would self-apply is 
therefore of rationalist, perhaps of a pure rationalist who sees the historical-cultural 
necessity, for a time, of using revelation as a means for imparting the true religious faith. 
 If Kant would agree that he is a rationalist in matters of religion, then the next 
paragraph is most revealing of his self-understanding: 
The rationalist must, by power of his title, hold himself within the limits of human 
insight.  From there he will never deny as does a naturalist, nor contest, the inner 
possibility of revelation in general or the necessity of revelation as a divine means 
toward an introduction to the true religion; for concerning these no man can make 
out something through reason.  [6.155] 
 
This apparent self-description might prompt us to recall our quotation from the beginning 
of the Critique of Pure Reason concerning the age of critique from which not even 
religion can exempt itself.112  From that earlier announcement the reader of the Religion 
 
112 KrV, Axi note.  In anticipation of the treatment to be given of this question in chapters four and five 
below, one can also look to 6.132, top. 
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can expect to see reason acting as the judge and examiner of religion, but this quotation 
from the Religion seems rather cautious.  The difficulty vanishes if the reader keeps in 
mind the important distinction between religion and church-faith.  From the little of the 
Religion that we have seen, the latter item is clearly subject to critical attack.113  We can 
say with confidence that, despite the superficial contradiction suggested by the existence 
of this work along with the earlier critique of speculative theology, Kant has not changed 
his mind about the impossibility of rational theology and the claim to scientific 
knowledge regarding God.  Following through on the vague suggestions of the first 
critique and the lengthy presentation of the second, Kant shows again in the Religion that 
any genuine theology, or religion, must be moral rather than speculative: reason remains 
although knowledge is impossible.  To answer the remaining question as to why even 
moral religion is desirable or necessary, we begin again in our examination of this work. 
 
 
113 We might also note that the passive appearance and then critical use of reason appears throughout the 
main parts of the Religion.  For instance, in the first major use of sacred scripture, Kant writes the 
following in a footnote: “That which is said here must not be seen as if it ought to be scriptural 
interpretation, which lies outside the boundaries of the authority of mere reason” (6.43n).  This attitude is 
contradicted several times by the end of the book.  The chief point to be taken from these observations is 
that Kant does not indicate, explicitly, his full intention or methodology, and that he has protected himself 
from the charge of heresy by operating in the language of experiment and observation of appropriate 
boundaries.  With this language he is free to make the controversial statements or implications that he does, 
and then to retreat to the cover of (what is called in his “Enlightenment” essay) “public reason”.  That he 
does wish to rely on “private reason” as well is clear from his suggestions that the Religion, or another 
book like it, be used in theological training and that its message be translated, through sermons, to women 
and children.  This tension runs throughout the book. 
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3. Room for Faith: The Religion and Morality 
 
We have observed that, contrary to possible first impressions, the Religion follows the 
Critique of Pure Reason in denying theoretical knowledge of God and yet preserving, or 
perhaps establishing, moral faith.  We may likewise assume that the character and 
desirability, and for that matter the necessity, of moral faith according to the Religion will 
correspond to Kant’s teaching in the Critique of Practical Reason.114  The assertive 
beginning of the preface to the first edition, and thus to the whole of the Religion, 
certainly gives the reader reason to take comfort in his assumption: 
Morality, insofar as it grounded upon the concept of man as a free essence but 
who also binds himself through his reason to unconditional law, needs neither the 
idea of an other essence above him, so that he cognizes his duty, nor an other 
incentive than the law itself, so that he observes it.  [6.3] 
 
Further, toward the end of the Religion, Kant gives his definition of religion and reveals 
fully its genuine importance: religion is “the cognition of all our duties as divine 
commands” (6.153-4), and this, too, recalls the earlier critical writings.115  And so we can 
expect no major surprises in the Religion, leading us again to the possibility that this 
work is supplementray at best and reiterative at worst.  But lest we make this conclusion 
too quickly, and lest we fall prey to the temptation to read the former book merely in the 
light of the latter, let us then follow the trail through the doctrine of religion as it presents 
 
114 One should note, however, the admonition of Schweitzer: “The question as to the relationship of the 
Critique of Practical Reason and Religion within the Limits is almost insoluble, should one presuppose the 
former in evaluating the latter” (Schweitzer, p. 294).  One curious problem among several is that in the 
former work “immortality is postulated in the interest of the infinite moral development” while in the latter 
“this development is thought of as finished with life on earth” (ibid., p. 296). 
 
115 Compare KpV, 5.129.  the first principles of the doctrine of religion are already formulated in the 
Critique of Practical Reason, 5.124-32 and of course even prepared by the Critique of Pure Reason. 
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itself.  The task in this chapter is chiefly expository: to expose the core of the first two 
parts of the Religion, wherein Kant lays the ground for religion but merely comes to the 
brink of discussing it.  Rather than a treatment of religion itself, parts one and two are 
largely the presentation of what should animate it, and why it should be so animated.116  
What is the teaching of the first half of the Religion, understood through the lens of the 
preface to the first edition, and what can that contribute to the teaching about political 
life?  To put it briefly in advance of the exposition: the moral analysis of a human nature 
which makes moral faith and (eventually) religion not only desirable but necessary makes 
clear the moral rather than theological core of religion and furthermore provides the real 
basis of a possible critique of religion as it is practiced in contradiction to that moral core.  
In other words, morality first provides a ground for justified religion and then, so 
grounded, that religion can be unleashed on existing religious groups and practices that 
are not so grounded.  This would link the opening quote from the first preface, the 
definition of religion from the beginning of part four, and the subsequent moral criticism 
and plan for reform that takes up most of part four.  What appears to be a doctrinal work 
thus continues the task of criticism.  If this is true, then the Religion can be seen less as 
the mere presentation of a new notion of religion and more as the basis of criticism.  This 
chapter provides the opening part of this interpretation.  Let us commence with a more 
detailed examination of another of Kant’s beginnings to the work, the preface (or the first 
 
116 The argument for the necessity of religion does not appear, with the exception of a brief passage in the 
first preface, until the beginning of part three (discussed in the next chapter); as Schweitzer notes, apropos 
the problem of relating parts two and three, “the recognition that the moral concept of God is not actually 
reached until well along in the third [part] remained under cover by virtue of the confusion of the 
presentation with the religious-dogmatic pronouncements of historical Christianity” (Schweitzer, p. 304). 
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half of it117) to the first edition.  In this scant but dense text three paragraphs in length the 
reader is confronted first with the independence of morality from outside factors 
(including, it would seem, religion), then the necessity of religion for human life and for 
human reason itself, and then lastly the inevitable connection of morality and religion.  
We thus find the introduction to the key theme of morality as it extends not only to 
religion but to the whole of the Religion. 
A. Necessary Connection: The First Preface 
Kant immediately qualifies what is meant by morality so as to prevent the reader from 
relying on a notion of morality that is in some way defective.118  The subject of Kant’s 
study is morality properly understood, and it is to be understood as having no need of 
anything aside from itself.  Further, for it to be properly understood requires that the 
reader operate with a certain concept of man.  Man is free, but free in a particular manner, 
as we note from the Groundlaying: freedom is the property of the will of the rational 
being “that makes it effective independent of any determination by alien causes.”119  
 
117 The second half of this preface takes up another matter, and provides another interpretive entryway, 
which is pursued in chapter five below. 
 
118 The meaning of the word “morality” does contain great potential for equivocation, whereas any system 
or code of praise and blame may be called a morality.  Ignoring this might lead one automatically to recoil 
at the pronouncements of Machiavelli and Nietzsche and deny that Machiavellian or Nietzschean morality 
is really morality, wheareas all they can really mean is that it is not Christian morality, or Aristotelian 
morality. 
 
119 Groundlaying, 4.446 (Ellington trans.).  Cf. Critique of Practical Reason 5:41: “the conclusion from 
this, that since material principles are quite unfit to be the supreme moral law (as has been proved), the 
formal practical principle of pure reason (in accordance with which the mere form of a possible giving of 
universal law through our maxims must constitute the supreme and immediate determining ground of the 
will) is the sole principle that can possibly be fit for categorical imperatives, that is, practical laws (which 
make actions duties), and in general for the principle of morality, whether in appraisals or in application to 
the human will determining it” (Gregor trans.). 
 
  78  
                                                
Unlike nonrational or nonliving beings, man as a free being is not limited to natural 
necessity: he is not determined from outside himself.  Saying this alone leads to freedom 
in a merely “negative” sense, however, and must give way to the “positive” sense 
resulting from it, for this positive sense “is richer and more fruitful.”  Without such an 
extension in meaning, freedom would seem, wrongly, to be lawless.  Compared to natural 
necessity, which “is a heteronomy of efficient causes,” positive freedom must be 
“autonomy, i.e., the property that the will has of being a law to itself.”120  This self-
legislation is necessarily connected to the adoption of maxims of action based upon the 
universal moral law.  In accord, therefore, rather than in contrast with this freedom, man 
“binds” himself by his own choice to law.121  This would exclude, as the opening of the 
Religion asserts, dependence on a “higher essence.”122  Man cannot, or need not, 
therefore know his duty by means of receiving divine commandments, for he is self-
sufficient as a free and rational being to determine his duty with the efforts of his own 
reason.   
It would seem that God and the teachings of religion would have no place at all in 
moral considerations, and that they would either be harmful or irrelevant in the 
determination and performance of one’s duty.  If man needed such an external 
determinant, then he would be showing a faulty limitation whose remedy could not be 
 
120 Groundlaying, 4.447. 
 
121 The language of “binding” appears several times in the Religion (e.g., 6.93-94) and recalls an ancient 
source of the word “religion” itself.   Cf. 6.182.  Here the verb used is “bindenden,” and Kant has not yet 
arrived at the notion of binding that fully characterizes his understanding of religion, but the word for it, 
“verdinden,” first appears only a few lines afterwards. 
 
122 See, however, Kant’s mention of the “highest essence” at 6.79. 
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supplied from outside him anyway.  At best, God or religion would be useful merely in 
speculative matters – but this possibility has seemingly been removed by the argument of 
the Critique of Pure Reason.  In this early sentence of the Religion, Kant has summed up 
the argument of his prior writings on morality: “Thus, on its own behalf, it needs… in no 
way religion, but rather is itself enough by virtue of the pure practical reason.”  So far, 
Kant has given us no reason to maintain religion but instead has made it more difficult to 
do just this or to spend time reading a book on religion. 
Before addressing this problem, Kant elaborates on the assertions he has just 
made by clarifying the relationship of morality, universal moral law, and the will.  
Autonomy extends to the internal workings of the will itself, for in adopting universally 
lawful maxims the Willkür is not subject to a material determining-ground.  In cognizing 
his duty to tell the truth under oath and to keep faith in contracts, man not only does not 
need God to tell him his duty but also does not need a given outcome to his action to help 
him to determine his duty.  One merely tells the truth and acts faithfully because the 
universal moral law dictates that he do so.  There is no need, morally speaking, for man 
to cognize the purpose or result of his doing his duty, for such considerations have 
nothing to do with the morality of an act or of its conformity to the moral law and would 
make man “contemptible.”  To tell the truth is expected without reference to a reward for 
doing so.  Morality “on its own behalf” here is characterized as faultless, existing in its 
own abstract perfection.  It “very well can and should, when it comes upon duty, abstract 
from all purposes” (6.4).  Of itself, it is a work of formal design, but one wonders if this 
makes up a complete concept of man in relation to the moral life.  Kant has often been 
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seen as a formal rigorist, one who takes insufficient heed of the actualities of man’s 
passions and overall finitude.123 
Immediately after asserting that morality needs nothing but its own reason, Kant 
steps back and admits that, although morality on its own behalf is self-sufficient, man 
himself is not.  He explains the difficulty, and indicates the solution, by addressing the 
relation of parts of the will to the extra-moral purpose of a given action resulting from 
one’s duty: 
For without connection to a purpose, absolutely no determination of the will can 
take place in man, because [this determination] cannot exist without an effect, 
[and] its presentation – although not as the determining-ground of the Willkür and 
[not] as a preceding purpose in intention – of course must be taken up as the 
consequence of its determination to a purpose through the law (finis in 
consequentiam veniens), without which a Willkür – which does not add to a 
planned action either an objectively or subjectively determined object (which it 
has or should have had), indeed instructed how to work but not whither –  cannot 
give itself satisfaction. (6.4)124 
 
The Willkür, as it is not an abstract and objective part of the human will, but is rather 
inevitably influenced by incentives exterior to human autonomy, takes into account these 
various incentives and thus cannot operate in isolation from them; the incentives must be 
dealt with even if they must not be directly obeyed.  When accepting the command of the 
moral law from the Wille, the Willkür sets beyond the command any incentives that 
happen to conform with it in their purpose, therefore agreeing to act according to the 
 
123 Passages from his own writings, especially when taken out of context, can encourage this way of seeing 
him.  For example, he writes at Groundlaying  4.410n. “that ethical principles are not grounded on the 
peculiarities of human nature, but rather must exist standing for themselves apriori, and practical rules must 
be able to be derived from such [princples] for every rational, and thus human, nature” (Ellington trans.) 
 
124 Cf. Wood 1970, p. 41. 
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moral law and thus satisfying itself as well by acting in accord with a purpose provided 
by the nonmoral incentives.  In such a way, a represented purpose (as provided by 
religion) can answer a question which is rational but which morality needs not and does 
not address, namely, “what then comes out from this right-action of ours?” (6.5).  
Although the dictates of the moral law are sufficient for morality, even reason itself 
requires further satisfaction.125   
Religion “has a necessary connection to such a purpose, that is, not as the ground 
but rather as a necessary consequence of maxims which are taken according to them” 
(6.4).  A purpose for a given action already seen as one’s duty can help to illuminate but 
not determine the moral validity or desirability of a given action.  That is to say that once 
morality has determined right action, religion may be employed so as to give moral 
support for the carrying-out of the action.  Such a role for religion, or for another means 
of providing a depiction of the consequences of an action, suggests not the dependence of 
morality upon other factors, but rather reflects the inability in man to conform to his duty 
to morality alone without a more perfect comprehension of the context of his actions.  
Without the presentation of the purpose, and thus the effect, of an act, the Willkür “cannot 
give itself satisfaction” (6.4).126  The difficulty of presenting a purpose without making it 
 
125 Compare the following statements from the preface: “to reason it cannot possibly be indifferent” and 
“thus to morality it cannot be indifferent” (6.5).   
 
126 A grasp of the respective roles of Wille and Willkür are central not only to the preface to the first edition 
but also for finding in the Religion a larger analogical examination of these two elements of the human will.  
The argument of the Religion is in a way the working-out of the Wille-Willkür relationship, which is 
perhaps the dominant conflict in the book, whose resolution takes place beyond the divided will and in an 
ethical commonwealth.  Kant’s proposal is thus for a public and social solution to a problem fundamentally 
originating in every individual will. 
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the ground finds its solution in the idea of the highest good, a theme banished from 
modern philosophy by Thomas Hobbes127 but subsequently resuscitated in Kant’s second 
critique and now given central importance.  
 The idea of the highest good “contains united together in itself” two elements, 
duty and happiness proportioned to that duty.  Duty has clearly been an important 
element in all of Kant’s discussions of morality, but happiness often seems to be 
overshadowed if not apparently completely denigrated.  As the Critique of Practical 
Reason states, “When one’s own happiness is made the determining ground of the will, 
the result is the direct opposite of the principle of morality” (5.35; cf. 4.442).  This is not 
a complete denial of the importance or benefit of happiness but a caution that the desire 
for happiness not be the controlling factor in the choosing of a maxim.  Obviously, even 
in the present discussion of the highest good, happiness per se is not at issue, but rather a 
happiness correctly proportionate to the observance of duty; here one sees a replication of 
sorts of the relationship of morality to religion – the former determines according to 
moral law, while the latter adds, for the sake of the human Willkür, a discernable purpose.  
Importantly, it does away with, or at least softens, the interpretation of Kant as a moral 
puritan who claims that adherence to the moral law is sufficient for human life, and who 
also believes that happiness is in its nature detrimental to the moral life.   
 Despite Kant’s confidence that duty and happiness can be combined and result in 
a strengthening of morality, he is not so confident that man can be left to his own devices 
 
127 “… we are to consider that the felicity of this life consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied.  For 
there is no such Finis ultimus (utmost aim) nor Summum Bonum (greatest good) as is spoken of in the 
books of the old moral philosophers.”  Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. XI.  (This chapter precedes Hobbes’ initial 
discussion in Leviathan of religion.) 
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in order to make this combination.  For this reason he defines the conditions for the idea 
of the highest good as follows: “we must assume128 a higher, moral, holiest, and all-
powerful essence129 which alone can unite both elements of this [good].”  To be sure, this 
idea is not meant for theoretical speculation, in which case it would be transcendent and 
thus off limits, but rather is intended for the practical purpose of satisfying the “natural 
need” of the Willkür which otherwise would be hindered in the moral choice of a maxim.  
The idea of the highest good therefore provides an “end-purpose to all our doings and 
non-doings taken as a whole” that is rationally justifiable.  Therefore, reason, in “making 
for itself the concept of an end-purpose of all things,” gives “objective practical reality” 
to the combination of the purposiveness of freedom with the purposiveness of nature.  
Here is the first substantive appearance of the key word, Verbindung, which, insofar as 
Kant will rely on it for his development of the concept of religion, introduces in the first 
preface the purpose of religion in the most general formulation of that purpose.  The idea 
of the highest good is the final synthesis of the separate worlds identified by the critical 
philosophy, and this synthesis is possible only on the ground of religion.  At this point 
Kant suggests a thought experiment whose conclusion is that “man proves the need, made 
morally actual in him, to think an end-purpose to his duties, as their result” (6.6).  
Religion, in positing the idea of an essence capable of combining duty and happiness, 
 
128 Kant’s account of this process is elaborated in more detail in KpV, and is aptly summarized in Hoffe, 
pp. 202-4, who asserts that the existence of God is not a mere “useful fiction”; it has reality, but in the 
moral and not the empirical world. 
 
129 At the beginning of the preface, Kant denies the moral benefit of the idea of “another essence above” 
(über) man.  In the later instance, the essence is “higher” (höheres). 
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allows man to contemplate himself in the divine position and, in assuming the idea of the 
highest good as unifying all human actions, to justify the world as it is, man as he is, and 
the higher essence as it made them.  Without this idea of the highest good, however, 
human nature is not capable of satisfying its own yearnings to know the meanings of its 
actions even though the moral law is clearly discernable. 
 By way of summary Kant concludes the first half of the preface to the first 
edition: “Morality thus inevitably leads to religion, and through religion it extends itself 
to the idea of a mighty moral lawgiver outside man, in whose will the final-purpose (of 
the creation of the world) is what can and at the same time ought to be the final-purpose 
of man” (6.6).  At this point the reader is left wondering about the character of that 
religion, as to whether it is dogmatic, mystical, or anything other than moral – and if it is 
moral, how it would be anything other than framing moral considerations in edifying and 
nontheological contexts.  The rest of the Religion provides Kant’s answer. 
With the opening words of this preface, Kant has suggested that religion need no 
longer guide morality; now he asserts that it never has, that morality has always informed 
religion rather than the other way around.130  Kant’s initial presentation of the problem of 
religion is an abstract one, not providing historical, dogmatic, or biblical support,131 and 
therefore he is not presenting a theological argument but is rather among the first authors 
 
130 Barth notes the following: “Religion, the religion of reason… is distinguished from morals as the 
primary use of reason not in its content but in its form, inasmuch as it represents morals in a certain 
connexion…” (Barth, p. 165) 
 
131 As Barth writes, Kant’s treatment of religion without revelation is “merely a void, but which, precisely 
because of this, is the necessary form in all reason too which is filled by faith based on revelation.” (Barth, 
p. 165) 
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to offer a philosophy of religion, and one that is primarily geared toward moral and 
psychological rather than theological considerations.  The consideration in the Religion of 
the relationship of morality and religion is twofold, just as was the position of the first 
preface itself, but in the body of the Religion the order of consideration seems to be 
reversed.  First, Kant lays out at length the moral importance of religion and subsequently 
uses the resulting notion of (moral) religious faith as a means of criticizing existing 
religious practice. 
B. The Disposition and Human Nature: Religion Part One 
The precedence that Kant gives to morality in the first preface prepares the reader for his 
distance from religion itself at the start of book one of the Religion, where there is no 
discussion to be found of matters such as God, revelation, faith, or church.  Instead of 
speculative theology, Kant offers his most profound investigation into human moral 
experience.  The investigation, and the ensuing analysis of religion from this standpoint, 
has at its center the human disposition,132 which has already made important appearances 
in the Critique of Pure Reason133 and in the Critique of Practical Reason.134  The 
 
132 The apparent etymological connection of two key terms, “disposition” (Gesinnung) and (what is 
normally translated as) “predisposition” (Anlage), is in English but not in Kant’s German.  For this reason 
“tendency” translates Anlage. 
 
133 See, for example, A748/B776 (“There is in human nature a certain insincerity that must still in the end 
involve, like everything that comes from nature, a tendency to good purposes: viz., and inclination to 
conceal one’s true dispositions, and to parade certain adopted dispositions that one considers good and 
laudable”), A813/B841 (If “the prospect of happiness… first makes possible the moral disposition… the 
disposition would not be moral, and hence would also not be worthy of full happiness…”), and A829/B857 
(“In other words, the faith in a God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral disposition that, 
as little as I am in danger of losing my moral Gesinnung, so little am I worried that my faith could ever be 
torn from me”) (Pluhar trans., with slight modification). 
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centrality of the concept of the disposition is clear from the following passage late in the 
Religion: “Moral faith… presupposes as necessary a morally good disposition” (6.115-
16).  The disposition, which is alternately defined as “the first subjective ground of the 
adoption of the maxims” (6.25) and as “a subjective principle of actions” (6.37), makes 
its appearance in the Religion in the midst of a puzzle about human evil. 
 Between the priests who complain that the world declines further into evil and the 
philosophical pedagogues who assert that man is on the course of moral betterment, Kant 
suggests the middle position that man is neither good nor evil or even that he is partly 
good and partly evil.  It is difficult to make a judgment, however, for we call a man evil 
not primarily because of his actions but because of the maxims that inform them – and 
maxims are impossible to observe.  The only resort, then, is to infer “an underlying evil 
maxim, and, from this… a maxim, of all particular morally evil maxims” (6.20).  Because 
his reader may be alarmed at the “expression nature” – which carries with it the 
implication that natural impulses are at the origin of man’s moral life – Kant clarifies that 
by “nature of man” he means that “deed of freedom” which serves as the “subjective 
ground of the exercise of man’s freedom in general… prior to every deed that falls within 
the scope of the senses” (6.21).  Otherwise, of course, if the subjective ground were not a 
deed of freedom, a man could not be said to be morally good or evil but rather naturally 
 
134 See especially 5.99 [“For, the sensible life has, with respect to the intelligible consciousness of its 
existence (consciousness of freedom), the absolute unity of a phenomenon, which, so far as it contains 
merely appearances of the disposition that the moral law is concerned with (appearances of the character), 
must be appraised not in accordance with the natural necessity that belongs to it as appearance but in 
accordance with the absolute spontaneity of freedom.”] and 5.71 [“… the highest worth which men can and 
should procure for themselves lies in dispositions and not in actions only.”]. 
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determined.135  On the other hand, in order to avoid an infinite regress, we are left to 
conclude that the ground adopted and held is “to us inscrutable.”  Because man’s good or 
evil character is the result of a choice, albeit a distant and mysterious one, nature cannot 
be held accountable for that character; because, however, this choice is so distant and 
mysterious, it is yet proper to speak of the moral character as “inborn” – present at, but 
not caused by, birth (6.22).  Man alone, as free rather than as naturally determined being, 
is the “originator” of his own moral character. 
 The mysterious adopted subjective ground of the exercise of man’s freedom is 
unnamed until this point, when in a page-long “Remark” Kant identifies not only this but 
also the approach he takes in ethics and what that approach necessitates.  Having just 
argued that man by nature is either morally good or morally evil, he now observes that 
“at the ground of the conflict between the two hypotheses lies a disjunctive statement: 
Man is (by nature) either ethically good or ethically evil” (6.22).  Of this statement one 
could ask whether it is correct and whether it is not possible on one hand that man is 
neither good nor evil or on the other hand that man is partly good and partly evil.  
Experience, which has not been helpful thus far in Kant’s inquiry, seems to bear out the 
possibility that the latter is a verifiable “middle,” but the rigorist way of thinking, to 
which Kant seems to hold, thinks it against the interest of the doctrine of ethics to 
proclaim any “moral half-way point.”  According to this “strict way of thinking”: 
“between an evil and a good disposition (inner principle of maxims), according to which 
 
135 Kant returns to this matter several times, taking great pains not to be associated with a position such as 
ancient Stoicism.  Although he is less explicit about keeping his distance from modern materialism 
(whether of Hobbes or of Tom Wolfe), it would seem that his position would preserve that distance, at least 
to the point of resisting a chemical or neurological determination of man’s moral character. 
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also the morality of the action must be judged, there is thus no middle” (6.23n).  For this 
reason, disposition being what it is, man is never neither good nor bad, nor is he partly 
one and partly the other.  Although the short “Remark” is illuminating in that Kant 
reveals plainly to the reader his own approach to moral questions, it is further helpful in 
its introduction of the key terms way of thinking (Denkungsart) and disposition 
(Gesinnung).  In its sixth and concluding paragraph we find the latter defined as “the first 
subjective ground of the adoption of the maxims” (6.25). 
As deftly as he proposes the disposition, Kant drops his focus on this mysterious 
ground and turns, in the bulk of part one, toward somewhat more determinate elements of 
human nature in order to sketch the causes of the Willkür’s adoption of a good or evil 
disposition.  The full anthropology that Kant claims will be necessary for a complete 
consideration of whether any man is exempt from having a good or evil disposition will 
not be found in these pages, but still the reader witnesses an encounter with human nature 
in its various aspects to an extent not often seen in Kant.  Until section three, however, 
Kant is clearly working a priori rather than from experience of directly human things.  
That he takes up human nature at all might seem out of place, not because his moral 
thought precludes that source as worthy of attention but because, in light of what he has 
said thus far about morality and the source of religion, the reader ought to expect Kant to 
shy away from considering natural determinants of freely chosen maxims and actions as 
well as ultimate subjective grounds for them.  In part, the reader is correct, and so our 
first look at part one will be largely cursory, allowing us to draw from it what is needed 
for the exercises in moral theology in part two.  It is not by accident, however, that Kant 
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places his considerations of human nature at the beginning, and so our study of this book 
will have to return again to the beginning of part one and make a new interpretive 
beginning. 
 The first and briefest136 section of part one is “On the Original Tendency in 
Human Nature toward the Good.”  This tendency, divided into three classes and thus 
three related tendencies, provides “the elements of the determination of man,” at least 
insofar as man does tend toward the good.  By “toward the good” Kant means nothing 
more mysterious or metaphysical than ordered to observance of the moral law, while by 
“original” he suggests that these tendencies “belong to the possibility of human nature,” a 
vague statement that must mean that, as the sources and thus principles, they make man 
what he is.  This is clear from the subsequent definition of “tendency” as “the 
components… as well as the forms of their combination” of a given essence “so as to be 
such an essence” as it is.  Of course, the tendency toward the good is not the sole source 
or set of sources that determines a man, for Kant is presently concerned with only “those 
which related immediately to the desiring power and the use of the Willkür,” that is, with 
only those tendencies that do have the observance of the moral law as their purpose. 
 Some combination of the animality, humanity, and personality determines man 
toward the observance of the moral law.  The proportion of that combination is not clear, 
 
136 Section one treats the tendency toward the good and second two the propensity toward the evil.  This 
balance is overturned decisively in sections three and four, where the focus is clearly on the evil principle; 
this is in keeping with the subtitle of part one.  Even in section one, which ostensibly has the tendency 
toward the good, there is, as we shall observe at length in chapter four, in that context the shadow of evil.  
The subject of section one is, however, of central importance to the first parergon, which is itself larger 
than any of the four sections to which it is appended as a general remark. 
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but personality is of primary importance in moral considerations.  Although animality 
produces self-preservation, reproduction, and society, and humanity produces the rational 
judgment of happiness or unhappiness and thus the desire for equality, personality137 is 
“special” in that extends that rationality to moral responsibility: “The tendency toward 
personality is the susceptibility to respect for the moral law as in itself a sufficient 
incentive of the Willkür” (6.27).  Although this susceptibility, this “moral feeling,” is not 
itself the purpose of the tendency toward personality, it does provide an incentive – the 
incentive – to the Willkür.  This tendency is the subjective ground itself for “assuming” 
the moral law into our maxims.138 
Yet the tendency toward the good would seem to be only half of the human moral 
situation, and Kant takes the next three sections of part one (the remainder of its body) to 
examine the other half.  Even so, he has already hinted in section one, and will state more 
clearly in section three, that these two components of the situation, although not identical, 
are not ultimately separable either.139 
 The distinction between propensity and tendency, with which section two opens 
instead of with an explanation of what is meant by evil, is necessary because of the 
difficult task facing Kant, whereby he must show that the propensity to evil is natural to 
 
137 Cf., from the Critique of Practical Reason, 5.87-88. 
 
138 In an intriguing parenthetical statement, Kant calls “personality itself” – i.e. the moral law combined 
with the person’s respect for it – “the idea of humanity considered wholly intellectually” (6.28). 
 
139 We should further note that, within part one, sections two and three form a smaller unit.  At first they 
appear to be repetitious and scattered, but section two, without informing the reader, is providing the 
terminology and raw material for the full exposition that is found in section three.  This is most clearly seen 
if one wonders of what use the division into levels of the propensity to evil is to Kant, while the answer is 
provided in the formulation offered in the middle of section three. 
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man and yet not inborn to him in the way that the original tendency to the good is.  The 
wording of the distinction itself, as well as the choice of italics, displays the difficulty: “It 
distinguishes iteslf from a tendency in that it can indeed by inborn but yet may be 
presented as not such: but rather it can also be thought (if it is good) as acquired, or (if it 
is evil) as brought upon himself by man” (6.29).  A footnote added to the second edition 
adds more determinacy to the difference: “Propensity is actually only the tendency 
toward the craving of pleasure which, when the subject has the experience of it, 
engenders an inclination to it” (6.29n).  Just as all uncivilized men have a propensity to 
alcoholic beverages, so do all men have a propensity to evil; this is in neither case a 
tendency in Kant’s sense, for, although it seems to be bound up in what man is, the 
propensity is only a potency until something stirs it – whereas the tendency toward the 
good is already in act insofar as man is man.   
 After this distinction Kant makes clear, as he will at length again at the end of the 
section, that he is here concerned with moral propensities, i.e. those having to do with the 
Willkür, and not with physical propensities, which would have to do with the body alone.  
If the Willkür, and thus the man, is to be “judged” good or evil, and this judgment relies 
on the observation of its maxims, then the propensity to moral evil “must consist in the 
subjective ground of the possibility of the deviation of the maxim from the moral law” 
(6.29).   
 For reasons not clear until the climax of section three, Kant provides “three 
different levels” – weakness (Gebrechlichkeit), impurity (Unlauterkeit), and depravity 
(Bösartigkeit, or perversity – Verkehrtheit) – of the propensity to evil.  The chief 
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differentiation between them is their degree of relationship to the moral law in the 
adoption of maxims.  Human nature is seen in its weakness when, upon having adopted a 
maxim, the man in question has difficulty complying with it; even though receptive to the 
dominant force of the moral law in the adoption of the maxim, the man gives into or at 
least suffers from the pull of his other inclinations: he needs other incentives than the 
moral law to see him through in the acting upon a maxim that took the moral law as the 
sufficient incentive (6.29).  The goodness of the maxim itself comes into question when 
human nature is seen in its impurity; the maxim is “not purely moral” because the moral 
law is not the sufficient incentive.  Instead, if often if not always requires those other 
incentives not only (as in the first level) in the carrying-out of a maxim but in the very 
adoption of the maxim.  The moral law is still the dominant but not the sufficient 
incentive in this second level, and so, even if not “purely” so, the moral order is still in 
place. 
 By comparison of the names alone the reader can see a drastic transition from the 
first two levels, weakness and impurity, to the last, depravity, and this transition would 
seem to provide all the Dostoyevskian elements that the name “radical evil” (which is, 
after all, to be found in the title of part one) suggests.  Further, in suggesting that this 
level might also be called corruption and perversity, Kant mentions a reversal of “the 
ethical order” (6.30).  Yet what Kant has in mind is not necessarily a man like 
Smerdyakov, but instead someone much more banal, for depravity is simply the occasion 
of the Willkür’s adoption of maxims in which the moral law is not only not the only 
incentive but is furthermore not the supreme incentive.  One need not be Smerdyakov to 
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be considered bösartig, for his actions might well still be morally good.  This is not to 
deny, however, that for Kant this is the great moral disaster for any man who is not really 
a devil, for with the reversal of moral order, in which the supreme incentive is no longer 
seen to be supreme, comes a corruption at the root of the way of thinking.  This is the evil 
man. 
 The corruption of the way of thinking is set up in every man, “even the best” – by 
which Kant would seem to mean the man whose external actions at least appear to 
conform with the moral law in result if not in intention.  Both the bene moratus and the 
moraliter bonus act in accord with the moral law, but for the bene moratus the law is 
rarely or never the “sole and supreme incentive”; instead, he follows the letter rather than 
the spirit of the moral law.  It would seem then that the moraliter bonus is a fiction.  Even 
the bene moratus whose Willkür is determined by sympathy is evil, for a man acting out 
of sympathy might as easily commit an evil as a good act.  That the actions agree with the 
moral law is merely accidental: regardless of his good actions the man is nevertheless evil 
(6.31).  This statement would seem to close the discussion opened toward the beginning 
of part one, namely, whether man was good or evil.  Even if it does not, it leads clearly 
into the third section of part one, titled “Man is Evil by Nature.”  Now, whether this is the 
conclusion to that question, and whether we now have sufficient grounds to answer the 
still prior question, i.e. whether man is heading towards moral betterment or decline, is 
not yet clear.   
 In the final paragraph of section two, Kant offers an “explanation” that is not only 
“necessary so as to determine the concept of this propensity” (6.31) but which also 
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provides “the ground” as to why he focuses in section two on moral and not physical 
propensities (6.32).140  The explanation consists in four sets of distinctions.  First, Kant 
distinguishes between two kinds of propensities, the second of which is of present 
concern: propensities may be physical, related to man’s body and thus taking account of 
man as a natural being, or they may be moral, coming from man’s free Willkür and thus 
understand him as a moral being.  Second, considering the moral propensity in the light 
of two premises – that only our own deeds are morally imputable and that the concept of 
propensity is that it precedes every deed – he is forced to conclude that, unless “simple 
propensity to evil” has different meanings, man’s propensity to evil is not morally 
culpable.  To get around this difficulty, he turns from propensity to deed, which itself can 
be said to have two meanings: it can mean the use of freedom in adopting the supreme 
maxim, or it can be the use of freedom by which actions themselves are performed 
according to that supreme maxim.  The propensity to evil, as discussed in this section, is 
a deed in the first sense, and is the principle of all other deeds.  The propensity to evil, 
therefore, is, in theological language, the peccatum originarium, or, in philosophical 
language, an intelligible deed.  As the principle, it provides the “formal ground” for the 
material conduct of the deeds in the second sense, each of which may be called – if 
unlawful – peccatum derivatum or sensible-empirical-temporal deeds.  These distinctions 
only go so far to make the phenomenon of human evil intelligible.  The reminder that we 
cannot, despite the sophistication of argument that Kant himself puts before us, grasp the 
 
140 This ground has already been provided, though not definitively, in Kant’s explanation of his use of the 
word “natural” in relation to the Religion.  This is not the last time that he will emphasize the significance 
of a moral rather than physical basis of evil. 
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origin of evil in man is repeated so often in part one that clearly Kant does not wish his 
reader to forget this – regardless or perhaps especially because of the level of 
determination reached about subsequent questions related to it.  Kant thus plunges his 
reader into what in another context (parergon three) is called the mystery of human 
freedom.  The final word must be inscrutable.141 
 Kant concludes his particular analysis of the propensity to evil by noting that the 
“maxim, then, in terms of whose goodness all moral worth of the individual must be 
appraised, is thus contrary to the law, and man, despite all his good deeds, is nevertheless 
evil.”  This conclusion would seem to close the discussion initiated at the beginning of 
part one, namely, whether man was good or evil.  And even if it does not, it leads clearly 
into the third section of part one, titled “Man is Evil by Nature.”   
 At first, section three would seem redundant coming right after section two, which 
seems to have settled the question.  After all, if section one lays out the good in human 
nature, and section two the evil in it, then Kant would seem to have given both sides of 
the story.  A glance ahead at section four, which treats the origin of evil, would suggest 
that it, not the contents of section three, should come next.  What, then, is the point of 
section three? 
 
141 This may well be the single most definitive point to be taken from part one, and yet this cannot be all 
or, for the purposes of the overall argument of the Religion, even the most important lesson from reading it.  
The most important lesson must be that the radical evil in man is a fact, a fact that man can neither safely 
ignore nor prudently allow to cover over the fundamental fact of his tendency toward the good.  Having 
established these facts Kant has made his entryway into the question of religion as an agent or a barometer 
of man’s moral situation. 
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 Before answering this question directly, we note that Kant assigns to section three 
a quote from Horace as an empigrammic subtitle.  Because his classical quotations do not 
seem to be done for the mere sake of style or without serious intention,142 and because 
the head of section three is the only such occurrence in the Religion, it is reasonable to 
expect it to have bearing on section three.  Even out of context, Horace’s statement, “no 
one has been born without vices,”143 certainly makes sense in the context of Kant’s 
argument that man is by nature evil – but a look at the original context may indicate sti
more about Kant’s in
The theme of Satire 1.3 is the disjunction between how one sees or judges the 
vices of one’s fellows and how he sees or judges his own.  It begins with a look at a 
particular singer, who is meant to illustrate singers in general, who in turn, one might 
suggest, are meant by Horace to represent men in general.  Of this singer Horace says that 
“There was nothing consistent with the fellow” and “Never was a creature so 
inconsistent” (1.3.9,18).  “Now,” Horace adds, “someone might say to me: ‘What about 
yourself?  Have you no faults?’” (1.3.19-20).  After providing a response that we might 
expect would make rigorist (6.22-25) Kant’s skin crawl – “Why yes, but not the same, 
and perhaps lesser ones” (1.3.20)– Horace quickly adds that if a critic of a man’s faults 
says “I take no note of myself,” then this “love is stupid and improbus and worthy of 
 
142 See, for example, the many quotations or references found in the Critique of Pure Reason, where texts 
quoted or referred to offer not only a more beautiful or more witty restatement of Kant’s point but a context 
in which the gravity or extent of that point is emphasized.  A second example would be the references to 
Lucretius in “Toward Eternal Peace”. 
 
143 Horace, Satires, 1.3.68.  All quotations are of the translation by H.R. Fairclough. 
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negative remark” (1.3.23-24).  It would seem then that the moral critic is cannot afford to 
ignore the blemishes in his own character.  One may gather from this that Horace is 
arguing that one be consistent, “aequale,” in moral judgment, so that if rigorous 
regarding our fellows we be similarly rigorous in looking at ourselves.  He continues in 
this direction as he goes on: 
When you look over your own sins, your eyes are rheumy and daubed with 
ointment; why, when you view the failings of your friends, are you as keen of 
sight as an eagle or as a serpent of Epidaurus?  [1.3.25-27] 
 
Yet Horace makes a different move than we expect, for he suggests that we not be so 
harsh on our friend, for “he’s a good man, none better” and “under that uncouth frame are 
hidden great gifts” (1.3.32-34).  He does wish his readers to shake themselves violently 
so as to determine whether “nature, or haply some bad habit has not at some time sown in 
you the seeds of folly” (1.3.34-36).  With this, certainly, Kant would find agreement, and 
this line could serve as the subtitle to part one as a whole, and yet, with the rest of Satire 
1.3, Horace moves further away from what lies at the heart of Kant’s moral teaching; 
honesty about oneself is not alone sufficient, for this can lead to moral betterment or to 
cynical or resigned acceptance.  The chief vice for Horace is not so much the choice to be 
ignorant of one’s own vices but the unwillingness to forgive the weaknesses144 of one’s 
 
144 “Let us turn first to this fact, that the lover, in his blindness, fails to see his lady’s unsightly blemishes, 
nay is even charmed with them… I could wish that we made the like mistake in friendship and that to such 
an error our ethics had given an honorable name.  At any rate, we should deal with a friend as a father with 
his child, and not be disgusted at some blemish… This, I take it, is how to make friends, and to keep them 
when made” (1.3.38-44,53-54). 
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fellows and even ignorance of their virtues.145  Consideration of these tendencies leads to 
the statement quoted by Kant at the head of Religion 1.3: 
Ah, how lightly do we set up an unjust law to our own harm.  For no living wight 
is without faults: the best is he who is burdened with the least.  My kindly friend 
must, as is fair, weigh my virtues against my faults, if he wishes to gain my love, 
and must turn the scales in their favor as being the more numerous – if only my 
virtues are the more numerous.  On that condition he shall be weighed in the same 
scale.  One who expects his friend not to be offended by his own warts will 
pardon the other’s pimples.  It is but fair that one who craves indulgence for 
failings should grant it in return.146 
 
Horace’s suggestion for moral judgment accepts that anger, and “all the other faults that 
cleave to fools cannot be wholly cut away” (1.3.76-77).  The solution is not then to 
attempt to eradicate them but instead to look to reason for a suitable means of 
measurement for judging and punishing.  If one does not make such an appeal to reason 
he risks committing the “madder and grosser sin” of harsher punishment than he should: 
a friend who “has committed a slight offense” ought not to be hated and avoided 1.3.83-
86).  If someone finds unforgivable the inadvertent urination on his couch by a drunk 
friend, he will find it difficult to have a suitable response to real acts of vice such as theft 
or breaking faith.  Again, Horace is making a great deal of sense and coming closer again 
to Kant, if he includes under the rubric of vice the piddling offenses made by friends.  He 
is clearly not absolving the criminal or the immoralist of blame.  To the reader who 
wonders why Horace presents his position in the way that he does, the author responds in 
the last part of the satire by hinting at and then identifying against whom it is chiefly 
 
145 “But we turn virtues themselves upside down, and want to soil a clean vessel” (1.3.55-56).  This is not 
the “reversal of the ethical order” about which Kant speaks in Religion 1.2, but it is an inversion 
nonetheless. 
 
146 Horace, Satires, 1.3.66-75. 
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directed.  The hint follows immediately upon the appeal to reason and the showing by 
examples of the problems that follow from not making that appeal. 
Those whose creed is that all sins are much on a par are at a loss when they come 
to face facts.  Feelings and customs rebel, and so does expedience herself, the 
mother, we may say, of justice and right.  [1.3.96-98] 
 
From this Horace launches into a history of justice and injustice that springs from human  
 
prehistory. 
 
If you will but turn over the annals and records of the world, you must needs 
confess that justice was born of the fear of injustice.  Between right and wrong 
nature can draw no such distinction as between things gainful and harmful, what 
is to be sought and what is to be shunned; nor will reason ever prove this, that the 
sin is one and the same to cut young cabbages in a neighbor’s garden and to steal 
by night the sacred emblems of the gods. [1.3.111-17] 
 
In other words, as the evolution of just and unjust shows, it is not reasonable to hold that 
all sins are alike.  Horace’s addressee, not the morally lax or the lenient in punishment 
but their opposite, is the man who, if granted “royal power,” would “cut back with the 
same sickle” both great and little sins (1.3.122-24).  Against this man, who holds to the 
Stoic doctrines of Chrysippus, Horace and his friends, willing to ignore each others’ 
vices, will live more blessedly in private life than the kingly wise man. 
 Why does Kant quote from this text and place the quote so prominently, 
especially since there is not an unambiguous agreement between himself and Horace?  
Further, why does he employ a text that is aimed directly against the Stoics?  He will, a 
few pages after 1.3 concludes, begin part two of the Religion by noting the error of the 
Stoics, but he does this while making clear how correct they were as well; furthermore, 
the Stoic Seneca is mentioned in a favorable light in the same breath as Rousseau earlier 
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in part one, when Kant first brings up the natural goodness in man (6.20).  In hopes of 
answering this question, we must examine section three itself. 
 Section three appears to have the following purposes: to draw, from section two 
and on the basis of experience, the conclusion that man is by nature evil, and to provide 
the a priori rather than experiential “development of the concept” of evil (and so a fuller 
account of that begun in the previous section).  The further purpose of the latter is to 
clarify the “actual quality” and the “ground of the opposition” of the propensity to evil. 
 Kant opens section three with an explanation of what is meant in its title by “evil” 
and “by nature,” and these explanations are based upon the contents of section two: “man 
is evil” refers to the incorporation of deviation from the moral law into his maxims, and 
“by nature” belongs to man as a member of his species, insofar as we have experience 
that forces us to make that inference.  He continues to reiterate that the propensity to evil 
is not a natural tendency but is itself morally evil; it is a natural propensity, however, 
insofar as the “supreme subjective ground” of maxims of the Willkür contrary to the law 
were “in all cases somehow entwined with humanity itself and, as it were, rooted in it.”  
Because of this rootedness, we can call it “radical” (6.32).  There is no need of “formal 
proof” of radical evil, for we have plenty of “woeful examples” in the state of nature, in 
the political state, and in the external relations of political states.  After giving evidence 
from each of these sources, 147 Kant returns to the a priori account begun earlier: the 
ground of the evil cannot be placed either in man’s sensuousness – otherwise man would 
 
147 We shall put off commenting on this aspect of 1.3 until chapter four.  For now we need only note that 
Kant has no trouble providing a variety of examples to manifest the truth of his assertion. 
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be a mere brute – or in a corruption of his “morally legislative reason” – or man would be 
demonic (6.35).  And thus begins the heart of the section, a development of the concept 
of evil.  The reader might object that, with section two’s layout of the three “levels” of 
the propensity to evil, he has already provided this concept, and done so with reference to 
the relationship of the free Willkür to the moral law.  A comparison of sections two and 
three, however, clearly bears out the suggestion that two is merely preparatory for three 
and that the latter is the real account of the concept of evil that employs the ideas laid out 
noncommittally in the former. 
 Kant begins his account with the striking claim, in light of his recent dismissal of 
sensuousness as the source of moral evil in man, that, without the sensuousness, man 
“would be morally good” (6.36).  Man is dependent on his sensuousness precisely 
because of his innocent natural tendency, and he “naturally” incorporates both the moral 
law and sensuous incentives into the same maxim: it is not conscious rebellion against the 
moral law but instead acting according to his own sensuous nature – though not 
determined by it – that makes moral evil possible in man.  The formal – i.e. the 
arrangement according to which incentive (moral law or sensuous incentive) is 
subordinated such that one is the “condition” of the other – and not the material element 
of the maxim determines whether man is good or evil.  Man “reverses the moral order of 
his incentives” when the “law of self-love” is the condition for the fulfillment of the 
moral law.  Even so, as Kant noted previously in section two, the actions of evil men may 
themselves conform to the law “as if they had originated from true principles” (6.36).  
The “empirical character” is good while the “intelligible character” is “still evil” (6.37).  
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If a propensity to this reversal lies in human nature then there exists in man a natural 
propensity to evil which itself is evil because “it must ultimately be sought in a free 
Willkür.”  It is radical in that it “corrupts the ground of all maxims”; inextirpable through 
human148 forces because it is the very ground itself that is corrupted; and possible to 
overcome because man could not otherwise be called free. 
 Here Kant weaves together the three levels of the propensity to evil that he laid 
out in section two.  The depravity of human nature is not demonic but rather a perversity 
(cf. 6.30).  The perversity of the heart can be found in a generally good will “springs” 
from the “weakness” of human nature “bound” (verbunden) with the impurity of human 
nature, so the first two levels of the propensity to evil bound together lead to “seeing only 
the conformity of these incentives to the law” – with resulting deeds that are sometimes 
vicious, sometimes not – and thus the radical depravity of the way of thinking: “no 
attention is given to the incentives in the maxim but only to compliance with the letter of 
the law” (6.37). 
 This “inborn guilt” can be “judged” in two parts, full consideration of which 
brings Kant and his reader back to the original question of human moral betterment and 
to the further question, dealt with at length in part two, of man’s worthiness to be happy.  
The same consideration prompts Kant to give his most vivid description, as well as his 
most morally-charged condemnation, of this propensity in man.  While the first two 
levels of guilt may be judged unintentional, the third, which is deliberate and in which the 
heart “deceives itself as regards its own good or evil disposition,” must be judged 
 
148 Here is an important qualification that becomes important soon. 
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intentional (6.38).  The depravity of the human heart seems even more troubling to Kant 
in the cases where the resulting deed is not contrary to the letter of the moral law, since 
then the heart can avoid judging its disposition and thus is enabled to think itself justified: 
“From this so many men get their peace of conscience (conscientious in their opinion)…”  
The problem does not remain in the realm of individual morality, however, and so Kant 
provides a clue as to the connection between (im)morality, religion, and social-political 
life: “This dishonesty149… extends itself150 also externally toward falsity and deception 
of others”: to overcome radical evil is therefore not only a necessity of the moral life of 
the individual man but of the public life of social and political man.  The public context
of radical evil is further emphasized in the anecdote that is part of the climax of Religio
1.3.  In a strictly political setting, a member of parliament revealed a truth that perhaps is 
revealed in only two possible situations, in the calm of philosophic reflection such as the 
Religion (or the Satires) or “in the heat of contention”, for nowhere else is man forced to 
utter the truth about the evil in him and according to which he operates in everyday life.  
But Kant is offering here only a hint at the larger context in which the problem of radical 
evil is operative.  His more pressing task in 1.3 is to indicate that the nature of radical evil 
is in the subordination of the moral law to other incentives in the adoption of a maxim, 
combined with the dishonest convincing oneself of righteousness due to performing 
actions that do not explicitly contradict the letter of that law. 
 
149 This dishonesty might well be called unworthiness, which stands in obvious contrast to the notion of the 
worthiness to be happy, brought up at 6.46n and elsewhere in the Religion.   
 
150 It is remarkable that the phrase “erweitert sich” here echoes the key passage concluding the first half of 
the preface to the first edition (6.6). 
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 The explicit concern of section four, “Concerning the Origin of Evil in Human 
Nature,” is whether the move from cause (the determination of the Willkür) to effect 
(moral evil) can be grasped temporally (in terms of the “happening” of that effect) or 
only rationally (in terms of its existence alone).  By means of this question Kant 
emphasizes again in this section what has dogged his consideration of moral evil almost 
the start, the unintelligibility of its origin, whether in human history or in the human soul, 
and thus of its full nature. 
 That we can and do have an account of the rational origin of moral evil springs 
from what makes a man evil: as Kant argued much earlier in part one, “the ground of evil 
cannot lie in any object determining the Willkür… but only in a rule that the Willkür 
itself produces for the exercise of its freedom, i.e. a maxim” (6.21).  The maxim, as the 
“determination of [and thus the cause of] the Willkür to the production” of moral evil as 
an effect, illuminates the rational origin in the sense that the existence of moral evil is 
accounted for by the priority of the maxim.151  Because the case of moral evil is one in 
which the cause and effect are “bound” (here again that ubiquitous word) not by laws of 
nature but by laws of freedom, the priority of the maxim as cause is to be understood as a 
priority not of temporal state or condition but only of being.  The moral quality of man, 
by which Kant means “the ground of the exercise of freedom” (6.40), may therefore be 
grasped only according to the presentation of reason.  This is only partially satisfying, but 
a practical purpose corresponds to Kant’s statement of theoretical ignorance. 
 
151 Here Kant is speaking of the maxim that serves as the ground of all other evil maxims (cf. 6.20, end). 
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 The purpose of Kant’s distinction of rational and temporal origin is to avoid 
harming the moral force of the doctrine of radical evil, for casting that origin in temporal, 
and thus natural, terms would lead quickly to absolving man from moral blame from that 
evil which he seems to have authored.  Aided by the notion of the rational origin of evil, 
Kant’s reader is able to view every individual evil action as a fall from the tendency 
toward the good rather than as a weakness in the face of physical incentives or past bad 
habits. 
… his action is free, and determined through none of these [natural] causes, so it 
can and must be judged as an original use of his Willkür.  He should have omitted 
it, whatever circumstances and bonds may have been, because through no cause in 
the world can he stop being a free acting essence.  [6.41]  
 
This leads to the following statement that reminds the reader, again, of the question into 
decline into moral evil and of the “now” that is as old as history: “However evil someone 
has been up until an imminent free action… it is not only his duty to have been better; 
rather, it is now his duty to be better” (6.41; cf. 6.19).  The beginning of an answer, then, 
to the dispute between priests and philosophic pedagogues is in a way indecisive, for as 
yet we have no evidence of decline or betterment.  What Kant has given his readers, 
however, is the ground for a new means of asking and investigating the question, and 
thus for seeing the possibilities for decline and betterment, for now it appears that the 
moral struggle in man is removed – at least in its most important aspect – from its 
historical (and thus, as we shall find in increasing detail, from its theological-biblical) 
context.  The struggle between good and evil is played out not in the social-political 
world so much as in the individual Willkür.  (That the world does not however hang in 
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the balance has yet to be shown.152)  This is not to say that history or theology are ever 
far from Kant’s mind in his investigation, for they often give him the means of furth
investigation; in the present text, theological-biblical claims serve to illuminate his 
rational presentation of the origin of evil. 
 The first occurrence takes place as an aside in which, turning for a moment from 
the question of origin and toward spreading and continuation, Kant rejects the notion of 
inheritance informing the account of evil.  Although the error of inheritance may be 
found in law (as legal consequences to inherited debt) and medicine (inherited disease as 
represented by a tapeworm), the vehicle of this “unbecoming” way of presenting the 
spreading and continuation of moral evil is to be found in the use of scripture by the 
theology faculty.  If we were to view sin as inherited, then we could say of our guilt, as 
the (in Ajax’s view) deceitful and cowardly Ulysses puts it in another context quoted here 
by Kant from Ovid, “birth and ancestry, and what we have not ourselves made, I scarcely 
reckon ours”153 – that is, if we inherit it, it is not fully our responsibility, coming as it 
does from another.  Instead, as Kant points out, the Adam and Eve story, read properly, is 
a symbolic presentation of the existential struggle each time man is faced with the 
possibility of a free act. 
 
152 The answer to the question posed at the beginning of part one is thus answered, in germ form, by the 
argument and conclusion of part one alone.  Parts two and three of the Religion are elaborations and 
extensions of the last sentence of the body of part one, and part four is the settling of further complications 
that arise from two and three but which go back to the principles laid out in part one. 
 
153 Ovid, Metamorphoses, 13.140-41.  Kant changes Ovid’s “voco” into the less neutral “puto.” 
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 Kant’s rejection of the theological doctrine of inherited sin is followed two 
paragraphs later by the surprising observation that his teaching goes together well with 
“the manner of presentation made use of by scripture to depict  the origin of evil in the 
human race as a beginning” (6.41).  It is further puzzling that Kant frames the biblical 
presentation by mentioning that it makes its point by doing what he has just rejected, 
namely, showing the beginning of evil in a history,154 “where what must be thought as 
the first according to the nature of the thing (without taking up the temporal conditio
appears as a first in time.”  How this supports Kant’s distinction of rational and temporal 
origins is not clear, and, furthermore, it is – as he must realize, in light of his forthcoming 
claim that he is not doing biblical exegesis – not a convincing interpretation of a biblical 
text.155  At first, helped along by the quotation from Horace156 that immediately follows, 
Kant’s treatment of Genesis seems less a support for his argument about origins than a 
means by which he can force his reader to see his, the reader’s, own desperate moral 
situation: it is clear that on a daily basis we sin, since “in Adam all have sinned” (6.42).  
How then does the Scripture bear out what Kant has argued? 
 
154 Kant thus reminds the reader of his “as old as history” and the poetic fiction of the priest-religion of 
6.19. 
 
155 This interpretation is based upon three short passages from Genesis.  First (Gen. 2:16-17), God’s stated 
prohibition to the woman not to eat of the Tree is taken to present the going forth of the moral law as a 
prohibition, a prohibition that is necessary in light of man’s temptation by his inclinations.  Second (Gen. 
3:5), the serpent’s claim to the woman that if she eats of the tree she will become like God regarding 
knowledge of good and evil is taken to present the propensity to self-deception in interpreting the moral 
law.  Third (Gen. 3:6), and of the three the least convincing of the interpretive glosses, the woman finding 
the eating of the fruit desirable for several reasons is taken to present the ignoring of the moral law as 
sufficient incentive and searching for other incentives that are good only conditionally.  From this, Adam 
and Eve were led to “rationalize” in weakening the adoption of the moral law. 
 
156 “Mutato nomine de te fabula narratur” (Satires 1.1).  
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 As a history, the Genesis account by necessity of its very form portrays the origin 
of moral evil in temporal terms – a history (Geschichte) cannot exist without a happening 
(Geschehen), for the mere existence there of the subject of the history is insufficient.  
Whether the Scripture offers an historical account of the origin of evil is not clear, or 
even necessary, for what is most telling about it is that it exists at all, that is, that it puts 
on display the human need to clarify that which is mysterious.157  In attempting to give 
the temporal origin of evil, the author of Genesis presents the reader with the first man, 
endows him from the start with not only sensuous temptations but also with a fully-
functioning rational faculty.  Because of this endowment, Kant suggests, and instead of 
Kant’s own suggestion that man has a “prior innate propensity” to evil, the biblical author 
gives to man a temporal condition of innocence.  The first transgression of the first man 
is presented as a fall into sin, whereas Kant presents human transgression as resulting 
from that prior innate depravity.  There is a resulting parallelism between Kant’s 
argument and the Biblical portrayal of the origin of evil is as follows: one begin to trace 
the origin back in time, but eventually that attempt comes to a stop, whether with man’s 
condition of innocence (Scripture) or with man’s propensity innate propensity to evil,158 
before arriving at a complete account.  More troubling, though philosophically intriguing, 
is that the failed attempt at a temporal origin illustrates not only the inability of the Bible 
 
157 At this point in the Religion, even with the note of clarification regarding whether he is engaged in 
Biblical exegesis, Kant is vague as to the human or divine origins of the Scripture itself.  The present study 
takes up this question explicitly in chapter five below. 
 
158 It is useful to recall that, though innate, this propensity is also brought upon by man.  It is equivocally 
natural, insofar as it is radical. 
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to grasp moral evil but also the inability of human reason to do so.  The rational origin, 
too, “remains inscrutable to us,” and “there is no conceivable ground for us” by which to 
grasp the origin of moral evil in man (6.43).  In framing the Genesis narrative of man’s 
fall within a larger cosmic struggle, between God and a being much more “sublime” than 
man (6.44), the Bible admits that the origin is inconceivable: the recourse to a mythical 
narrative is less a naïve pre-scientific account of the world than a knowing admission of 
the lack of a scientific or rational account in the first place. 
 The conclusion of section four is this tying together in failure the rational and 
temporal accounts of the origin of evil.  In this tying together is the basis of the 
subsequent religious rather than (purely) moral tone of the Religion; it is thus the perfect 
transition into the first parergon.  The rhetorical skill with which Kant makes this 
transition is noteworthy.  It is fairly clear that Kant concludes the last paragraph of the 
section by still talking about the biblical admission of the inconceivability of the origin of 
moral evil, and yet it seems that Kant wants the reader to accept on its own terms the 
final clause: “and so for [man], who in spite of a depraved heart still always has a good 
will, there remains hope of a return to the good from which he has wandered” (6.44).  
This answers the question with which the Religion opens but without any support that is 
independent of the Bible.  Although in section three Kant alluded to supernatural 
intervention in the project of moral progress159, and he concludes the fourth section with 
a more explicit statement that prepares us for the first parergon, in which Kant makes the 
 
159 “This evil is… as natural propensity, through human power not to be eradicated” (6.37).  When this 
passage appears Kant makes no attempt to explain the force of the qualification “human.” 
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transition from morality to religion, he leaves the reader somewhat mystified.  The reader 
has at least made the observation that the unknowability of his own disposition is the key 
to living a human life. 
C.  The Disposition and Grace: The First Parergon 
The General Remark concluding part one, titled “Concerning the Restoration of the 
Tendency to Good to its Power” and subtitled “Of the Effects of Grace” (see 6.52), is the 
first of the four parerga found in the Religion and the longest unit of text in part one.  In 
this Remark, Kant, freed from the boundaries of mere reason that he set for himself in the 
body of the Religion, is able to proceed further in his exploration of human evil and moral 
betterment.  Any temptation to view the Remark as less crucial and even less serious than 
the four sections of part one is mistaken, for here the question of the Religion is taken up 
in from an explicitly religious or theological point of view, and we see for the first time 
what Kant meant in the first preface by the extension of morality into religion.160  As this 
is the first real glimpse of religion, rather than morality simply, that the reader 
encounters, the Remark is less an appendix or afterthought than the culmination of part 
one.161  Along with the benefit of this glimpse comes the introduction of the core 
principle that Kant will use in his critique of contemporary religion, and so to view the 
 
160 To be more precise we ought to write “revelation” instead of “religion”.  Kant has moved from a priori 
reasoning into using revelation (or selected and sanitized elements of it) as the basis for further exploration 
of the same questions.  Strictly speaking, even though parergon 1 does address religion by name, it does so 
briefly and then Kant lets a full examination wait until part 3, that is, after the exploration of ideas in part 2 
that might be called theological (or theologically inspired) but not really religious.  
 
161 That the contents of the first parergon are the culmination rather than an afterthought of part one 
becomes more clear upon the discovery that, when Kant first published part one as an essay in the Berlin 
Monthly (and when he published the first edition of the Religion), the parergon was then listed as a fifth 
section rather than as the passage of lesser importance as it appears in the second edition of the Religion. 
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ultimately political character of the work it is necessary to study the Remark.  
Furthermore, it can be no accident that that principle of critique is introduced in the 
neutral zone of the parerga, rather in within the boundaries themselves of mere reason. 
Reiterating the point that man makes himself good or evil based upon the 
propriety with which he incorporates the moral law into his maxims, Kant looks to the 
difficult question of moral progress once man his fallen.  Two things, “some supernatural 
cooperation” and one’s making himself worthy of such cooperation, appear to be 
necessary for a man’s full restoration to good; with this latter requirement is the further 
stipulation that he makes positive use of that cooperation once he makes himself worthy 
of receiving it.  Clearly the first requirement, supernatural assistance of some kind, is of a 
religious character insofar as it appeals to matters beyond human cognition, even the 
second requirement, a man’s making himself worthy of that assistance, “surpasses all our 
concepts” (6.45).  It is not immediately clear where morality strictly speaking ends and 
religion begins; although one might suspect – and his suspicions are borne out – that the 
matter of making oneself worthy is a matter of the disposition and thus rational at least 
insofar as it deals with something derived a priori from empirical evidence (cf. 6.20), it is 
still odd that the bulk of the General Remark is devoted to discussing this rather than the 
question of the divine assistance.  Then again, in the light of how speculative theology 
has been limited in the previous critical works, one might doubt that there is much to 
think or say about that divinity. 
From the start of raising the question of whether moral improvement is possible, 
Kant appears to take the point of view of the moralists from Seneca to Rousseau in 
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claiming that the possibility of moral progress necessarily presupposes “that a germ of 
the good remains in its whole purity, [which germ] cannot be eradicated or corrupted” 
(6.45; cf. 6.20).162  Because the demand in our souls is that we become better men such a 
thing must be possible, even if complete betterment is possible only with “inscrutable 
higher support” (6.45); that this last statement recalls the opening lines of the preface to 
the first edition (i.e. the “idea of another essence above him” [6.3]) indicates the 
beginning of the departure from pure morality and the extension of morality through 
religion – but this is a passing comment, and Kant is not quite ready to cross that 
boundary yet.  Instead, he remains on the level of discussing moral progress from the 
natural (or at least rational and hypothetical) and human point of view. 
The restoration of the original tendecy toward the good in us… is thus only the 
production of the purity [of law], as the highest ground of all our maxims, 
according to which it is not merely bound with other incentives, or subordinated 
to them (the inclinations) as conditions, but rather to be taken up in its whole 
purity as the sufficient determination of the Willkür.  [6.46] 
 
There is nothing particularly religious about this, although Kant suddenly relies on 
religious language to drive home the point – the man who incorporates into his maxims 
the purity of the moral law is “not yet holy himself” but yet “on the way into an unending 
progress” (6.47).   
 Apropos this road of endless progress Kant addresses the question of gradual 
moral improvement as seen in external actions that are taken to be virtuous; he thus 
embarks on one of many digressions in this General Remark, one that will be crucial to 
 
162 This tendency toward the moralists and philosophical pedagogues and away from the priest-religion is 
crucial to the political analysis of religion, as will be shown in chapter four below. 
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later comments about civil society.  For the present it is sufficient to note that Kant’s 
analysis of virtue is an illustration of the larger question of the inscrutability of the 
disposition163 and the resulting uncertainty about true moral progress: virtue in the legal 
sense, as an habitual, empirical, and phenomenal display of “lawful actions,” is not 
sufficient to the restoration about which Kant writes, for it is ultimately “according to the 
principle of happiness”: virtue “thus has the steadfast maxim of lawful actions, regardless 
of whence one takes the incentives that the Willkür needs” (6.47).  It is not morally good, 
for example for an immoderate man to become moderate because his physical health is at 
risk.164  By contrast, in the case of a man becoming morally good, he is “virtuous 
according to the intelligible character (virtus noumenon)” or in other words experiences a 
change in his very disposition.  The noumenal change, therefore, precedes and makes 
possible the phenomenal change if the latter is to have any genuine moral worth.  At this 
point the reader is reminded of the tenuous boundary between pure morality on one hand 
and religion on the other, for Kant equates moral, as opposed to legal, virtue with man’s 
being “well-pleasing to God” (6.47); furthermore one notes the recurrence of the 
cognition of duty which Kant uses later as part of his definition of religion (cf. 6.153).  
This reverberation of theological language culminates in the following passage: 
[Becoming pleasing to God] is effected not through gradual reform, as long as the 
groundlaying of maxims remains impure, but rather through a revolution in the 
disposition in man (a transition to the maxim of holiness [of disposition]); and he 
 
163 In the previous section Kant defines virtue as “conformity of the disposition to the law of duty” (6.37).  
Later on, he identifies “virtue striving toward holiness” as the “true object” of faith, and thus as the source 
and value of religion (6.132).  In a footnote added in the second edition, early in part one, Kant identifies 
virtue as “the firmly grounded disposition to fulfill one’s duty strictly” (6.23n.) 
 
164 For more on this, see the discussion of “a glimmering delusion of virtue” (6.132). 
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can become a new man, only through a kind of rebirth, as a new creation (John 
3:5; compare with Genesis 1:2) and a change of heart. [6.47]  
 
By “gradual reform” Kant means the enumeration of particular cases of a man’s 
phenomenal appearance of acting according to duty; this is insufficient because it does 
not get to the root, to what is “radical,” in that still-impure groundlaying of maxims.  
Instead, to strike at the root of the problem, a “revolution” must completely alter the 
disposition and start again.  The “new man” has directed his free Willkür to receive its 
influence from the original predisposition to good. 
 The challenge still facing Kant, however, is how to “reconcile” the opposed 
notions of (a) human inability to overcome the self-inflicted corruption of his very nature 
and (b) the command to be good, which as a command must be obeyed (here as before at 
6.45 Kant states that ought implies can).  The only possible answer, that this opposition 
suggests on one hand a revolution in the mode of thought and on the other a gradual 
reform in the mode of sense, preserves but refines the distinction into the following: 
provided he reverses his evil disposition (i.e. the supreme ground of his maxims) and thus 
becomes a new man, he makes himself according to principle and to the mode of thought 
“a subject susceptible to the good” (6.48) but yet in the mode of sense he can consider 
himself a “good man” only “continuous operation and becoming” and may hope to be on 
the path of moral progress.  The second half of this formulation is necessary because the 
“judgment of men” regarding their moral worth and the strength of their maxims is 
limited to the temporal grasp of sensibility; they can only hope that the hard work of 
acting in accord with good maxims is a sign of the gradual reform of the propensity to 
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evil as well as of the perverted way of thinking.  Only to God is the “intelligible ground 
of the heart (of all maxims of the Willkür)” and only to God can the “endless progress” of 
moral struggle be seen as a unity.  For determining the line between morality and religion 
in Kant’s thought this is crucial, for if man achieves the revolution in his disposition, he 
is “actually a good man (pleasing to him).”  One might wonder if Kant has answered his 
own question satisfactorily, but the ascendance of hope as the primary religious virtue – 
stripped of much of the theological character that it possessed prior to Kant – is key to his 
analysis of religion.  Inasmuch as becoming pleasing to God (which itself is restoring the 
moral law to its priority in determining the Willkür) is the point of religion according to 
Kant, the argument of the first General Remark contains the best indication of the moral 
importance of religion.  This view of the nature and purpose of religion is clearly opposed 
to many other views of religion, and thus it is not surprising that the Kant’s moral 
explanation of the character of religion is also useful as a tool of criticism of religion. 
 The succeeding paragraph of the General Remark is devoted to using the 
foregoing principles in outlining the type of “moral development” that is necessary for 
the transformation of the mode of thought and the grounding of a character, a 
transformation geared not to “a bettering of ethics,”165 which is the traditional method, 
but rather toward attacking the “universal root” of the various vices (6.48).  The new 
moral education – it is worth pausing to note that Kant indicates that the language of 
improvement, even to the point of trying to become well-pleasing to God, is geared to 
 
165 The striking use of “ethics” (Sitten) repeats Kant’s previous criticism of virtue of a merely legal and 
empirical character: this requires not a change of heart but only a change of ethics (6.47). 
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nothing more than the support of morality – although it cannot knowingly reverse the evil 
of the disposition, is a training in the hope that moral progress is possible and will 
transform into a being pleasing to God.  In this formulation one sees the error of the 
customary moral education that focused on ethics and individual vices: whereas virtuous 
actions ought not to be provided to the student for mere admiration, the example of good 
men (whose goodness is understood in relation to the law) may profitably be judged by 
“apprentices” so that the predisposition to good of these apprentices is “cultivated” when 
critical judgment uncovers “the impurity of many maxims from actual incentives of their 
actions” (6.48).  As a result of this education the predisposition to good “gradually 
changes into the way of thinking,” and the moral apprentice furthermore has the critical 
ability with which they can examine apparently good actions, an ability that will prove 
useful in Kant’s subsequent moral analysis of religious practice.   
 Instead of using virtuous actions as objects of admiration for moral apprentices, 
“something in our soul”166 may be used instead.  The incomprehensible tendency to good 
in every man, “proclaiming as it does a divine origin,” fills man “with the highest 
wonder” and is at the heart of moral education: 
Often to make lively this feeling of the sublimity of his moral determination is, as 
a means of awakening ethical dispositions, especially to be praised, because it 
directly operates against the inborn propensity toward the perversity of the 
incentives in the maxims of our Willkür, in the unconditioned respect for the law 
as the highest condition of all adopted maxims, in order to restore the original 
ethical order among the incentives, and with it the tendency toward the good in 
the human heart in its purity.  [6.50] 
 
 
166 The reader may be surprised, in one way or another, regarding Kant’s use of the word “soul” – that it 
appears so rarely in the Religion, or that it appears at all.  Another appearance is at 6.45. 
  117  
Again, the disposition is at the center of the argument. 
 Despite his talk of the moral student’s profit by considering the sublimity of the 
original tendency to good, Kant is still unwilling to let the reader forget the nagging 
question of how all this is possible.  It would seem that his two previous treatments of the 
question in the General Remark have not been sufficient, so he returns once more to the 
following question: “But does this restoration through one’s own efforts stand directly 
against the statement of the inborn corruption of men for all good?” (6.50).  The 
difficulty with his answer – yes, as regards our limited insight, but no, as regards the 
notion that ought implies can and in light of our ability to use our own effort and to hope 
for the best – is that it is virtually the same as the previous two answers, and so one must 
consider the reason for him to raise the question again.  This becomes clear when he 
explains the purpose of the “statement of inborn evil” in moral dogmatics – the 
propensity to evil is inextirpable, and so moral education must emphasize this to the 
detriment of the tendency to good which is, after all, connatural.  This would also explain 
the preponderance of discussion on the evil (sections two through four) rather than the 
good (section one only) in human nature in part one of the Religion. 
 The main line of argument in the General Remark at the end of part one is thus 
the fullest account of the relationship between religion and morality, and this is striking 
because the much larger share of authority is given to morality.  One may ask whether 
there is anything left in the religious dimension of the hope for moral progress that in the 
least resembles more common notions of religion.  The concluding paragraph of the 
Remark addresses this question in a way that would seem to indicate a negative answer, 
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suggesting that nonmoral conceptions of religion – that is, views of religion that are 
opposed to “this imposition of self-betterment” discussed in the preceding paragraphs – 
are result of the laziness of  
reason, which, by nature annoyed at moral labor, now summons, under the pretext 
of natural impotence, all kinds of impure religious ideas (to which belongs: to 
impute to God Himself the principle of happiness as highest condition of his 
commands).  [6.51]  
 
What is the “natural impotence” from which reason claims to suffer and which prohibits 
reason from aspiring to hope in moral progress based largely if not completely on human 
exertion?  Here is the entering wedge for a critique of religion based on moral principles 
of religion itself, and so subsequent pages of the Religion will be devoted to the analysis 
of nonmoral manifestations of the religious impulse – that is, of the attainment of 
happiness by means not initially one’s own.  To aid this analysis, Kant provides a basic 
division of religions, into which all of them fall; they are either religions devoted to good 
life conduct, and thus may be considered moral religion, or they are religions based on 
the self-flattery of man that God will make him happy if he only wishes for it and without 
any necessary moral exertion. 
At this point one might raise the question of how any of what Kant has thus far 
said is in the least controversial.  Kant might be said to be devotedly purifying religion of 
all that makes it irreligious, and that if religion is meant to make men into better men, 
then this is precisely what Kant is doing.  Kant is far from denying the existence of God – 
and in fact, in asserting the sublimity of the moral law and thus of man’s moral vocation, 
he seems to be speaking of matters more transcendent than one might expect in light of 
  119  
his critical works.  Yet this last point already admits of problems, for despite possible 
appearances there is nothing transcendent in any of this, inasmuch as Kant is presenting 
these matters a deduced a priori by reason.  The preceding and all further discussions of 
religion in the Religion is centered on the reasonable possibility of the bad state and 
resuscitation of the disposition in man – a disposition which, despite the occasional 
Biblical language (e.g. good or bad heart) used to describe it, is not a supersensible entity 
in any traditional sense: it is merely an inscrutable but logically necessary element in 
human nature.  Although the Religion is a part of Kant’s doctrinal efforts, one could 
hardly claim that there is anything dogmatic in the book, at least thus far, but one is also 
difficult to see anything offensive to traditional orthodox (at least Christian orthdox) 
religion. Kant goes so far in the present text, when he divides the kinds of religion, to 
include Christianity (which, in comparison to other public expressions of faith or religion, 
stands alone) in the division of moral religion rather than in that of the religion of cult.  
(That Kant implicitly omits Judaism, from which Christianity springs, and Islam, which 
at least shares its heritage with Christianity and Judaism, allows the reader to wonder 
whether the Abrahamic, Mosaic, and Davidic elements of Christianity can be so easily 
disregarded.  Kant will have more to say about this later.)  One might very well say of 
Christianity the following: 
It is a principle that everyone must, in order to become a better man, do as much 
as is in his power; and only then, if he has not buried he inborn talent (Luke 
19:12-16), if he has used the original tendency toward the good in order to 
become a better man, he could hope that what is not in his ability will be supplied 
through a higher cooperation.  [6.52] 
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Certainly no Christian thinker would argue that moral struggle has nothing to do with 
becoming pleasing to God, although members of different sects of Christianity might 
disagree as to the level of importance of such moral struggle.  It is nevertheless far from 
clear that, for Kant as well as for most Christians, this is the sum total of the Christian 
religion.  Whether a deposit of faith, aside from the moral faith of the individual man, is 
necessary to the moral religion seems to be doubtful here, and this will begin to raise the 
eyebrows of the orthodox: 
Also, it is not utterly necessary that man knows in what this consists; perhaps it is 
quite inevitable that, if the way how it happens were revealed at a certain time, 
different men would, at another time, make different concepts of it, and no doubt 
with all sincerity. 
 
The suggestion is not only that individual men, but also all sincere theologians, have no 
basis for assertoric statements about the nature of the needed moral cooperation.  
Sincerity, both in one’s conduct and in one’s hope for cooperation in the improvement of 
the very basis of his conduct, is the active ingredient in adherence to the moral religion. 
 Part one of the Religion has introduced the notion of radical evil as a natural and 
inextirpable fact of human nature, and has suggested – tentatively, and vaguely, in the 
parergon –  that it may be overcome in a way consistent with the moral freedom of man.  
The continuation of this inquiry in part two indicates that the suggestion is inadequate or 
inadequately formulated: part one has laid the grounds for the conflict between the good 
and evil principles, and part two, as we shall see, takes up the conflict itself and leads to 
the reasonable hope for the victory of the good but without yet addressing the manner of 
achieving that victory.  In the meantime, Kant in the second part also illuminates the will 
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under the aspect of eternity, i.e. the possibility of its attaining, after death, the good or 
evil principle forever. 
D. Morality Extended through (Moral) Theology 
 
Part two of the Religion, consisting of a brief introduction, two sections, and an 
accompanying parergon, continues the moral analysis of evil that Kant began in part one, 
but something is now different.  Whether it is merely the subject matter, or also the tone 
and even mode, the difference may be explained by the presence of the intervening 
parergon: whereas part one, with a few scattered fissures in the boundary line 
notwithstanding, went as far as it could without entering theological or mythical depths.  
Kant’s treatment of the effects of grace in the first parergon, and the reliance, if even 
merely for the purpose of example or clarification, keeps a prominent role and is even the 
subject matter of part two.  Of course, this does not mean that this part has a theological 
or dogmatic character so much as it constitutes a philosophical examination of data that 
are of an originally theological or dogmatic character.  That Kant has not suddenly 
converted to traditional Christianity in part two’s lengthy investigation, in more or less 
Christian terms, of the doctrine of justification, is clear from the beginning, in his 
identification of good and evil as principles rather than spiritual beings.167 
 
167 It is curious to note the increased boldness with which Kant operates after having emerged from the 
safety of the first parergon.  It is further curious that his reticence in part two, seemingly friendly to 
traditional Christianity, is in the second parergon.  These observations partially support a more serious 
theological investigation than offered in the present study, an example of which may be found in Schulz.  I 
do not mean to suggest that Kant does not take his own claims in part two seriously, but rather that he does 
not reach the brink of real theology and piety, as Schulz suggests he does. 
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 Part two, especially the first section, is the least explicitly political or social text 
of the Religion; it is the greatest obstacle to considering the latter as a work of political 
philosophy.  The theme of this part is the question of man’s becoming worthy through 
moral struggle, and Kant sets it in the context of the doctrine of justification.  It is, 
following and taking its bearing as it does from the first parergon, the most theological 
and abstract part, yet it serves to contribute to the answer of the question posed at the 
beginning of the Religion – the possibility of moral betterment – and Kant begins part 
two in a way that reminds his reader of the ultimately non-abstract, even non-theological, 
intention: the reader is constantly reminded of the need for active combat against the evil 
principle (6.57).  Kant’s reliance on the example of ancient stoicism leads him to observe 
the modern combination of misunderstanding and disrepute of the word “virtue” – and of 
the word “enlightenment”, which is a revealing comparison.168 
 Despite a serious error in their conception of the moral life, the ancient 
philosophers, and the Stoics in particular, are to be credited with the notion of virtue.  
Only to the extent that virtue has to do with brave combat with an enemy does Kant think 
it deserves its “lordly name.”  That it has often been “ostentatiously misused” despite or 
 
168 Furthermore, that there is a line connecting moral struggle, faith, religious practice, and social and 
political life is indicated from Kant’s useful twofold division of part two.  Section one is largely a 
furthering of the formal argumentation, though with the added presence of theological questions and terms, 
of part one, while section two, employing Christian scripture, is the application of what is discovered in 
section one’s formal argument to an historical presentation.  The difference between sections one and two 
of part two are similar to the transition from parts one and two to part three, i.e. a move from the 
moral/logical analysis of the concerns of religion to the social/political analysis.  Only with the former 
analysis as a basis, even if the terms of that analysis largely disappear, can the latter analysis and critique 
operate. 
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because of its name, might be insofar as these misuses deviate from the Latin or Greek 
meanings of the name. 
 The curious comparison of the Stoic “password”, “virtue”,  with the word 
“enlightenment” because both – recently in the case of the latter – are mocked makes 
sense only later (with Kant’s mention of “true enlightenment” at 6.176 [cf. 6.178], 
indicating that this word, too, has been ostentatiously misused), but it strikes the reader in 
bringing together two words whose significands were not necessarily thought possible to 
reconcile. 
 The error of Kant’s predecessors is directly connected to their otherwise centrally 
correct identification of virtue in relation to an enemy: they merely identified the wrong 
enemy and by extension an incomplete notion of transgression.  Here, in identifying the 
true enemy, Kant relies on the language of deception and secrecy that he used in part one: 
the enemy is not the natural inclinations, which everyone can see, “but rather more or less 
invisible enemy hiding behind reason and therefore all the more dangerous” (6.57): the 
Stoics ought to have armed themselves “against the malice (of the human heart) which 
undermines the disposition with soul-corrupting principles.”  The Stoic account lacked “a 
special positive principle” of evil in itself.  Evil is not a failure to resist the inclinations 
but instead, as Kant showed in part one, the choice of a principle of all maxims.  The 
introduction of principle to the notion of evil is important, as Kant can then show further 
that Biblical accounts of good combating evil are presentations by means of spiritual 
beings of what is a combat of principles, of starting points.  
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Kant takes the foundation laid in the discussions of human nature and the 
disposition and develops them through the rest of the Religion.  The moral core of 
religion, and the centrality of the disposition, is especially clear in the portrayal of Christ 
as a prototype of the good moral disposition, in the resolution of theological puzzles of 
conversion and justification, and finally in the notion of the creation of the God within 
man – the last of these marking the full extent of morality extending itself through 
religion to the concept of a moral legislator. 
Part two of the Religion, “On the Struggle of the Good with the Evil Principle for 
the Lordship over Men”, provides the development and subsequent application of the 
morally-informed principles of religion to explicitly traditional theological questions.  
This, of course, requires that it be a different kind of theology, for it treats the same 
matter as does St. Paul in his epistles but “in order to make for practical use a graphic 
concept of what is for us ungrounded” (6.59), thus relying on a modified version of 
Christian revelation in order to investigate further the question of the conflict in man 
between good and evil principles.169  Kant’s employment of the central doctrine of the 
Christian faith – God’s becoming man – is useful because, he will later note that Christ 
taught that “only the pure moral disposition of the heart can make men well-pleasing to 
God” (6.159).  As he notes early in part two, the hidden disposition, which in man is evil, 
 
169 The title of part two is the first occurrence in the Religion of the word Prinzip, which Kant does not take 
the trouble to define.  Throughout part one he uses Grundsatz for what appear to be the same as Prinzip.  In 
the second paragraph of part two, Kant uses Grundsatz instead of Prinzip (6.57), though the latter does 
appear in the accompanying footnote, apropos the stoic philosophers’ “universal moral principle.”  Later in 
the footnote, however, he uses both Grundsätze and Prinzip (6.58n.).  No effort is made here to differeniate 
between the two in translation, for, after several attempts, it was difficult to determine much difference in 
use. 
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is the “true enemy” of virtue (6.58n), and the transition in part two to religion is precisely 
so that man can put trust in his own moral disposition (6.62).  That Christ is somehow 
divine will enable Kant to demonstrate the moral use of religion, and that he preached the 
necessity of a pure disposition will be part of the reinterpretation of Christianity in the 
service of the critique of false religion. 
Of course, the way in which Christ may be understood to be divine is open to 
question inasmuch as He is “humanity170… in its full moral perfection” (6.60).  The 
discussion begins as follows, in a manner for which the reader of the Religion has not 
been prepared: 
That which alone can make the world an object of divine decision and the purpose 
of creation is humanity (the rational world-essence in general) in its full moral 
perfection, from which happiness is the immediate result in the will of the highest 
essence as its highest condition. – This man, alone well-pleasing to God, “is in 
him from eternity”; the idea of him goes out from his essence, he is no created 
thing but rather his only born son; “the Word” (the becoming!) through which all 
other things are, and without which nothing which is made exists, (because for 
him, i.e. for a rational essence in the world… everything has been made).  – “He 
is the reflection of his lordship.”  -- “In him God has loved the world” and only in 
him and through the adoption of his disposition can we hope “to become children 
of God”; etc.  [6.60-61] 
 
Because of the sudden rapidity of biblical quotations and references here, one almost 
overlooks the strongly human, not to say Kantian, meaning of Kant’s introduction of the 
idea of Christ.  Most striking is that Kant quotes several biblical passages referring to 
Christ but then, in the ensuing discussion, does not mention Him by name.  Using 
passages about Christ as an application of the speech of presentation to the matter of the 
 
170 Cf. 6.26. 
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good principle, Kant at the same time relies on the automatic association by his reader of 
Christ with those passages.  We get an indication of Kant’s purpose from the title of the 
subsection, “Personified Idea of the Good Principle” (emphasis mine).  Kant need not be 
discussing Christ at all, at least insofar as He is God Who became man at a determinate 
point in history.  Rather, Kant is using this idea, provided historically by religion but 
logically springing from reason – as he notes, “we are not its authors” – as a means of 
settling a problem he laid out in the preface to the first edition of the Religion, namely, of 
the possibility of binding together the “purposiveness from freedom and the 
purposiveness of nature” (cf. 6.5-6): it offers the means by which man can reconcile “the 
world” with “divine decision” and the “purpose of the creation” (6.60).  Even this insight, 
that man is the crown and thus somehow the purpose of creation, is taken from 
theological representation and transformed into a hypothetical teaching of practical 
reason.  Further, however, not man himself but rather a particular way of being man – 
that is, “humanity (the rational world-essence in general) in its full moral perfection” – is 
the idea at work here.  With this in mind the reader can proceed further and with the 
assurance that Kant is at present not necessarily urging belief in Christ.  In the larger 
picture, however, the reader is also able to note that the slow extension of morality 
through religion is manifest here.  In making Christ – or at least the idea that is 
represented biblically by Christ – the centerpiece of “practical faith,” Kant turns from 
taking seriously His divinity as the second Person of the Trinity and toward considering 
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Him as an “ideal of moral perfection” or a “prototype of ethical disposition in its whole 
purity” (6.61).171  Yet Kant lingers in the realm of religion, for, as he writes, 
We cannot think the ideal of humanity well-pleasing to God (consequently of a 
moral perfection possible for a world-essence contingent upon needs and 
inclinations) except as in the idea of a man, who exercises not only all human 
duties himself and at the same time spreads out through doctrine and example the 
good in the greatest possible circumference, but rather also although tempted 
through the greatest lures, to take over all suffering toward the most disgraceful 
death for the good of the world and even for his enemies.  [6.61] 
 
Kant’s derivation of imagery from accounts of the life of Christ is necessary for 
presentational purposes: man cannot conceive adequately the degree and strength of the 
moral disposition to become a good man.  The goodness of the good man is already 
visible through the command of the natural law, while the path to becoming such a man 
is accessible only through ideals supplied by religious imagery.  The ideal of a humanity 
well-pleasing to God is an object of faith but thus of “practical faith,” connected to 
practical reason and thus morality, and is the most concrete grounds given in the Religion 
for the man’s hope in becoming pleasing to God.  The hope is based upon man’s 
consciousness of a similar “moral disposition within himself” (6.62). 
 No doubt aware that he has intrigued readers with his use of biblical quotations to 
Christ but with an explanation of those quotations that makes their subject appear to be a 
mere idea, Kant poses the question of “the objective reality of this idea” (6.62).  From 
Kant’s point of view, this seems a useless investigation from the start – the idea of 
humanity pleasing to God “lies in our morally legislative reason” and thus “in a practical 
relation… has full reality in itself”.  After a dense argument reminding the reader of the 
 
171 The use of “ideal” brings to mind the discussion in the first critique of the Transcendental Ideal. 
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difference between concepts of nature and moral ideas or postulates and thus of the 
indemonstrable character of the latter, he concludes even more strongly: “No example 
from experience is thus needed in order to make the idea of man well-pleasing to God a 
model [Vorbild] for us; it lies as such a model already in our reason” (6.62). Of course, 
some would-be good men desire more, asking for evidence not through reason but 
through “miracles as credentials” of the possibility of a man being morally pleasing to 
God.  Such an exhibition of “moral unbelief” (6.63) is a man’s demand for something 
beyond the visible and empirical evidence of true virtue, that is, of “more than what he 
sees.”  The irony, of course, is that the moral doubter ignores the visible evidence of the 
invisible result of an hypothesis of practical reason (i.e. the disposition) in favor of 
something not only invisible but nonrational (i.e. miracles).172  More striking to the 
orthodox reader is the assertion that “according to the law, every man ought to appoint in 
himself an example of this idea,” for this plants the germ of a radical thought, the God 
within of one’s own making, that does not sprout fully until near the end of the Religion. 
 Although he has just asserted that it is impossible to demonstrate the possibility of 
the existence in objective reality of the prototype of humanity pleasing to God, Kant 
allows himself to speculate what it would mean to morality were “a man of such a truly 
 
172 In bringing up, somewhat artificially in light of the context, the question of miracles, Kant provides a 
segue to the second parergon, which appears a dozen pages later.  Although it has no title aside from 
“General Remark,” we learned from the note concluding the first parergon that it may rightly be titled 
“Miracles” (6.52).  Aside from a serious critique of the possibility of miracles, based upon both morality 
and knowledge, the parergon is notable for its opening line, which states that “moral religion… is to be set 
on the disposition of the heart and the observation of all human duties as divine commands” and thus 
prepares for the full definition of religion that is only given later in the Religion (6.84; cf. 6.153-54). 
  129  
divine disposition” to descend from heaven at a time in human history.  Of the possible 
difficulties the gravest is the danger such a fact would cause to man in his moral life, for  
the elevation of such a holy one over all the weakness of human nature would, 
from what insight we are able to have, be in the way of the practical adoption of 
this idea for our succession … [because] this distance from natural man would 
again be so unendingly great that the divine man could not more furnish an 
example. [6.64] 
 
The “natural man” would be led to think that holiness equates to a lack of moral struggle, 
and that virtue is an effortless result of one’s intrinsic holiness of disposition.  The 
problem with the notion of Christ as God made man, as hypostasis, is that His divinity 
obliterates the possibility of serious moral struggle within Him insofar as He has a human 
nature.  To take such a Christ as one’s prototype would thus mean to take on a view of 
moral life in which blessedness need not be earned, that is, that one need not make 
oneself worthy of God’s grace before receiving it.  Following this consequence, the 
importance of hope as the primary religious virtue drops away as well, and the religious 
man is left once again deceiving himself about his own moral worth.  Again we are 
reminded that reason itself is limited in these matters (6.64n) and that therefore the 
content of religious beliefs must somehow remain at the level of hypothesis or postulate.  
Anything beyond the consciously analogical level is sure to descend into 
anthropomorphism: although he is sure to deny that a hypostatization of God and man is 
absolutely impossible, the implications for Christian revelation are clear.  The Gospel is 
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merely a presentation of the principles of moral reason within us in the language of 
presentation.173 
 Having laid out the idea of humanity well-pleasing to God, Kant raises three 
“difficulties” that make its “reality” problematic.  The three difficulties with which Kant 
proceeds to deal – the permanent deficiency of human acts; moral happiness and the 
danger of overconfidence; and, “apparently the greatest difficulty,” the impossibility of 
wiping out an evil origin – all rely on the disposition and the possibility of a change of 
heart for their solution.  Insofar as the investigation into these difficulties is based upon 
moral rather than purely theological considerations, it comes as no surprise that the 
solutions themselves are of a rational-moral rather than theological nature.  A brief look 
at each of these difficulties and their solutions will serve to display this and also to show 
Kant taking an increasingly critical position. 
 The first difficulty springs from the observation that an infinite distance between 
the evil in human nature and the good (that is, the holiness of the law) to which we ought 
to tend, so man must assume in the disposition this holiness in germ form.  Also assumed, 
therefore, is the change of heart that makes possible the adoption by man of the 
“universal and pure maxim of the agreement of conduct with the law”; we can assume the 
change because it is a moral duty.  At this point comes the difficulty: “how can this 
 
173 Kant does take up, in the following section of part two, the Gospel account of Christ’s life and death, 
and treats it as such – with several crucial differences.  First, Kant still neither names Christ nor identifies 
Him as a God-man, but rather as a person of wisdom.  Second, that the “Jewish theocracy” is overthrown 
by the people inspired by Greek philosophy and in particular a doctrine of moral freedom, seems not to 
match the Gospel accounts.  One might go so far as to suggest that the person here has more of Kant in him 
than of Christ.  Third, and this is curious for a different reason, Kant introduces this account of Christ with 
a long discussion of Adam’s fall – but claims that this comes from the “Christian portion” of the Bible. 
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disposition be worth the deed, which is every time deficient?” (6.67).  Because we as 
men, the solution goes, are limited to temporal conditions when we conceive of cause-
effect relations and thus can only see the deed as a continuous but indefinite advance and 
thus also our goodness as always inadequate to the law, “on account of the disposition, 
which is supersensuous, from which betterment is derived, we are able to think this 
endless betterment of our goodness towards conformity to the law even if it is thought as 
deed (life-conduct), judged by one who knows the heart, as a complete whole” (6.67). 
 Kant introduces the second difficulty by suggesting that if man is assured “of the 
reality and constancy of a disposition that always advances in goodness” then “the so-
disposed man would be confident that to him ‘all the rest (whatver concerns physical 
happiness)’” (6.68; Matt. 6:33).  But:  
without any confidence in the disposition once taken up, steadfastness in it would 
hardly be possible.  But one finds it without surrendering oneself to the sweet or 
anxious enthusiasm, from the comparison of life-conduct led until now with the 
purposefulness already seized.  [6.68] 
 
Such an effort is “a glance into an immense but wished-for and happy future” and a look 
into a “blessed eternity” and thus “reassurance and confirmation in the good” and an 
incentive that need not entail a dogmatic position concerning man’s eternal destiny and 
whether it be good or evil (6.69).  This is an incentive without a transgression of the 
Schranken of reason’s insights, while the other choice is the taking up of “childish 
questions” whose considerations lead to uncommitted or dishonest hope (6.69-71n).174  
 
174 Concluding the rich footnote to this text, Kant writes, “Overall, if we confined our insight to the 
regulative principles (rather than to the constitutive principles of the cognition of supersensible objects, 
insight into which is impossible for us), which are satisfied with possible practical use, human wisdom 
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Yet at this point Kant does launch into theological language again, although clearly for 
metaphorical purposes: 
The good and pure disposition (which one can call a good spirit ruling us) of 
which one is conscious thus leads also the confidence in its own steadfastness and 
sturdiness, although only mediately, and is the comforter (paraclete), when our 
missteps make us care about its steadfastness.  [6.70-71] 
 
It is remarkable that, although the ostensible subject of this problem was overconfidence, 
Kant focuses more of his concern on despair. 
 Spending far more time on the third, and seemingly greatest, problem than on the 
first two, Kant introduces it thus: regardless of a man’s success in taking up a good 
disposition and however much he has been able to live it out, “yet he began from evil, and 
it is never possible to extinguish this guilt” (6.72).  The chief problem is therefore that 
“the preceding guilt”, i.e. radical evil, cannot be removed by another (6.72).  
Furthermore, “moral evil (a trespassing of the moral law as divine command, called sin)”,  
carries an “infinity” of guilt primarily because evil is “in the disposition and the maxims 
overall” (6.72).  In sum, we are right to be troubled that, even were we able, through a 
change of heart, to live in accord with a good disposition, our original debt of radical evil 
still remains and cannot be erased, not even by another.  The solution of this third and 
apparently greatest difficulty shows Kant making very technical distinctions and is the 
best showcase of the three of his turning age-old theological puzzles into moral questions 
to be examined and resolved by practical reason.  The heart of the solution is thus as 
 
would stand better in many ways”, and morality would not suffer as the result of sophistical claims to 
knowledge of things of which man will remain ignorant [6.71n]. 
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follows: Insofar as he is a physical, sensible being with an empirical character, he is still 
subject to punishment and must be so judged.  At the same time, according to his new 
disposition, which reflects his nature as an intelligble (not merely physical-empirical) 
essence, he is “morally another” essence (6.74).  This sets up the quietly stated but 
astonishing and bold suggestion that his disposition  
has as proxy of the sin-debt for him and for all who believe (practically) in him, as 
savior through suffering and death gives satisfaction to the highest justice, and as 
advocate causes [macht] that they can hope to appear before their judge as 
justified, except that (in this way of presentation) every suffering that the new 
man must take up in life while dying to the old is presented in the representative 
of humanity as death suffered once for all.  [6.74] 
 
Kant thus concludes, “Here is that excess over the merit of the works… which is supplied 
to us by grace.” 
 The question springing from this conclusion, however, is whether this idea of 
“justification” has any “practical use” (6.76).  Here Kant emerges from the theological 
orientation of his questions and returns to the act of critique, for this question is useful in 
a primarily “negative use”: one sees that expiations, be they ceremonial or penitential, 
cannot substitute for a change of heart or obscure the defect which only that change can 
supply (6.76).  So the “theological” solutions that arise from initially moral 
considerations are always subject to criticism on the basis of those moral considerations 
and by the practical reason that is concerned with them.175 
 The more difficult question of what man can look to or fear with respect to the 
end of his life and in terms of his life conduct (6.76) has, based upon the preceding 
 
175 Through this account, deception and insincerity make another, and lasting, appearance in Kant’s 
development of the concept of religion. 
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treatment of the three difficulties, two possible answers depending on whom one asks: if 
one asks the “judge” in man himself, whose reason cannot be bought off, he will judge 
himself harshly, but if one posits a judge other than the man himself, this man to be 
judged will plead for mercy on the basis of human weakness.  This “pretext” allows the 
man to think that he can avoid not only the harsh judgment but also the necessity of 
becoming disposed to moral betterment; at best he will rely on prayers and penances 
which do not have the change of heart at their core (6.77)  Kant ends his discussion of the 
three difficulties on a bitter note, and his disgust at those men who calculate beforehand 
how much evil they may do, suggests that the solutions to those questions can lead to 
further moral evil. 
 We should recall that Kant’s examination of these three difficulties occurs within 
the larger context of the first half of part two of the Religion, “On the Legal Claim of the 
Good Principle on the Lordship over Men”, and that the second, albeit shorter, 
examination of the identical claim of the evil principle is yet to come.  Rather than 
providing a precisely opposite account with the same philosophical-theological language, 
however, Kant chooses to present the latter claim by means of the “intelligible moral 
relation” that is found in the Christian part of the Bible, which is a “history” of the two 
opposed principles in man but “presented” as persons outside of him (6.78).  Such 
language indicates that it would be useful to keep in mind Kant’s previous discussions of 
or allusions to the substance of and reports about the teachings and death of Christ, for 
here he continues in his rather tendentious interpretive manner.  The reader should also 
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note in the passage in question the preponderance of legal language, which reflects the 
present concern of a claim of “right.”   
Kant begins his analysis of the “Christian portion” of the Bible by turning to 
Genesis (!), and tells of Satan’s rebellion, Adam’s fall, and the subjection of Adam’s 
descendants to the kingdom of evil.176  It is fitting for Kant’s position that the “evil 
essence” is a spirit and, thus not pleased by “earthly and bodily objects,” desires to 
dominate the minds of “the progenitors of all men” (6.79).177  All men naturally (an 
interesting and, for the moment, unexplained qualification) descended from Adam were 
made willingly made subjects of the kingdom founded by this personification of the evil 
principle because the attractions of worldly goods distracted them from the “abyss of 
corruption”  Thus far, one sees a deep agreement of the retold biblical narrative with the 
earlier moral account of the origin of evil insofar as the former echoes the latter’s 
predominant theme of willfulness and deception; although the biblical narrative might 
seem to differ from the moral narrative in the focus on “the good of this world” as the 
source of man’s moral misery (thus perhaps contradicting the opening of Religion part 
two), but this is to blur the distinctions Kant has already made in relating sensual 
incentives and the will in man’s moral life.   
 
176 Here one sees that the ambiguity, or even mystery, at the heart of Kant’s overall discussion of the origin 
of evil is made more clear by means of the Bible narrative, for “how [man] became so evil, so as to become 
untrue to his Lord, since there at the beginning he was good, is not known” (6.78); even the presentational 
version of man’s moral experience does not pretend to offer a full account. 
 
177 That God – the creator, owner, and overlord – does not destroy this rebel and his kingdom on earth gives 
Kant the opportunity to suggest that honesty about ignorance of things divine seems the most virtuous trait 
of the clergy (6.79n).  For more on this see chapter four below. 
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Despite the worldly dominion of the evil principle over men, however, the good 
principle still has a claim of right to domination of man, and this is most manifest in the 
existence of the “Jewish theocracy” – “a form of rule, which was ordered merely to the 
public reverence for its name” (6.79).  The ensuing discussion is a moral critique of the 
Jewish theocracy as a bastion of the good principle and sets the groundwork for the moral 
critique of religion as a whole that follows in much of the remainder of the Religion.  At 
the heart of the failure of the Jewish theocracy to preserve man under the dominion of the 
good principle is that men’s minds “remained attuned” to the “goods of this world” as the 
sole incentive.  For this reason they wanted to be ruled “through rewards and 
punishments in this life” (6.79).  Of course, from Kant’s moral point of view, it does not 
seem problematic that men would be concerned in “this world” and “this life”; the 
problem is the incentive of goods and the governing by rewards and punishments, for this 
is hardly in agreement with the view of morality given in the first preface to the Religion 
and in Kant’s earlier moral writings.  In other words, men under the Jewish theocracy 
erred not in living without regard to heaven or the future life but rather in the incentives 
themselves.  Kant continues by adding that men in the Jewish theocracy were capable of 
obeying only those laws that demanded ceremonies and observances; that these laws 
were “partly ethical,” and indeed civil rather than moral, means little insofar as external 
compulsion (rather than virtue or a change of heart: the moral disposition was “not at all 
in consideration”) was the key factor.  Nevertheless, especially because its slavish mind 
had been shaken by the Greek doctrines of moral freedom, the Jewish Volk felt “all the 
evils [Übel] in full measure of a hierarchical constitution” and was thus “ripe for a 
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revolution” (6.79-80).  At just this time there appeared, as if descended from heaven, a 
“person whose wisdom was even purer than that of previous philosophers” – a person 
whose “doctrines and example” showed him to be “a true man” and yet also an envoy not 
subject to the contract between the evil principle personified and the rest of the human 
race (6.80).  This point, the apparent moral innocence of this person, allows Kant the first 
of two lengthy footnotes on theological questions in this section of part two.  The 
sentence introducing the first footnote is admirable in its deadpan delivery – “To think as 
possible a person free from the inborn propensity to evil, that one allows him to be born 
of a virgin mother, is an idea of reason in comformity with a moral instinct that is 
difficult to clarify and yet also not to be denied” (6.80n) – but the ensuing discussion is a 
mockery of scholastic theologizing.  The conclusion of the footnote adds the following 
devastating punchline: “But for what is all this theory, pro and contra, if for the practical 
matter it is enough to present the idea as a symbol of humanity sublimating itself over the 
temptation toward evil (standing against it victorious)?” (6.80n).   
To return to the rightful claims of the evil principle, Kant quotes John 14:30, 
showing that the advent of this person sets the evil principle’s lordship in danger, since 
this “man well-pleasing to God” may cause other men to take up his disposition (6.81).  
For this reason, the personified evil principle tempts and persecutes the man and 
eventually “haunted him to the most disgraceful death” (6.81).  “And now to the outcome 
of this struggle!”  If viewed in legal terms (those of freedom), the death of this man is a 
manifestation of the good principle, but if viewed in physical terms (those of necessity), 
the death is obviously a defeat (6.81-2).  “But the good principle came down from heaven 
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into humanity not merely at one certain time but rather from the origin of the human race, 
invisibly… and has right of way in its residence” (6.82). 
 The moral outcome of this conflict is the breaking apart of rather than the 
overcoming of the evil principle, whose kingdom remains and who still offers earthly 
well-being as the final end of his kingdom.  Human will is not limited to this dominion, 
however, since the other, new, moral lordship offers to man freedom in the subjection to 
that lordship and protection from the enemy (6.82-3). 
The Biblical account of man’s position in relation to the good and evil principles, 
despite the mystical raiment of its manner of presentation, has a “spirit and a rational 
sense” that apply to, and bind, all men at all times, each of whom “cognizes” his duty in 
it (6.83).  The rational sense of the Biblical account, the essence of the Christian religion, 
is identical to that of Kant’s account and it is threefold: without a “really ethical” change 
in the disposition, salvation is not possible for man; fraud or satanic tricks, and thus a 
“self-criminating perversity,” rather than sensuousness stands in the way of this salvation; 
neither superstition nor enthusiasm, that is, nothing other than a well-led life conduct will 
overcome man’s corruption.  So concludes the main body of part two. 
After this summary it remains to be seen what the reader, and what the present 
study, is to make of part two as a whole.  Leaving aside for the moment the chief question 
of how part two does or does not conform to a reading of the Religion overall as Kantian 
political philosophy, one should first determine how or whether it follows from and 
builds on part one.  Part one introduced the question about human moral betterment 
apropos human nature and the hiddenness of the disposition, followed by the parergon 
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making suggestions about the possible role of grace in that betterment.  Part one was 
placed by its title in the context of a cohabitation in man of two opposed principles, and 
the connection with part two is obvious from the title of latter, in which the two opposed 
principles are shown in conflict.  That part two is divided into two sections results in a 
rather pronounced difference between its halves, for the first, which deals with the legal 
claim of the good principle over man, takes up the theological questions as discussed 
above, while the second, which deals with the legal claim of the evil principles over man 
and with the struggle itself and its result, is less abstract and more biblical and historical, 
and religion itself is more visible to the reader.  Yet the concluding paragraph of part two 
(if we exclude the parergon) does not shift the focus from the moral to the social or 
political, but rather turns the reader from thinking about Christianity as an historical event 
and toward thinking about what the Christian scripture presents as rather historically and 
theologically unlimited truth about human nature and the constant conflict within it.  
Salvation comes from a good disposition which does not defraud or engage in 
superstition or enthusiasm.   
Part two, taken as a whole, therefore, is quite obviously not a discussion proper to 
political philosophy; its first half especially is the investigation of certain traditional 
theological questions that Kant now puts to practical use apart from claims of holding 
their revealed basis to be true or false.  This nonpolitical character of part two ought not 
to give us pause, however, not only because later, more explicitly political texts of the 
Religion will rely on it, but also because some smaller social-political indications already 
exist.  Chief among these is Kant’s first reinterpreted presentation of Christianity as the 
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public emergence of a moral doctrine and the struggle against the evil principle (6.79-82, 
particularly 6.81-2n.).  Furthermore, the argument of part two relies heavily on scripture 
and on theological questions that spring from it; that the scripture and the theology 
themselves play a role in supporting or subverting religion is therefore a question which 
is here introduced but not treated; it may be said to be a social or political question in that 
these things always occur in those contexts, among many and not lone moral agents.  
Also the idea of a humanity well-pleasing to God is first and foremost for the purpose of 
individual moral betterment, but it presents itself publicly, and has public effects.  
Finally, part two is full of legal terminology, which hints that the solution to the moral 
problem is not from within morality but from a public institution; this legal language is 
intensified and combined with explicitly political language in part three.  From these 
observations we can conclude our consideration of the first half of the Religion by 
suggesting that morality necessarily extends itself through religion into political life, and 
in this way part two prepares for the more explicit political content of the rest of the 
book.  At this point we have discussed morality at length and religion and politics much 
less so.  We now turn to them head-on, by looking first at the beginning of part one again 
and second at the third part of the Religion; these texts together suggest a new beginning 
to the book178 and lead to its central teaching, which is taken up in the next two chapters. 
 
178 See the introductory comments in chapter one.  Additionally, Schweitzer has observed a real break 
between parts two and three of the Religion as well: “If we keep in mind that in the second [part] it is as a 
matter of man considered as an individual, and that man in general (in so far as he comprehends within 
himself the societal bond with mankind) is the subject under consideration and dominating the presentation 
in the third; and if, furthermore, one is aware of how little the third [part] refers back to the second one, one 
will rather incline toward the assumption that in both [parts] basically the same problem is treated under 
different presuppositions about the subject” (Schweitzer, p. 301).   
  141  
                                                
4.  As Soon as He is Among Men: The Religion and Political Life 
Thus far we have considered the Religion in the light of its continuation and extension of 
Kant’s account of the moral life; now we turn more directly to those elements of the book 
which take up religion in relation to political life.  The most explicitly political 
discussions are found in part three, which is both a continuation of and a departure from 
the first two parts of the Religion.  It is a continuation insofar as it situates religion, as an 
extension of morals discussed in parts one and two, in the larger context of politics, 
history, and culture; the placement in this larger context, however, also suggests a 
departure in that the discussion of religion is recommenced from a different point of 
view, as if to suggest the inadequacy of the previous analysis.  This is true, but only 
partly so, for if we look again to the initial discussions of human nature and morality, 
especially as presented in part one, we see from the start that Kant is not thinking of 
man’s moral life in abstraction from his natural as an animal that lives in proximity to 
others.179  In a larger sense, if we keep in mind that the four parts comprise a unity, we 
find that only in part three does Kant address fully the initial challenges posed by the very 
opening of part one, i.e. what we have called the third beginning of the Religion.180  The 
intervening part two, largely an exploration of issues related to certain elements of part 
one and to the preface to the first edition, both completes part one in its moral 
 
179 Compare, for instance, the discussion of the comparative element in animality at 6.26 to the discussion 
of the sociality of evil in the second paragraph of part three, at 6.93-94. 
 
180 The passage in question is the original introduction to the work, insofar as part one, published by itself 
in the Berlin Monthly with the title “On Radical Evil in Human Nature,” had no introduction aside from its 
opening sentences.  For this reason one can say that this is the foremost of the introductions to the Religion 
as a whole.  Here one sees the statement of the problem to be worked out, rather than a synoptic statement 
of the relationship of morality and religion or of rational and revealed religion. 
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questioning and interrupts the resolution to its opening political-historical setting.  
Despite the centrality of morals to the Religion, then, only by considering religion in a 
political-historical context do we read the Religion properly.  This is not to suggest that 
the moral element of the doctrine of religion can be ignored without either misreading the 
argument of the book or distorting the very basis of the political discussion.181 
 Thus far we have followed Kant’s argument for the inevitability of religion, of 
moral faith, and seen how it would respond to long-standing questions of Christian 
theology such as justification and presumption.  There is, however, the unsettling thought 
that Kant has not provided us with an adequate notion of what religion182 itself is or does, 
and that what he has provided is largely an abstraction.  Many of his readers, in his time 
and now, would expect a book about religion to take up its public character, for common 
usage of the word, at least in the present time, identifies religion with public life; the life 
of the individual might by us be called “spiritual” but not “religious” unless that 
individual derived some or all of his determination from membership in a church.  
Furthermore, many of us would say that religion with the paucity of dogmatic beliefs and 
observational practices that Kant has so far presented seems less a religion than a 
personal code.  These very confusions that we hold are dispelled in Kant’s treatment of 
 
181 Kant’s moral thought very clearly animates his political thought, as is clear from not only the Religion 
but also from Toward Eternal Peace, published not long after the Religion, which is a firm call to political 
life to accommodate the demands of morality; only were the path cleared through a reform of religion, and 
thus of ethics, would this call be met with any success.  If there is to be improvement in political life, it will 
be by way of the Religion, which itself takes as its starting point Kant’s moral thought.  An interesting side 
note is that the essay on peace was written at a time when Kant was forbidden to write on religion (see 
chapter five below for details), but the close connection between the religion book and the peace essay 
suggests that the latter is a surrogate for a fully articulated continuation of the former. 
 
182 Earlier, chapter two examined his definition of religion, but recall that that definition does not appear 
until the beginning of part four. 
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religion in its social context.  This treatment will consist in an argument for the necessity 
of religion through church-faith, which is a necessary continuation of the extension of 
morality into religion; a critique of church-faiths as they have existed in history insofar as 
they deviate from morality and have grave political as well as moral consequences; and 
finally the plans for a reform of church-faith.  Although the Religion is identified as a 
doctrinal and not a critical work, Kant’s doctrinal efforts are always preceded and aided 
by the spirit of critique. 
 Although Kant’s treatment of religion in public life seems dependent on the moral 
(and perhaps epistemological) teaching already examined, the social or political aspect of 
religion is sounded as a concern at the very beginning of part one.  Let us therefore return 
to part one, which we have already treated in the light of the first preface, and begin 
again. 
A. The Historical Problem and Human Nature: Rereading Part One 
The book begins with a “complaint,”183 and a serious one at that: “That the world lies in 
evil” (6.19).184  That the complaint, and the opening words of the Religion, comes from 
the Christian Bible is not adequate to gain Kant’s approval or immediate agreement, for it 
is not unique.  It is a complaint “as old as history, even as old as the still older poetry, yes 
equally old with the oldest among fictions, the religion of priests.”  So the complaint, 
 
183 That “Klage” may also connote “lawsuit” is useful to keep in mind, in light of the preponderance of 
legal terminology to be found throughout the Religion. 
 
184 Kant, quoting 1 John 5:19, uses “Arg” and not, as elsewhere in the book, “Böse,” for “evil.”  Also, in the 
passage about to be quoted, Kant speaks of a fall into “Böse” and toward the “Ärgern”.  Cf. “Der Mensch 
(selbst der ärgeste)” (6.36). 
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which we might note is not part of a larger complaint but quite the contrary,185 in its 
antiquity surpasses history and equals poetry and priest-religion; perhaps it is as old as 
man himself, and thus a complaint bound up with who or what man is.  It is not entirely 
clear that Kant claims that poetry and the priest-religion are of the same age, but that they 
together predate history and are both fictions186 gives them a prerational or prescientific 
character.  Prior to man’s historical self-consciousness of himself and his actions, man 
expressed his self-consciousness through these fabrications. 
The complaint, bound up with the fiction of the priest-religion, takes its bearings 
from another human fictional or poetic utterance: “All allow, nevertheless, that the world 
began from good: from a golden age, from life in paradise, or from an even happier life, 
in communion with a heavenly essence.”  The unanimity is striking; “all,” presumably all 
men, assert the beginning of the world from goodness.187  Obviously this assertion of the 
original goodness of the world is understood in opposition to the claim always made that 
the world now lies in evil, whereby the present world is held in contempt by its 
 
185 The context of the passage is as follows: “We know that any one born of God does not sin, but He who 
was born of God keeps him, and the evil one does not touch him.  We know that we are of God, and the 
whole world is in the power of the evil one.  And we know that the Son of God has come and has given us 
understanding, to know him who is true; and we are in him who is true, in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the 
true God and eternal life.  Little children, keep yourselves from idols.” (RSV trans.) 
 
186 The priest-religion is one of many fictions (Dichtungen), and thus has some relation to poetry 
(Dichtkunst). 
 
187 This echoes the clause from 1 John 5:19 (“We know that we are of God…”) that precedes the quoted 
complaint. 
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inhabitants because it does not compare favorably with the golden age, life in paradise, or 
communion with a heavenly essence.188 
Then, with the third and last sentence of the paragraph, pregnant with foreboding 
and more characteristic of the author than is generally thought, Kant presents the full 
problem with which he will concern himself in the Religion: 
But they allow this happiness to vanish as a dream; 
And now they hurry the fall into (moral) evil 
(with which the physical always goes in the same pair) 
toward the evil one with an accelerating fall: 
so that now189 (but this “now” is as old as history) we live in the last time,  
the youngest day and the destruction of the world is at the door, 
and in some regions of the Hindu lands,  
the world-judge and destroyer Rutra (otherwise called Shiva or Shiwa) 
is already venerated as the now powerful god, 
after the world-holder Vishnu, 
tired of his office that he accepted from the world-creator Brahma, 
laid it down centuries ago.  [6.19] 
 
The reader is struck first by the appearance of “happiness” and then wonders what Kant 
claims about it.  According to this conception of a golden age, happiness was not a moral 
problematic such that desiring it caused its possessors to weaken the command of the 
moral law: happiness was already a possession, and so its possessors might at the same 
time have been worthy to be happy.  At least in this conception, then, there is no moral 
evil.  One might wonder about Kant speech in that not the conception of happiness so 
 
188 The phrase, “communion with a heavenly essence”, reminds of other passages about highest or superior 
essences in the Religion, for instance at the insistence that no higher essence above man is necessary  for 
him to cognize or observe his moral duty (6.3).  This original communion is perhaps restored or improved 
upon by means of the notion of the God within or further by means of the ethical community described in 
parts three and four. 
 
189 The word translated as “now” is “jetzt”, which, in that it has wider connotations than another German 
word for “now” – “nun”, can also mean “already”.   
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much as the happiness itself vanishes: Kant suggests that to lose this conception is to lose 
the reality of happiness as well, and so man has created for himself his own fall.  The 
reader is also forced to puzzle about the identity of the “they” in the “they allow… to 
vanish”; is it the “all” of the previous sentence, or is it the agents of the priest-religion, of 
the first sentence?190  Intriguing ambiguity aside, it seems more likely that the “they” is 
the “all” who hold the good origin of the world, but this does raise the question of why 
they would allow this happiness to remain only as the remembrance of a dream.  That the 
happiness vanishes as a dream does not indicate whether the happiness can be recovered 
or whether, even if it were recovered, it would have the status of anything more than a 
dream. 
 Yet, as the next clause of the sentence indicates, that happiness vanishes as a 
dream is not the result of the passivity (as the “allow” might suggest) alone of the “they,” 
for “they” furthermore now hurry the fall into evil toward the evil one with an 
accelerating fall.  Here again is a question that is suggested but not answered: why would 
“they” willingly hurry this fall?  (One is at first glance tempted to take advantage of 
Kant’s use of biblical language here, but the moral argument of the Religion makes clear 
that the representational language of the scripture limits our cognition of the matters that 
it addresses.  As we shall see later, that the representational language is of an historical 
character cannot be used by Kant in the explanation itself of the history.)  Also worth 
noting is Kant’s parenthetical illumination of the kind of “evil” that he has in mind.  
 
190 Furthermore, one could also inquire into the relationship of the use of “lassen” in the second sentence 
with the use of the same word in the third sentence, i.e., whether “lassen” might be meant differently. 
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Rather than a mythical or spiritual idea of a demon or devil, despite the imagery 
borrowed from Hinduism and the quotation from John, the evil he has in mind is both 
moral and physical; suggested is a growing degeneration or perversion of moral life 
accompanied by physical effects whether war or disease or plague. 
Kant underlines the gravity of the situation and the pessimism that might well 
accompany it, for – at least according to the “they” – “we now live in the last age, the 
youngest day and the destruction of the world is at the door,”191 and this is reflected in 
the eastern veneration of the world-judge and destroyer in place of the abdicated wor
holder.  Not only is the world held to lie under the evil one; it is about to end amidst 
moral and physical evil, and even its sustaining gods are seen to be exhausted.  Strangely, 
Kant inserts into the comment that this “now” is as old as history (thus not necessarily as 
old as poetry or the priest-religion).  First one notes a suggestion that we may reasonably 
be cynical about the claim of an accelerating fall, but second we see the linking of the 
beginning of human history, of human self-knowledge perhaps, with the conscience of 
this pending destruction.  It is strange because both the dream of happiness and the 
complaint that the world lies under the evil one are older than history, whereas the 
awareness of the destruction is not contemporaneous with the dream or the complaint.  
One implication is that the knowledge of the accelerating fall (whatever this means) 
initiates history in the first place, so that history is the working-out of the knowledge of 
this falling. 
 
191 From the second and third sentences of the first paragraph we thus have three sets of opposites of 
beginning / now  – golden age / last age; life in paradise / youngest day; communion with heavenly 
essences / the destruction of the world. 
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 Kant has thus provided us with several themes in this first paragraph of part one 
of the Religion: the collective human notion of a golden age; the willful passing away of 
this age and the hurrying into moral and physical evil; the rule of the evil one; the 
destruction of the world; the antiquity of these widespread beliefs; and the nearly co-
extensive antiquity of the “now.”  Either the world itself or at least man’s idea of his own 
place within it and its survival is a matter of serious doubt.  For this reason Kant can be 
said to be tackling the question of the dominion of the world by the evil one and the 
subsequent coming destruction of the world on two simultaneous levels, one in terms of 
whether the world may well be destroyed, and the other in terms of what makes man 
think that this is so.192  All told, this is a terrifying depiction of the course of the world 
and of man’s view of his moral and physical future.  That there is any hope in this view is 
denied in the quotation from Horace that is linked to the statement of the accelerating 
fall: “The age of our parents, worse than that of our grandparents, bears us, more 
worthless and soon about to give more vicious offspring.”193  This poetic gloss on 
acceleration indicates the certainty that future generations are increasingly depraved.  
Horace begins this ode by providing the context in which this continuous degeneration is 
to be understood and the conditions under which it might be halted and even reversed: 
“Innocent Roman, you will expiate the faults of your elders, until you rebuild the temples 
and the tottering sanctuaries of the gods and the statues filthy with black smoke.  You 
 
192 These questions are again raised, and treated somewhat differently, in “The End of All Things,” the 
essay written just after the Religion.  For an examination of this essay, see chapter six below. 
 
193 Aetas parentum, peior avis, tulit nos nequiores, mox daturos progenitum vitiosiorem  (Horace, Odes, 
III.6.46-48). 
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rule, lesser than the gods you cherish: every beginning is from this; attribute a happy 
outcome to this.  The neglected gods have given to Italy many sorrowful evils.”194  From 
what we have seen already from parts one and two, Kant does not share fully Horace’s 
opinion of the addressee’s innocence, that he is undeserving of his moral situation.  
Horace indicates the need for an expiation that is explicitly religious in terms of 
veneration or worship rather than of moral conduct, but the suggestion from the middle 
part of the ode is that the two are linked at least as cause and effect.  It is a question for 
readers of the Religion, then, to what extent Kant sees the relation similarly.  On the basis 
of what we have already seen, though, we are led to wonder whether Kant is about to 
display much concern with the restoration of temples, sanctuaries, and statues of gods.  
By the end of our examination of his teaching on religion and chuch-faith, we shall be 
certain that he is not – generally speaking. 
 Fortunately, for those readers of Kant who are not so pessimistic, there is another 
opinion offered for consideration.  The “newer but far less widespread… contrary heroic 
opinion” that is currently held only by philosophers and pedagogues – “that the world 
moves straight ahead in the reverse course, namely from bad to better, incessantly 
(although hardly noticeably)” (6.19-20) – takes into account the human tendency toward 
improvement.  The problem with this opinion, however, is that while it might be true of 
an improvement of “civilization,” the experience found in “the history of all times” 
shows that we cannot hold such an improvement in terms of moral good itself.  Because 
 
194 Delicta maiorum immeritus lues, romane, donec templa refeceris aedesque labentes deorum et foeda 
nigra simulacra fumo.  Dis te minorem quod geris, imperas: hinc omne principium; huc refer exitum: di 
multa neglecti dederunt Hesperiae mala luctuosae  (Odes, III.6.1-8). 
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neither the priestly nor the philosophico-pedagogical opinion seems fully acceptable, 
Kant attempts to find a middle way, and does this by launching into the a priori analysis 
of human nature and the will that has been sketched out in the previous chapter of this 
study.  As we have noted at the beginning of the present chapter, however, that early 
analysis illuminates not only Kant’s explicit concerns about the relationship of morality 
and religion but also, as one would expect, sheds light on the question about whether man 
(and the world along with him) is morally (and physically) progressing or degenerating.  
Let us look again to the analysis in part one of the human tendency toward good and 
propensity to evil, where we find even at the start the view of the possibility of the 
sociality of moral evil. 
 An application of Kant’s presentation of human nature directly to political life 
may seem problematic insofar as his immediate concern is not with “unlawful actions” 
but with maxims that are unobservable.  And yet it is the submoral elements in human 
nature that contribute to the taking up of maxims that are morally evil which in turn may 
(or may not) result in unlawful actions.  We must proceed with care, and not attribute to 
the argument what is not there, namely a purely materialist/determinist account of evil in 
human beings: “the ground of evil cannot lie in any object determining the Willkür 
through inclination, not in any natural impulses, but only in a rule that the Willkür itself 
produces for the exercise of its freedom, i.e., in a maxim” (6.21).195    
 
195 It is important to note that here Kant is speaking of all human beings, i.e. as a species, rather than about 
individuals; if some were by nature good and others evil, then Kant would be unable to investigate them as 
members of the same species.  Further “anthropological research” is necessary on this matter (6.25).   
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 Kant proceeds to examine the human tendency to good and propensity to evil.  As 
we saw in our previous chapter, Kant’s depiction of the fundamental “determination of 
man” is a combination of elements some of which might be reminiscent of Hobbes, 
Rousseau, and Kant’s earlier writings on morality.  Looking again at the original 
tendency (or at least the first two of its three stages), one sees that with the tendency and 
thus potency toward good, there seems also a real possibility for evil, almost as if to make 
the tendency morally neutral.  For example, Kant describes the tendency to animality as 
“physical or merely mechanized self-love” whose chief interests are self-preservation, 
reproduction, and community or society.  Reason is not “required” for this tendency, and 
perhaps it is because of this that “all sorts of vices” “can be grafted” onto the tendency.  
Although Kant is quick to assert that the vices “do not of themselves issue from this 
tendency as a root” (6.26), it is curious that Kant defines “propensity” as “actually only 
the tendency to desire and enjoyment which, when the subject has experienced it, arouses 
inclination to it” (6.29 note); thus the propensity to evil is an inevitable alteration of the 
tendency to animality, and thus of the tendency to good in general.  Whereas the 
description of animality reminds the reader very much of Hobbes in the early chapters of 
Leviathan, the description of the tendency to humanity recalls Rousseau second 
Discourse;196 here Kant moves from “physical or merely mechanical self-love” to “a 
self-love which is physical and yet involves comparison” so that “only in comparison 
 
196 This distinction between the teaching of Hobbes and Rousseau might be misleading, insofar as Hobbes, 
although his initial account of man is mechanical, certainly does not omit the tendency toward comparison 
and supereminence, and Rousseau, although this latter has a primary role in his account, is building upon 
rather than working against Hobbes’ initial mechanical account.  The comparison is nevertheless useful 
provided it is not taken too strictly. 
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with others does one judge oneself happy or unhappy” (6.27).  While there is an eleva
from man as merely mechanical to an evaluative or comparative being, the original 
appearance of value-neutrality still remains.  Yet, as in the case of the tendency to 
animality, the tendency to humanity possesses a neutrality only “originally” – that is, the 
original tendency to humanity causes in man a desire of equal worth in others’ opinion, 
while they can lead to “vices,” such as jealousy and rivalry, that are caused by the gradual 
development of “an unjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself over others.”  
Particularly noteworthy is the description of just what kind of vices would be “grafted” 
onto the tendency to humanity – “the greatest vices of secret and public hostility” 
(6.27).197  It is among the first references in the Religion to deception and Kant’s special 
revulsion toward it.  It is also clearly an indication that society, not just the moral life of 
the individual, will bear the brunt of such vices.  Moral evil inevitably extends itself to 
social and political evil. 
 With the third element of the tendency to good, the tendency to personality, this 
changes, for now the moral law – rather than natural desire or need for esteem – is for 
man “a sufficient incentive to the Willkür” (6.27).  Personality is the most important of 
the tendencies for moral life because of the increased role of reason, which was absent in 
animality and which was “subservient to other incentives” in humanity (6.28).  The 
 
197 These so-called “vices of culture,” though “grafted” onto the tendency to humanity, “do not really issue 
from nature as their root but are rather inclinations…, for nature itself wanted to use the idea of such a 
competitiveness (which in itself does not exclude [or: promote] reciprocal love) as only an incentive to 
culture.”  That the tendency to humanity can be so perverted as to take on “the idea of a maximum of evil 
that surpasses humanity” (6.27) means that the tendency itself is not responsible for the evil possibilities – 
and, then, it could hardly be credited with good results either.  The question thus remains how the first two 
tendencies can be called tendencies to good, rather than tendencies to the possibility of good or evil. 
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autonomy of practical reason results in a “susceptibility to mere respect for the moral law 
in us” (6.27).  The moral law, as seen by the element of personality, is the sufficient 
determinant or incentive of the Willkür.   Although personality determines man morally, 
and is thus the most crucial element of the tendency to good for purely moral purposes, 
the presence in man of animality and humanity has effects that cannot be ignored, for 
only by the effort of personality is man able to control or channel them; this must be 
understood in such as way, though, as not to suggest that Kant is a stoic who sees 
physical incentives as the cause themselves of moral evil. 
 Nevertheless, in concluding the discussion of the tendency to good, Kant adds 
more definition to particular matters.  “All these tendencies in man are not only 
(negatively) good (they do not resist the moral law) but they are also tendencies to the 
good (they demand compliance with it)” (6.28).  This is puzzling, as the question of the 
moral law does not even enter into the analysis of animality or humanity; furthermore, on 
their own terms (i.e. so long as they are not informed or incorporated into personality), 
both animality and humanity are quite easily grafted onto vices, and it thus seems that 
these two tendencies do not conflict with the moral law because they are never 
confronted with it.  Kant’s analysis and conclusion to the contrary, there seems no reason 
to suggest that the first two tendencies will comply with the moral law, and quite a bit of 
reason to suggest that they will resist and conflict with it. 
 Furthermore, the tendencies are important because they “are original, for they 
belong to the possibility of human nature” (6.28).  So the tendency to good is a potency 
rather than a guaranteed actuality.  Human nature, then, is not determined but rather 
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directed toward the tendency to good.  Because this is only possibility, the tendencies to 
animality and humanity, as one would suspect, can be used “against their purpose” but 
man “cannot eradicate” them.  Despite vice, then, the tendency to good remains a 
possibility, if not the possibility. 
 In turning from the subjective ground of good to the subjective ground of evil in 
human nature, Kant also shifts from the concept of tendency to one of propensity.  This 
propensity exists in man universally, and man has a propensity to evil just as a savage has 
a propensity to alcoholic intoxication (6.29n).  Like the tendency to good, the propensity 
to evil may be divided into three levels – of frailty, impurity, and depravity. They all 
relate to the level of weakness or absence of the moral law in one’s adopted maxims.  
Any incentive other than the moral law can lead to agreement with or violation of the 
moral law, and so any of them must be viewed as potentially evil.  “The maxim, by the 
goodness of which all the moral worth of the person must be assessed, is therefore 
contrary to law, and man, despite all his good actions, is nevertheless evil” (6.31).  Kant 
has thus laid out an understanding of man that makes possible good actions and good 
maxims while preserving the evil that remains in his heart, for the “mere propensity” to 
evil “cannot be eradicated” (6.31).   
 This more complete account of the human tendencies and predispositions, as well 
as their possible social and political consequences, now leads more clearly into the 
empirical proofs offered by Kant in section three of part one, “Man is by Nature Evil.”198  
 
198 Religion 1.3 was treated very briefly in chapter three above, but see that chapter’s discussion of Kant’s 
use of Horace, Satires, 1.3.68. 
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These proofs give clear evidence that the concerns of Kant in the Religion are the 
concerns of the political philosopher, perhaps especially to one who is sympathetic to the 
early modern project of Machiavelli, Bacon, and Hobbes.  Relying on what has been said 
in the two preceding sections, Kant explains that the statement, “man is evil,” indicates 
man’s conscious “(occasional) deviation” from the moral law (6.32).  To make the 
additional statement that man is by nature evil is a reflection of the human race, based 
upon the knowledge of man from experience, according to which one cannot judge him 
to be other than evil.  So section three is a confirmation from experience of what Kant has 
attempted (and will continue to attempt later in section three itself) to show from a priori 
considerations about man’s disposition (but with an exclusive emphasis on the propensity 
to evil).  As Kant himself says in a note concluding section three, “this contains only the 
confirmation of this [moral judgment] through experience” (6.39n).   
 From the examples which Kant provides it is clear that the human propensity to 
dishonesty is an underlying fact, linked even to those instances of evil deeds that would 
seem to be derived merely from aggression or bloodlust.199  It is not only the evil deeds 
themselves that are social and political, but the very justification for them, as a willing 
deception, is, too – as Kant concludes by stating that “This dishonesty, with which we 
obscure our sight, which halts in us the grounding of a genuinely moral disposition, then 
 
 
199 An indication of this is provided in Kant’s elaboration on the example of purposeless cruelty as seen in 
the “enduring war” between two Indian tribes: as with civilized peoples, the praise of bravery is the stated 
reason for the cruelties of warfare that is truly without benefit.  Although something is to be said in 
admiration for occasions in which honor is seen to be more desirable than any other goal, beneath the praise 
of bravery not honor but rather superiority and destruction that are “actually” the good and the purpose for 
the deeds.  The participants in the wars, then, are deceptive or dishonest as to what really motivates them. 
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extends itself also externally toward falsity and deception of others” (6.38).  Underlying 
the evil deeds is this dishonesty, which indicates that we are, to use terms already 
introduced by Kant, unworthy if not malicious.200  To bear this out, let us examine the 
particular examples Kant provides. 
 It does not seem necessary to prove the existence of the natural propensity to evil, 
thanks to “the crowd of howling examples, which the experience of the deeds of men 
place before our eyes” (6.32-3).  Kant’s examples of bloodshed and dishonesty201 counter 
the hope of any philosophers who desire to “come upon the natural goodness of human 
nature”, whether in the savage or the civilized state.  Our expectations of simple and 
peaceful noble savages are disappointed by “the scene of unprovoked cruelty”, “never-
ceasing [cruelty]”, “ever-enduring war”, and “vices of rawness.”  The “civilized state,” in 
which the tendency to good ought to be and is “more fully developed,”202 is rife with “a 
long melancholy litany of accusations against humanity”203 as follows: of “secret falsity” 
even among the most intimate friends; of “restraint of trust” as a “universal maxim of 
prudence” in such friendships; of a “propensity to hate him to whom one is bound”; a 
 
200 Regarding dishonesty, Kant continues as follows: “This dishonesty… lies in the radical evil of human 
nature, which… constitutes the foul spot of our race…”  (6.38).  The germ of good will not develop without 
until we bring it forth. 
 
201 As we shall see, even though here his explicit task is to show the grounds we have for accepting the 
existence of radical evil in man, these marks of radical evil also characterize much of the effect of churches 
and church-faith in the world. 
 
202 Although moral evil becomes an unremitting danger when man is surrounded by his fellows, if he were 
not among them his tendency toward good might well remain a mere potency, or at least would not exist in 
its fullness. 
 
203 “Accusations” translates “Anklagen,” which thus echoes the “Klage” that opens part one.  “Humanity” 
is the second tendency that Kant outlines in section one of part one and has the prototype as its 
exemplification in part two. 
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“heartfelt well-wishing” that nevertheless does not overcome pleasure in the misfortunes 
of friends; many other vices “concealed under the appearance of virtue” as well as others 
which are not hidden.  By this time we must turn our eyes away from these vices of 
culture and civilization, for fear of acquiring the vice of misanthrophy (6.33).  But if we 
turn to the international situation we find further examples, and in so doing we are also 
led to consider the present concern of Kant in the Religion in comparison or in relation to 
the concern of his essay “Toward Eternal Peace.”  Civilized peoples exist toward one 
another “in the relation of raw condition of nature (a state of standing warfare)” and hold 
stubbornly to remaining in this relation (6.34).  War, Kant notes, is the “this scourge of 
the human race” (6.34n), but one sees also at work the “foul stain” of human nature: 
states, the “great societies” of which the peoples are members, extend the dishonesty and 
deception in the very conduct in relation to their neighbors, for they operate according to 
basic-statements which directly contradict “public pretext” and which no philosopher has 
been able to reconcile with morality.  The situation of international relations, a wondrous 
placing together of the natural state and the civilized state, thus offers the viewer of 
humanity no more hope for optimism than did either of its constituent parts on its own.  
Even if the state is some utilitarian cessation of open warfare between its members, the 
war continues beneath the surface for them and at the same time extends in a more or less 
open manner to neighboring states.  The state is no haven for morality. 
 In expanding on the significance of the state for his portrait of the evil of man, 
Kant employs his darkest language and looks with his most grave eye regarding the 
course of human life.  “If one looks at the history of these merely as the phenomenon of 
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the mostly concealed inner tendencies of humanity, so one can become aware of of a 
certain machinelike going of nature, according to purposes which are not theirs (the folk) 
but rather the purposes of nature” (6.34n).  A state, hoping to show its own preeminence, 
conquers its neighbors and in so doing reaches out for monarchical rule of the civilized 
world, until, becoming a monster by destroying freedom and law within and without 
through consuming its neighbors, it eventually breaks apart from “uproar” and 
“dissension”.  This swallowing up and breaking apart occurs over and over, thus 
maintaining the existence of war, that which “makes more evil men than it takes away.”  
This footnote meditation of the state in history is puzzling because Kant seems to have 
turned to a mechanical determinism when considering international relations and also, in 
identifying war as the maker of evil men, identified war, not the human disposition, as the 
author of evil.   
 Although the reflection on the relations of states is helpful as an illustration of the 
evil in human nature that he is showing in experience, it is such a captivating problem as 
to distract from Kant’s present purpose.  This is clear when Kant points out that the hope 
for a reasonable solution to the international problem (eternal peace through a union of 
peoples as a world republic) is ridiculed just as is the hope for the “perfected moral 
betterment of the entire human race”: both philosophical and theological chiliasm are 
seen as enthusiasm (6.34).  The hope of the philosophical and the hope of the theological 
chiliast would then seem two separate things.  Is the doctrine of religion thus not political 
philosophy?  First of all, one would have to determine whether Kant would name himself 
either (apropos the problems taken up in “Toward Eternal Peace”) a philosophical or 
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(apropos those in the Religion) a theological chiliast.  Despite the seeming moral naivete 
of some of Kant’s pronouncements about morality and politics and the peace essay, the 
same essay communicates a hesitation and even doubt about the success of a world 
republic.  Is Kant a theological chiliast?  It would seem that he is, and the qualification 
“perfect” quoted above, unlikely a result as it would seem, does seem to be part of Kant’s 
project of hope, for hope in no way is wishful thinking or self-delusion based on vague 
desire.204 
 Getting back to the original question of whether, if Kant is a theological chiliast, 
the political teaching of the Religion can be said to be political philosophy, perhaps we 
are forced to call it social philosophy insofar as it does not deal directly with states.  On 
the other hand, the concern of philosophical chiliasm, as it arises in Kant’s presentation 
of international relations, seems to be founded on the concern of theological chiliasm: if 
the moral-ethical-religious problem can be solved or at least softened in its effects (i.e. if, 
through the success of religion as Kant understands it, the everyday relations of men 
might be bettered due to firm resistance to the propensity to evil), this solution or 
softening might well be extended into the international problem.  One would think that 
the path toward international reform would be cleared by the success of religion and thus 
the successful resistance of (if not overcoming of) radical evil.  We could thus argue that 
 
204 Yet George Kelly asserts that the “decisive argument against chiliasm… is made in Kant’s treatise on 
religion… In the ‘End of All Things’ he uses similar arguments to repel the notion of spatio-temporal 
apocalypse.  Reactionary providence and revolutionary consummation are rejected… The only revolution 
that Kant really endorses is the moral one, as described in his work on religion… What Kant wished for, 
above all, was this revolution in thought on the part of rulers, so that their people might receive discipline, 
enlightenment and justice, and on the part of teachers, so that the cultural base of morality might be 
gradually expanded” (Kelly, pp. 152-3, 158). 
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what seems to be social philosophy or social theology in Kant is rather a preliminary step 
in addressing a problem of political philosophy; perhaps in a similar way much of the 
Wealth of Nations, erroneously called economics, provides a solution to a problem of 
political philosophy without being purely political in nature.  Of course, this assumes 
what is not yet clear, namely what Kant means by religion and what exactly it has to do 
with political life in the first place. 
 In the first place, or shortly thereafter, many of Kant’s readers might be struck 
that religion often seems pernicious rather than beneficial, whether one is thinking of 
individual or political cases.  There is much evidence in the Religion to convince those 
readers that they are correct, but an important set of distinctions goes along with that 
evidence. 
 Setting aside that “On Radical Evil in Human Nature” is only the first of four 
parts in the Religion, it would be useful to consider it as it was originally published by 
itself, that is, to see to what extent the answer it begins by proposing is answered within 
its own pages.  Such a consideration leads the reader to the last clause of section four (i.e. 
the clause preceding the beginning of section five, known in later printings as the first 
parergon): for man, who “despite a corrupted heart yet always has a good will, remains 
hope of a return to the good, from which he has wandered” (6.44).  Part one thus answers 
the beginning problem of moral progress as drawn out by Kant from the original 
complaint about the world, but it does not answer the complaint itself, inasmuch as the 
complaint extends to more than the problem of individual good and evil.  The complaint 
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ultimately points to the political, or social, question of morality and religion,205 which 
Kant begins to address explicitly at the beginning of part three.206  
B. The Necessity and Nature of Church-faith: A First Reading of Part Three 
 
Our second reading of part one of the Religion has given support to the suspicion that 
even those opening considerations of morality and religion are not completely abstracted 
from matters of social and political importance.  Even before reading part three, “The 
Victory of the Good over the Evil Principle, and the Grounding of a Kingdom of God on 
Earth”, we know from experience that the very setting of religion itself is not in 
abstraction either, but part three shows us why that is.  In part three, particularly in the 
first of its two divisions, “Philosophical Presentation of the Victory of the Good over the 
Evil Principle under a Grounding of a Kingdom of God on Earth”, Kant reveals the social 
necessity of not only the religion that he has presented but also of churches.  Churches 
are an object of study for the political philosopher not only because they appear in and 
influence public life but also because their necessity springs from it. 
 Part three follows directly upon part two.  The main thread of part two culminated 
in Kant’s demystified account of the revelation of “moral lordship” as a serious rival of 
 
205 One might object, from the following passage, that the Religion does not offer a political or social 
interpretation of religion: “From religion on earth (in the narrowest meaning of the word) one can demand 
no universal history of the human race; for it is, grounded on pure moral faith, no public condition but 
rather each man can be conscious of the progress which he has made in it only for himself.” (6.124).  The 
sentence immediately following, however, admits that such a history is possible based upon observation of 
churches, which, one might expect, manifest the agreement with or deviation from that pure moral faith. 
 
206 The last sentences of 3.1.7 (i.e. pp. 6.123-4) represent the completion of Kant’s attempt to answer the 
question with which part one (and the Religion proper) begins.  The rest (3.2 and 4) is elaboration and 
critique, not doctrine.  Part two, as well, displays its social-political importance in the way in which Kant 
sets up the analysis of justifcation: it is pertinent to “our species” and it will alter public teachings 
concerning what is meant by virtue and enlightement. 
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the evil principle, which has not destroyed the lordship of the latter so much as 
disintegrated its unchallenged ability to rule (6.82-83).  Freedom from the lordship of the 
evil principle is the most that the morally well-disposed man can expect “in this life,” but 
because he remains an open target for the evil principle “he must from then on always 
remain armed for battle”, and he is “bound”, insofar as this constant openness to attack is 
his own fault, to do all he can “to work his way out of” his “dangerous condition” 
(6.93).207  The force working against him is not a personified evil principle, and it is not 
his natural passions either.   
If he looks around for the causes and circumstances which draw him toward and 
hold him in this danger, so he can easily convince himself that they come to him 
not from his own raw nature, insofar as he exists as isolated, but rather from men 
with whom he stands in relation or in combination.  [6.93] 
 
If left to themselves, his natural needs are “only small” and his condition of mind is 
“moderate and still.”  This reminds very much of Rousseau’s picture of the natural man, 
and this should lead us to recall the discussion of quasi-Rousseauan humanity in part one 
of the Religion.  That tendency toward humanity, especially as regards the inclination of 
competitiveness that is connected to it – i.e. of the “vices of culture” (6.27) – seems to be 
at work in the dangerous condition Kant is now describing: 
 
207 The word for “bound” is verbunden, which is in italics in the original.  The word has many appearances 
in Kant’s earlier writings on morality.  In this section of the Religion Kant uses many times variations on 
the words Verbindung (“combination”) and verbinden (“to bind” / “to combine”), and an effort has been 
made for the English renderings to share the common idea.  At times there is an unfortunate oddness, as 
will be seen when “combination” appears instead of something like “association”; the reason for this is not 
only to preserve the etymological relation to Verbindung but also to underline the connection in meaning to 
religio.  The word for “condition” is Zustand, which when necessary is otherwise translated as “state.”  One 
is tempted to be consistent in translating Zustand as “condition” – both because the English “state” carries 
with it the connotation of a necessarily political entity, and to avoid confusion with Kant’s occasional use 
of Staat – but English philosophical speech has a tradition that makes “ethical natural condition” sound 
pedantic or odd. 
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Envy, domination, greed, and the hostile inclinations combined with them 
presently bombard his in itself satisfied nature, when he is among men, and it is 
not even necessary that they are already sunk in as if in evil and are set out as 
misleading examples; and it is sufficient that they exist, that they surround him, 
and that they are men, in order to spoil one another mutually in their moral 
tendency and to make one another evil.  [6.95] 
 
Again one sees that Kant links evil not with something otherworldly and demonic, or 
even with something terribly dramatic, but rather with ordinary human beings.  The only 
element necessary for the dangerous condition is that a man be in proximity to his 
fellows; they need not be evil at all to threaten his own moral disposition.  
Because evil exists in a social context, the only protection against the constant 
danger of falling into evil, the only cause for hope in victory of the good over the evil 
principle, is also social: “The lordship of the good principle, insofar as men can work 
thereto, is therefore, so far as we have insight, not otherwise reachable, as though the 
erection and extension of a society according to, and on behalf of, laws of virtue” (6.94).  
The idea of a society is not an accident of history but the act of reason as it “puts out the 
flag of virtue” that will unite men in an effort to gain the “upper hand” on the evil 
principle. 
But here Kant speaks not of religion but of virtue.  In all of the synonyms he 
suggests for names of the proposed combination under laws of virtue – ethico-civil 
society, ethical community, ethical state, kingdom of virtue – not one includes the words 
“religion,” “faith,” or “church.”  “An ethico-civil condition is that which [men] are united 
under… pure laws of virtue” (6.95).  The transition from part two to part three of the 
Religion, from personal morality to (apparently) public virtue, which mirrors the activity 
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of reason itself, is thus striking in several ways.  First, as just noted, there is an early 
absence of the talk about religious faith and dogma that the reader would now expect.  
Second, the emphasis is now on virtue, an external quality that may or may not reveal a 
change of heart and thus a disposition turned toward the good.208  Third, as the reader has 
already begun to see, part three of the Religion takes on the language and some of the 
thought of Hobbesian political philosophy, whose notion of a state of nature, in which 
man is abstracted from political life, is recycled into Kant’s presentation of an ethical 
state of nature, which exists even within political society (6.95).  These three 
observations indicate that Kant proposes to undertake first a philosophical and then an 
historical, rather than a theological, presentation; this goes hand in hand with the overall 
structure of part three, which is divided into a philosophical presentation and then an 
historical presentation of the victory of the good principle.  A look at the order of the 
seven sections of division one further illuminates the philosophical character of the 
discussion, for we see Kant beginning with the theme of society and laws of virtue, then 
moving to the people of God, then to the proper interpretation of scripture, and lastly 
back to the pure religious faith whose public establishment and maintenance is the chief 
concern of this part of the book.  Within these seven divisions is the basis and 
development of the idea of the transmission of a public faith, acting as a vehicle or 
surrogate for pure religious faith, made present and maintained in a church. 
1. “On the ethical state of nature”: In the ethical state of nature, as in the political 
state of nature, there is no common public authority, but the ethical state of nature 
can continue to exist even when and where a political state of nature has been 
 
208 On the significance of virtue, see chapter three above. 
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abandoned and a political community entered.  Because of its very relationship to 
moral freedom, no man can be compelled to leave the ethical state of nature.  The 
ethical community, i.e. that for which man leaves the ethical state of nature, is 
transpolitical but subject to political laws insofar as its existence is public. 
 
2. “Man ought to depart from the ethical state of nature, in order to become a 
member of an ethical community”: Because there exists a common human end of 
promoting the highest good as a common good, the human race has a special duty 
to itself to leave the ethical state of nature and to join the ethical community.  
Implicit in this special duty is the idea of a higher moral essence. 
 
3. “The concept of an ethical community is the concept of a people of God under 
ethical laws”: The ethical community is not legislated by the people, for moral 
laws require the idea of a legislator whose commands are also true duties and who 
can penetrate to the disposition of every man.  This ethical community, a people 
of God under the laws of virtue, can be contrasted to a people of God under the 
laws of statutes in that the latter is an historical reality rather than a philosophico-
moral necessity. 
 
4. “The idea of a people of God (under human organization) is not carried out other 
than in the form of a church”: Human hands, i.e. human Sinnlichkeit, limit the 
attainment of the ethical community, but man must still hope for divine assistance 
in that attainment.  In preparation for this assistance men must rely on the true 
visible church, which can be identified by its four marks and which is a mere 
representative of God’s state and has no resemblance in its constitution to a 
political community. 
 
5. “The constitution of each church goes out every time from some historical 
(revealed) faith, which one can call church-faith, and this is grounded, in the best 
case, on a holy scripture”: Because human nature is weak, pure faith is not a 
sufficient grounding for a church.  Statutory faith is often a necessary vehicle for 
that pure faith, and so a book of holy writings might on fortunate occasion 
harmonize the two.  From this it becomes clear that there is one true religion but 
many faiths (and with them churches).  A church usually tries to identify itself as 
the one true church, and comes up with notions of unbelief, heresy, and 
orthodoxy, the latter being either despotic or liberal; variations in this last 
characteristic, rather than specific theological positions, serve as the chief 
differentiation of Catholic and Protestant. 
 
6. “The church-faith has the pure religion-faith as its highest exegete”: Because of 
the human need for concepts to be transmitted in terms of sensuous experience, a 
preexisting church-faith is a necessary means of introducing the pure rational 
religion; this process often involves a (sometimes forceful) exposition of a 
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revealed text.  Since the moral bettering of man is the purpose of the rational 
religion, it will also be the criterion used in the exposition of these texts.  There 
are three claimants to the office of expositor (exegite, scholar, and man of 
feeling), but only the first has genuine claim to authentic exposition.  Public 
freedom of thought can preserve the benefits of the second. 
 
7. “The gradual crossing-over of the church-faith to sole leadership of the pure 
religion-faith is the approach of the kingdom of God”: In contrast to the 
universality of the true church, every historical church-faith is particular; if the 
latter is consciously attached to the former as a mere vehicle, one may call this 
phenomenon the true church – that is, the true church “militant,” with the prospect 
of becoming the church triumphant upon uncovering the pure moral religion.  
Saving faith is the faith held by those living worthy lives, and can be found within 
any church-faith that moves toward becoming the religion of reason.  If this 
crossing-over is accomplished merely in principle and not fully in actuality, one is 
still right to see that the good principle is approaching its lordship in men, a 
lordship which “assures the world of eternal peace.”   
 
Such is the main argument, with some important qualifications left out for later 
consideration, of the first division of part three.  Having expressed the main argument let 
us examine more closely the origin of religion in public life, the difference between 
religion and faith, and the nature of the church and its relationship to political 
government.   
 The Hobbesian picture of the political state of nature, in which every man is his 
own judge and in which there is no common external or public law, is translated into an 
ethical context: without an ethical community, even while within a political community, 
man is in a state of nature, ethically speaking.  What does this amount to, aside from its 
appeal as an analogy between Hobbes and Kant?  Kant has already begun to show, at the 
beginning of part three, what that ethical state of nature looks like, and now reiterates 
using much the same language (6.97; cf. 6.93-94), but with a further elaboration with the 
language of Hobbes: 
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As the condition of a lawless external (brutal) freedom and independence and of a 
war of all against all, from which men ought to exit, in order to enter a political-
civil condition, so is the ethical natural condition a public battle of principles of 
virtue and a condition of inner unethicality, out of which natural man ought, so 
much as possible, attempt to exit.  [6.97] 
 
The solution for Hobbes was that man in the state of nature sees that his own reason 
commands him, for the sake of self-preservation, to quit his dangerous condition and to 
agree to live under a powerful sovereign power and its laws.209  One imagines that Kant 
cannot keep up the analogy with Hobbes much longer without being forced to posit the 
necessity of coercive laws of virtue, whose authority he has just (6.95) denied.  It is 
crucial to keep in mind that, even though it has a public bearing insofar as it determines 
actions, it is “(inner) morality which here is alone the concern” (6.99).  The reader then 
wonders who or what will be offered by Kant as a replacement for the sovereign.  
Certainly someone or something will be necessary, or the exit from the ethical state of 
nature would seem to be an illusion. 
 In revealing that God is the lawgiver – though this must be understood very 
carefully – Kant, in a manner that is merely suggestive in comparison to its companion 
passage in the earlier Critique of Practical Reason, 210 produces the concept of God.  The 
first reaction to the possibility that God is the legislator of the ethical community is to 
recall Kant’s assertion in the first preface, in seeming contradiction to the present point, 
 
209 The most relevant passages are from Leviathan, chapter 13. 
 
210 Kant considers the existence of God as a postulate of pure practical reason in the second Critique is at 
5.124-32.  In those pages Kant argues the moral necessity of assuming God’s existence; provides the 
definition of religion that is later given in part four of the Religion; and provides a clear relationship of 
morals and religion in that the former teaches how to become worthy of happiness and the latter offers hope 
of that happiness to the degree that one is worthy of it. 
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that morality does not need the idea of an essence above man for the cognition of his duty 
(6.5).  And in the present discussion, Kant agrees that such a source of moral legislation, 
without further qualification (see the “not as merely” in the present text), would not 
produce laws that were ethical or that would result in virtue (6.99).  Rather, 
Only one such can be thought as the highest lawgiver of an ethical community, in 
respect of which all true duties, consequently also the ethical, at the same time 
must be presented as his commands; from there it must also be a noticer of hearts, 
in order also to see through the innermost of the dispositions of each and every 
one and, as his deeds are worthy, to allow what is due.  But this is the concept of 
God as a moral lord211 of the world.  [6.99] 
 
Kant escapes contradiction because he never claims that the duties themselves are 
determined or given to man directly or originally from God alone.  Rather, upon seeing 
the command of the moral law within him, and thus his duty, man is to cognize that duty 
as a command of God.  The connection between the concept of God and the concept of 
religion follows from this, insofar as the will of God is at the “ground” of religion: 
Since all religion consists therein, that we regard, for all our duties, God the 
lawgiver to be universally revered, so it comes with the determination of religion 
in intention our behavior, to know how God wills to be revered (and obeyed)… In 
regard to [purely moral laws], each man can himself cognize through his own 
reason the will of God, which lies at the ground of his religion; for the concept of 
the divinity actually originates solely from the consciousness of these laws and 
from reason’s need to assume a power capable of procuring for them the full 
effect possible in this world in conformity with the moral final purpose.  The 
concept of a divine will, determined merely according to purely moral laws, 
allows us to think of only one religion which is purely moral… [6.103-4] 
 
This is a very striking claim, that at the ground of religion is the will of God, and that this 
will of God can be cognized by man himself “through his own reason”: there truly is no 
essential dogmatic component of religion, for its first principle seems to come from 
 
211 Compare the discussion of the evil principle at 6.79. 
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within man or at least to be defined from within man.  It is not surprising later in the 
Religion that Kant speaks of the need for man to make for himself a “God within.”  
Kant’s claim about origination of the concept of divinity brings the reader back to the 
opening concerns of the first preface; not morality itself but human reason has a need for 
assurance of the efficacy of “conformity with the moral final end” (cf. 6.5).  Because of 
the need of reason morality extends itself through religion (6.6). 
 The present concern is not directly with the moral religion but with a 
philosophical account of religion in public life, and Kant’s exploration into the origin of 
the concept of God is a beginning step toward the development of religion in public life.  
Although Kant has not provided evidence that such a concept of God, and such an 
explicit desire for the ethical community as an exit from a perceived ethical state of 
nature, was consciously at work in the founding of any religious group in history, the 
suggestion is that such things were, at least unconsciously, at the basis of each of them.  
He has not, however, claimed that the ethical community as presented has ever been 
erected in history, and reason to think its concrete existence unlikely springs directly 
from human nature: the “sublime” idea of an ethical community is “never fully 
reachable” and is “very much diminished” in human hands212 due to the restrictions 
imposed by the conditions of sensuous213 human nature (6.100).  Kant is not explicit 
 
212 The problem of “human hands” is not new in the Religion; cf. 6.7 and the opening line of the first book 
of Rousseau’s Emile. 
 
213 While the first edition of the Religion has “sensuous” (sinnlichen) here, the second edition has “ethical” 
(sittlichen).  Assuming for a moment that the change in the second edition is not a typographical error, that 
man’s ethical nature is responsible for making the sublime ethical community unreachable is a curious 
claim. 
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about how human sensuousness inhibits the erection of an ethical community,214 but, in 
light of the moral danger in which man finds himself when surrounded by his fellows, 
something approaching that community must be attempted.  An institution (Anstalt) “able 
to present only the pure form” of this community is the best possibility.  That man’s 
nature makes impossible the realization of the ethical community, and that man is 
nonetheless able to present – in some degree of purity – the form of that community in an 
institutional establishment, indicates again the simultaneous human need for religion and 
the human propensity to corrupt it.  “But how can one expect something so perfectly 
straight to be built from such crooked wood?”   
Kant then reformulates the relationship between the idea of the ethical community 
and the best possible approximation of it: “An ethical community under the divine moral 
legislation is a church, which, as it is no object of possible experience, is called an 
invisible church” (6.101).  This is the prototype – the same term Kant used in his part two 
discussion of the envoy – for the humanly governed institution that replaces the idea of 
the ethical community.  “The visible is the actual union of men toward a whole which is 
attuned to this ideal” (6.101), although one must be clear that it is “considered as a pure 
presentation of a state215 [governed by] God” rather than that state itself (6.102).  One 
would expect, as a result of Kant’s emphasis on the primacy of the internal moral law 
over external human authority, that his notion of the visible church lacks distinction 
among its members, but, there is a necessary subordination insofar as it is a society with 
 
214 One possible reason is found at the bottom of 6.109. 
 
215 The word for “state” here is Staat, not Zustand. 
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public laws that are to be obeyed.  The “congregation”216 is therefore overseen by the 
“servants” who see to the concerns of the invisible head of the church.   
 Details as to what this church would look like are scarce, but Kant does list the 
four marks of “a true church”.217  He replaces one, holy, catholic, and apostolic with 
universality, quality, relation, and modality.  Some readers might find these new marks of 
a true church oddly familiar, as if part of some Kantian joke,218 but they do seem to 
illustrate the nature of the church that Kant has in mind.  The first mark, universality, is 
similarity to its counterpart insofar as the universality reflects unity of principles within 
the church rather than the quality of being widespread or common to all humanity; this 
latter quality, which would seem to necessitate a constant missionary project, might 
always be called universality, although Kant does not seem interested in it.  According to 
the mark of universality in his idea of the church, diversity of opinions on accidental 
matters is to be expected, but there can be no schism as concerns the “essential 
intention”.  Universality is crucial in the considerations of the church that follow in the 
next sections.219  The mark of quality is glossed “purity” and thus reminds of the second 
 
216 The word translated here is Gemeinde. 
 
217 The indefinite article seems to allow for more than one true church and to suggest that the truth of the 
church is less the possession of a doctrine than the honesty in according to which it exists in relation to 
virtue and the moral law – yet the inference of a multiplicity of true churches is seemingly rejected by the 
mark of universality.  Further, the indefinite article in sections four and five turns into a definite article in 
the title of the all-important section seven. 
 
218 See KrV A80/B106 and KpV 5.66. 
 
219 In section five Kant makes clear that the degree to which a church is not grounded on pure religious 
faith makes impossible that it be a universal church (6.102-3); in section six he reiterates this and further 
mentions that universality is “the most important mark” of a church’s “truth” (6.109); and in section seven 
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grade of the propensity to evil (cf. 6.30), and the equation of Lauterkeit with an absence 
of “superstition” and “enthusiasm” points toward the moral critique of church-faith (see 
part four).  A church identified by the mark of quality will unite its members under purely 
moral incentives and will thus avoid feeding them on “nonsense” and “madness” (6.102).  
The mark of relation is understood and is to be seen in terms of internal and external 
freedom, according to which the members of the church are not constrained by each other 
and the church itself is not constrained by the political power or powers in which it exists.  
The fourth mark, modality, means that the constitution of the church is, except when it 
comes to matters of administration that are linked to context of circumstance, 
unchangeable.  The unchangeableness is rooted not in a conservative or reactionary 
insistance of fidelity to old traditions that were arbitrarily determined but in the 
realization that the principle on which the church was founded was the unchangeing 
purpose of the moral life. 
In short, then, Kant’s idea of a true church is that it be free of internal 
disagreement concerning fundamental principles; that its members are united through 
purely moral incentives; that its members have the relationship of freedom to each other 
and that it itself is free in relation to the political state; and that it does not deviate from 
the unchanging principles on which it was founded.  Kant concludes his short sketch of 
what the church would look like by denying a perfect analogy between it and a political 
constitution: the former resembles a family with an invisible father much more than it 
 
reiterates this second point by stating that the “Distinguishing mark of the true church is its universality” is 
that the church is necessary and determinable in only one way. 
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resembles a monarchy, aristocracy, or a democracy.  There is no pope, patriarch, bishop, 
or illuminatus: a true church is rather “a free, universal, and continuing union of hearts” 
(6.102).  We need not wait for Kant’s historical analysis of churches to see that, 
especially in the light these comments and of the mark of quality, his philosophical 
presentation of a true church excludes both Catholic and Lutheran churches but that it 
might allow for something in the Unitarian vein.   
 This consideration of the necessity and nature of a true church, since we were led 
to differentiate between pure ethical community (and thus religion) and church, leads us 
to the point of clarifying the difference between religious faith and church faith.  
Compared to the other, each has a very different effect in a public context.  In his brief 
presentation of the relationship of “revelation” and the “pure rational religion” as 
concentric circles (6.12), Kant has, from the early pages of the Religion, laid out a 
distinction between what, in part three, are called “true religion” and historical “church-
faith.”  Part five of Kant’s philosophical presentation of the victory of the good principle 
is particularly clear on the distinction. 
 The basis for the difference between the faith of moral-rational religion and the 
historical-revealed faith of a church springs, like the necessary substitution of the church 
for the ideal of the ethical community, from human weakness.  The example of earthly 
lords, who are honored by their subjects’ expressions of submission, indicates to man that 
moral activity is not sufficient to God the legislator; rather, like the earthly lords, God 
expects the service of men in their performance of morally indifferent actions 6.103).  
But whereas the basis of the moral religion is human reason in each man, the basis of the 
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divine service to God must come from another, and external, source, from some 
(“alleged” as he writes in the second preface) historical revelation (6.104).  The particular 
revelation informs the particular “statutory” requirements for service that a church will 
prescribe, and so the church in this case will be animated by a faith which, insofar as it 
departs from what is universally known by human reason, cannot be considered moral 
and thus as true religion: statutory legislation “can be considered only as accidental and 
as such a thing that has not come to every man, nor can, consequently not binding men 
generally” (6.105).  The only service that we know is owed God is moral conduct.   
It would then seem that any church-faith, except insofar as a means by which the 
moral faith of religion might be spread, will not “ground” a universal church (6.102-03).  
But in this part of the argument Kant was considering man as an individual moral agent: 
insofar as we are bound to other men in a church in order that we fulfill our common 
human moral determination, the differing dispositions and experiences that the members 
of that church possess require the human invention of public statutory requirements 
(6.105).  Thus we have the differentiation of the “Jewish, Mohammedan, Christian, 
Catholic, Lutheran” faiths without any necessary plurality of true religions.  The 
singleness of true religion lies in the unvariability in the command of the moral law, not 
in that the truth of one set of doctrines necessitates the falsity of all others.in the fact that 
if one set of doctrines is true then the others opposed to it are untrue.  This is not to deny, 
however, that in one or more of those faiths one might meet the one true religion.  The 
inability of men to see this has led to public strife.   
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Also, the so-called religious conflicts, which have so often shaken the world and 
sprayed it with blood, have never been anything other than quarrels about church-
faiths, and the oppressed did not really complain about it that one hindered them 
from hanging on to their religion (because no external force can do so), but rather 
that one did not allow them to follow their church-faith publicly.  [6.108] 
 
This passage not only drive home the problem but also sharpens the difference between 
the religion and church-faith: whereas the latter, because it is public, is capable of being 
suppressed, the former, because it comes from man’s reason and because it has no 
requirements other than the performance of his moral duties, cannot be suppressed 
merely by an external power. 
 Because of the public existence of historical-revealed faith and of the church 
which combines its members by proclaiming it, it is now pertinent to turn to a 
comparison of a political constitution and a church constitution, and to see how the two 
entities relate. 
Despite a “certain analogy” between them, the ethical and the political 
communities are different (6.94).  For example, that a political community exists does not 
necessitate the existence of an ethical community nor that political citizens must become 
members of the ethical community (6.95).  Further, the ends themselves of politics and 
ethics are sufficiently different that to order the former by the principles of the latter (or 
vice versa) is to contradict the purposes of both and to cause real damage to political life 
(6.96).  More problematic from the point of view of political rulers is the nonpolitical or 
transpolitical character of the membership of the ethical community: “the concept of an 
ethical community always refers to the ideal of a totality of men, and in this it 
distinguishes itself from the concept of a political community” (6.96).  And ultimately, as 
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we have seen in its inability to be compared to monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, “an 
ethical community really has nothing in its principles that resembles a political 
constitution” (6.102). 
In addition to being different, however, the ethical and political communities are 
by necessity also separate.  Even if they contain the same members they exist separately 
(6.94).  The political community would contradict the very concept of the ethical 
community, which is freedom, by coercing membership of its citizens (6.95).  For this 
reason, “[i]t is self-evident that [the rational religion and the scripture-learning that 
supports it] must not on any account be hindered by the secular arm in the public use of 
their insights and discoveries… or be bound to certain dogmas” (6.113).  Of course it 
would seem efficacious for a political community to have control over the ethical 
community, for then it could (as ethical) reach its subjects where it cannot (as political), 
in their very “dispositions to virtue.”  As we have already noted, however, that the ends 
of ethics and politics differ means that they must be kept separate.  Further, that one of 
the marks of a true church (i.e. the human-maintained stand-in for the ethical community) 
is freedom further keeps the two communities separate: this mark is in “external relation 
of the church to the political power” (6.102).  Particular churches, insofar as they take 
their bearings from a book rather than nonwritten tradition, further illustrate the 
separation of church and political community in extreme situations: “history proves that 
never could a faith based on scripture be eradicated by even the most devastating political 
revolutions” (6.107).  Thus even when a particular political community (which, again, 
necessarily precedes in existence the ethical community or church) be overturned or 
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eliminated, the church, in surviving, displays its character as transpolitical or subpolitical 
or as epiphenomenal but surviving the death of the phenomenon. 
 The ethical community is, however, in some ways subordinate to the political 
community, particularly because only through the existence of the latter can the former 
even be a possibility (6.94).  Although the state may not meddle in the affairs of the 
ethical community, the ethical community, insofar as it “must rest on public laws and 
have a constitution of its own, must have those [joining it]… allow limitations, namely 
the condition that nothing be included in this constitution which contradicts the duty of its 
members as citizens of the state” (6.96).  Of course, since nothing should conflict in this 
relationship if the ethical community is true to its concept (cf. 6.99n), i.e. “if the ethical 
combination is of a genuine kind, [the condition] is not in any case to be a concern” 
(6.96).  The state does have both the authority and the duty to concern itself that the 
church has enough teachers and governors, but satisfaction of this concern is the extent of 
its duty and its authority to interfere.  Obviously, the other qualification, that the state 
does not determine the teachings of those teachers (6.113) greatly reduces the force of 
even the authority that does exist.220 
 Despite the partial subordination of the ethical to the political community, Kant 
suggests that, at the same time, the ethical community is necessary for the survival of the 
political.  In speaking of the possibility and desirability of reformulating popular faith in 
light of the rational religion, Kant cautions that it is inadvisable to “exterminate” the 
 
220 In the Rechtslehre Kant takes up several particular questions. 
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popular faith, “because the atheism resulting from it could have been further dangerous to 
the state” (6.111).  Perhaps this is part of the reason (aside from a morally educative one) 
for the state’s duty and authority to stock the church with governors and teachers (6.113).  
According to the priests, the service of God “was introduced so as to reconcile the people 
with heaven and to repel calamity from the state” (6.120).  The full import of this claim, 
and of those who make it, will be explored later, but it suffices now to note that one 
intention, though not perhaps the greatest, of the religionists is to secure the state by 
means of public religion.  By means of public church-faith the state is more closely 
bound together.221 
The public ethical spread of truth and good are different from political life so 
much that political and civil life can place obstacles in the way of that spreading (6.123).   
C. The Question of Part One Answered: Saving Faith and Progress 
 
Now, having put into place the necessary moral, political, and even (in part two) 
theological considerations, Kant is able to lay out, in section seven of Religion 3.1, an 
answer to the challenge he posed to himself at the beginning of part one, as to whether 
the priests or the philosophical pedagogues were correct about human moral betterment 
or decline.  After this, in the second division of part three, he will provide an historical 
presentation of the victory of the good principle that will bear out the more abstract 
points he is about to make in the culmination of his philosophical presentation.  The 
 
221 Although Lincoln in his Lyceum Speech is not speaking of church-faith, his notion of “political 
religion” and the presence throughout the speech of the notion of “attachment” are illuminating for this 
point. 
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middle of part three, then, is the high point of the Religion insofar as it concerns religion 
in political life. 
 Despite the clear importance of section seven that is announced by its title, the 
argument of the section almost lulls the reader to sleep by seeming to reiterate some of 
the puzzles about justification from part two in light of the religion-church distinction 
recently made in part three.  By the end of the section, this impression is clearly 
corrected, and the reader is led to see more clearly than before why Kant puzzled about 
those earlier matters which did not seem directly related to the question of the moral 
determination of the human race. 
 Section seven begins with another distinction, this one of kinds of faith.  Just as 
true religion exists amidst the many church-faiths that are related to it as a vehicle, so 
there is only one faith that saves.  The one true faith differs from the others in the same 
way that moral religion differs from a religion of divine service; unlike the latter, the faith 
of the former is “free” and “grounded on lautere dispositions of the heart” (6.115).  
Saving faith is a composite, made up of faith in a divinely supplied satisfaction for one’s 
sinful past life and faith in one’s ability to become pleasing to God by good conduct in 
the future.  As they make up a composite it is reasonable to expect that one precedes the 
other, but to pose this as a question is to confront an antinomy of human reason.  The way 
in which the antinomy is treated – whether it is resolved or, as turns out to be the case, at 
least settled – constitutes whether church-faith must remain an “essential part” of saving 
faith or whether it will finally, as a “mere guiding means”, cross over into pure religious 
faith (6.116).  As might be expected, each half of the antinomy requires the other to make 
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sense.  No “thoughtful” man can bring himself to believe that mere acceptance of the 
notion of satisfaction by divine intervention will lead to future good life conduct; instead, 
he will accept that satisfaction as conditioned upon bettering his life conduct first – and 
so pure moral faith takes precedence over church-faith.  On the other hand, man cannot 
believe that his own efforts to overcome his corrupt nature will make him pleasing to 
God; without satisfaction of atonement he cannot become the new man who begins a new 
life according to the good principle – and thus the effort to good life conduct is preceded 
by faith in merit, not one’s own, by which one is reconciled to God.  There is no 
theoretical resolution of this antinomy because we are unable to look at the “causal 
determination of the freedom of man” (6.117).  “Practically, however,” from a moral 
point of we must decide in favor of starting from the attempt to become worthy of God’s 
assistance.  If this is so, the pure faith of religion, which is practical and thus pertains to 
action, takes precedence over church-faith, which is theoretical and thus pertains to 
science.  The reader is led to expect that the antinomy, if not resolved, at least must be 
taken as settled in favor of expecting the pure moral faith of religion eventually to shed 
its guiding means of historical church-faith. 
 In a lengthy paragraph Kant settles the question in that direction and in so doing 
ties together the first two and a half parts of the Religion and effectively answers its 
explicit opening question. 
 Adherence to either principle may lead in the first case to “virtual superstition” 
and in the second to “natural unbelief” (6.118-19).  Faith in the prototype, insofar as it is 
a moral idea of reason, amounts to the same thing as taking as one’s principle good life 
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conduct.  Faith in the prototype, insofar as it is taken to be an empirical, historical person, 
is church-faith and thus does not amount to the same thing as a principle of good life 
conduct.  Insofar as the Son of God is a prototype in our reason,222 faith in it is a saving 
faith.  Therefore we need not think that we have two different principles and thus two 
differing ways but rather one “practical idea.”  The antinomy is thus apparent, and comes 
about only with a claim related to the prototype as an actual “appearance.”  This 
immediately removes universality as a mark of that faith.  Further, “History proves that, 
in all forms of religion, this conflict of two principles of faith has prevailed” (6.120).  
Then, with the dispute between the moralists and the priests, Kant brings his reader right 
back to the opening of part one.  The faith of the priest, by which the sacrament of 
confession smoothes over the “grossest vices”, ultimately leads to the “deadly leap of 
human reason” (6.121).   
 The “necessary consequence” of Kant’s exposition is that religion will “finally” 
shake off the church-faith and its statutes.  In language and tone reminiscent of his essay, 
“What is Enlightenment?”, Kant describes the full emergence of the pure faith of religion 
as a the coming to maturity of the human race.  This will occur not by means of a 
revolution but with “gradual reform” (6.122).  We need not wait for that full emergence 
to say that “the Kingdom of god is come into us”, for with the bringing of its “root” into 
public existence – even though it may face political and civil obstacles – it is well on the 
way: “But the true and the good, to which in the natural tendency of every man lies the 
 
222 Not merely implied but even stated at this point is that faith in the historical Jesus of Nazareth as the Son 
of God is not universal or moral and thus not saving faith. 
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ground of both the insight and the sympathetic heart, does not fail, if once it becomes 
public, due to its natural affinity with the moral tendency of rational essences, to 
communicate itself throughout.” 
Thus having worked out the problem raised at the beginning of part one, Kant 
concludes the main argument of the Religion: 
Thus is the labor of the good principle, to the human eye unmarked but steadily 
going forward, erecting for itself in the human race, as a common essence 
according to the laws of virtue, a power and a kingdom, which announces the 
victory over evil and, under its lordship, assures the world of an eternal peace.  
[6.124] 
 
Here, then, is the social solution to the moral problem raised by the Religion, along with 
its political implications.  Kant clearly sides with the philosophical pedagogues against 
the priests.  He has taken the middle way by adopting a modified version of human nature 
fallen through original sin, and yet the direction of human moral determination is a 
hopeful one of moving from bad to better. 
D. History and Critique of Church-faith: The Moral Core of Parts Three and Four 
 
Companion to the new hope which Kant has provided through his “Philosophical 
Presentation” is the chastening fact that “men have attempted many forms of a church 
with unhappy success” (6.105).  Examples of the unhappy success include the “so-called 
religious conflicts which have so often shaken the world and sprayed it with blood” 
(6.108), and even a church approaching the true faith is called “militant” because 
“conflict over historical ways of belief223 can never be avoided” (6.115).  Whereas the 
 
223 This translates Glaubensarten, which echoes Denkungsart. 
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“crowd of howling examples” offered in part one provided empirical evidence of the 
presence of the evil principle in man (6.33), Kant offers further evidence of the evil in 
man manifesting itself in what should be the promotion of the pure faith of religion.  
Although some of these examples are scattered throughout the Religion, the most 
concentrated collection is to be found in part three, in its second division, the “Historical 
Presentation of the Gradual Grounding of the Lordship of the Good Principle on 
Earth.”224  The historical presentation is not purely negative as regards the unhappy 
results of the institution of churches, but one cannot  escape that the history and the 
problem of church faith appear indivisible. 
 That the contentious movement – one is tempted to call it a dialectic – between 
church faith and religious faith is a focal point of the presentation is clear from Kant’s 
introduction to it: since “religion is not a public condition” the student of religion cannot 
arrive at a “universal history of the human race from religion on earth (in the strictest 
sense of the word)” (6.124).  We can, however, arrive at a universal historical account by 
comparing church-faith with pure religious faith to the extent that the former realizes its 
own dependence on, and necessary conformity to, the latter.  This realization, and the 
alteration that follows from it, is not easily accomplished: “One can foresee that this 
history will be nothing other than the account of the standing battle between the faith of 
divine service and of moral religion.”  Thus we are prepared to perform on an historical 
 
224 It is worth noting that the two divisions of part three, which is titled “The Victory of the Good over the 
Evil Principle, and the Grounding of a kingdom of God on Earth”, are parallel in that one is a philosophical 
and the other an historical presentation.  That the divisions are titled rather differently, however, indicates a 
further differentiation: the titles “Philosophical Presentation of the Victory of the Good Principle under a 
Grounding of a Kingdom of God on Earth” and “Historical Presentation of the Gradual Grounding of the 
Lordship of the Good Principle on Earth” do not necessarily present the same outcome. 
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faith, Christianity as it turns out, the second “experiment” or “trial” which Kant has 
suggested in the preface to the second edition (6.12).  Because we can foresee the battle 
between the two faiths, and because we have been brought to see the validity of one and 
the immorality of the other, we can further expect that statements made about the 
historical faith in question are going to be negative with the exception of those points in 
history when it expresses open willingness to make way for the faith of moral religion.  
And so, fairly quickly, the Christian faiths and churches become the primary target for 
Kant’s new critique. 
The explicit reason for the ensuing focus on Christianity is not that this faith 
should be the target of critique but rather that only Christianity fits the requirement of the 
attempted universal history of church-faith, for only the Christian church has, in the 
course of its development, showed a “tendency” toward the unity that is the primary mark 
of the true church (6.124): “Because it must be a unity of principle, if one ought to reckon 
the sequence of different ways of faith one after the other to the modification of one and 
the same church, and the history of the latter is specifically that with which we now 
occupy ourselves” (6.125).  From its first beginning only the Christian church contained 
within itself the “germ” and principle of the objective unity of the true and universal 
religious faith.225  Even though the Jewish faith precedes the Christian, it is not a 
 
225 To put the point more particularly, although the Christian faith is historical and not purely moral, it has a 
double nature on which Kant reflects in the first part of part four.  One can regard the Christian religion (a 
curious deviation from the strictness of Kant’s distinction between religion and church-faith as given at 
6.108) as a “natural” religion and as a “learned” religion, that is, as rational and universal on one hand and 
communicated by revealed dogma on the other.  Because it has both these qualities, Christianity can be 
studied as an historical faith that at the same time is clearly a “guiding means” for the pure faith of religion. 
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religious faith due to the importance it places on statutory laws, even in the grounding of 
the political constitution of the Jewish state.  The “proof” of its lack of religious-
constitution is threefold: its laws dealt only with external actions with no claim on the 
moral disposition (6.125); its rewards and punishments were geared to this world and 
without faith in a future life (6.126); and, as a faith, it has no desire for universality 
(6.127).226 
Thus far, with the exception of an unsettling (but expected) note casting doubt on 
the historical veracity of Christ’s resurrection and ascension (6.128n), Kant’s 
introductory account of the history of Christianity would be acceptable to the traditional 
Christian, if not to the Jew.  The portrayal might become troubling, however, as Kant 
begins to reflect on the degree to which we have a dependable history of early 
Christianity.  The doubt serves to cut the moorings from a dependence upon any 
historical (and thus miraculous and dogmatic) doctrines of Christianity.  The doubt 
surfaces as follows: every historical faith “needs… a learned public” (6.129), but since 
early Christianity lacked a learned public, the early history of the Christian church is 
cloudy (6.130).  Eventually, Christianity did “became” a learned public, but with the 
undesired result that “its history, which the beneficent effect concerns, which one with 
right expect from a moral religion, in no way does it justice to the recommendation” 
 
226 Christianity springs from Judaism, so that fact might cause a problem for someone trying to make the 
case for the purity of the former.  The origin of Christianity, however, was a “full abandonment of 
Judaism” and “grounded on a wholly new principle” and “made actual a complete revolution in faith-
doctrines” (6.127).  Judaism was handy as a prudential guiding means for the new principle of Christianity 
(just as Christianity, it would seem, is the guiding means for the rational religion).  Thanks to the Greek 
wisdom that “enlightened” many Jews by means of its “concepts of virtue,” the revolution occurred in an 
already-changing Judaism (6.127).   
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(6.130).  Instead of clear proof of a progression toward moral betterment, we are offered 
a detailed list of abuses by holders of the Christian faith (6.130-31), which is then tied 
back to a “bad propensity in human nature” (6.131).  The nature of that propensity is 
already known; how it exists at the core of historical Christianity will soon be clear, but 
what is already clear is the truth of Kant’s presupposition: the history of the Christian 
faith is a history of battle against the moral faith of religion.  Furthermore, the effects of 
this moral battle have had serious and wide-ranging political effects.  In his 
“philosophical presentation” Kant spoke of what may and should tend to happen now, in 
the “historical presentation” he lists what has happened in such a way as to inspire in his 
reader at least a momentary pessimism that one should hope for the victory of the good 
principle in historical time.  The list appears in a long sentence, the parts of which are 
broken up as follows: 
1. The praise of hermetic, monastic, and celibate ways of life “made a great number 
of men useless for the world.” 
2. The accompanying “ostensible miracles” press the people beneath a “blind 
superstition” by means of “heavy fetters.” 
3. As a result of “the hierarchy pressed upon free men, the frightful voice of correct-
faith escaped from the mouths” of “self-appointed scripture exegites” – thus 
“separated the Christian world , on account of faith-opinions, into embittered 
parties.” 
4. In the East, “the state itself, in a laughable manner, engaged itself with the faith-
statutes of the priests and with popery” with the result that “this state finally in an 
inevitable way had to fall prey to external enemies, who at last brought about an 
end to its lording faith.” 
5. In the West, “where faith had erected its own throne independent of worldly 
power, the civil order together with the sciences (which preserve it) were 
disorganized and made powerless by an arrogant governor of God.” 
6. Just as dying plants and animals attract insects to complete their decomposition, 
Christian East and West alike were beset and overcome by barbarians. 
7. In the West the “spiritual head lorded over and trained kings, as children through 
the magic wand of his threatened excommunication, [and] incited them to external 
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wars (the Crusades) in order to depopulate another part of the world, toward 
making war on one another, toward the rebellion of subjects against their 
authorities, and toward the bloodthirsty hate against their other-thinking comrades 
of the one and same universal so-called Christianity.” 
8. And “to this lack of peace, which even now227 is restrained from violent 
outbreaks only through political interests, the root lies secretly in the ground 
proposition of a despotically commanding church-faith and ever after allows one 
to be concerned about scenes si
 
Following this litany of accusations against the history of the Christian church, Kant 
quickly ensures that his reader will not lapse into despair by reminding him that, despite 
this history, from it is nevertheless clear that the “true first intention” of Christianity is to 
introduce a pure religious faith. 
 Although Kant’s overall intention in his “Historical Presentation” is thus to show 
to the reader that the “the present” is the “best” period of all of Christian history, the 
evidence that he musters in favor of hope cannot be anything but a devastating rebuke to 
the Christian who does not share his position on the development or on the necessity and 
desirability of the “germ” of “true religious faith” coming into fuller development.  The 
moral and political disasters that Kant has just listed can only mean that their causes – 
monasticism, faith in miracles, hierachies, orthodoxy, and so on – must be eliminated.  
There is hope for the moralist and the philosophical pedagogue but a direct challenge to 
the priest.  Along these lines it would be illuminating to consider the quotation given here 
from Lucretius.  The quote, “such evils religion has been able to recommend!”,228 is 
presented as something that one might exclaim were he to view the history of Christianity 
 
227 The “jetzt”, again, brings us back to the opening concerns of the Religion. 
 
228 From De Rerum Natura 1.101: tantum religio potuit suadere malorum. 
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“under one glance, as a painting” (6.131).  There is a terrible aspect to it if it is taken all 
at once. 
 The quote from Lucretius is from early in the De Rerum Natura with the opening 
praise of Epicurus for being the first openly to oppose religion, which had crushed his 
fellow men.  Epicurus’ investigation into nature put religion beneath his feet.  Lucretius 
continues by writing, “religion has quite often brought forth wicked and impious 
actions”229, and then proves it with the example of the sacrifice of Iphigenia at Aulus, 
then makes the announcement quoted by Kant.  The rest of the context is Lucretius’ 
attempt to persuade the reader that no punishment after death is to be feared.  The lines 
immediately following that quoted by Kant are particularly revealing in the light of the 
Kant’s concerns with Christianity: 
In time, you, subdued by the fear-speaking of the soothsayers, will presently flee 
from us.  Indeed, how many dreams they are able presently to touch you, dreams 
which they would be able to turn the directions of your life and to confuse all your 
fortunes with fear!  And with merit do I say this…230 
 
Again, Kant quickly turns from the necessity of making the Lucretian exclamation, and 
thus from the dire situation in which it has its context, but we also repeat that it is with 
Lucretian philosophical boldness that Kant is able to do so.  That the present is the best 
period of Christian history is so only if we see something in the beginning of that history 
– the intention of planting a seed of true religious faith that is to be sown later – that is 
not necessarily held by most or any believing Christians.  Our reason for hope is that men 
 
229 De Rerum Natura 1.82-83: saepius illa / religio peperit scelerosa atque impia facta. 
 
230 De Rerum Natura 1.102-07: Tutemet a nobis iam quovis tempore vatum / terriloquis victus dictis 
descisere quaeres. / Quippe etenim quam multa tibi iam fingere possunt / somnia quae vitae rationes vertere 
possint / fortunasque tuas omnis turbare timore! / Et merito…  
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– whether Christian or not is not clear – small in number but public in profession are 
beginning the slow development toward the unity of all men in the “visible presentation” 
of the “invisible kingdom of God on earth” (6.131).  The reform already mentioned (122) 
has begun not merely in theory but also in history.  The rest of the second division of part 
three is a continued reflection on this fact. 
 Kant’s explicit message, despite the many individual awful scenes in the history 
of Christianity, is that the present, in the light of the original purpose of the grounding of 
Christianity, should cause us to hope in religious-moral reform.  Before looking further at 
the nature and extent of that reform, and at Kant’s role in it, we are prompted by Kant’s 
reminders, throughout the rest of the Religion, to be fully aware of the cause of “all that 
bustle through which the human race has been wrecked and is still divided” (6.131).  
There is a sole cause, which Kant identifies as a “bad propensity in human nature”, thus 
reminding us of the subject of earlier parts of the Religion and putting them into wider 
context whereby the moral and the seemingly internal and private have in fact brought 
about what is apparently the most devastating public moral-political damage to humanity.  
The historical point at which this occurred was in the early Christian period, when human 
nature took its revelation, which was meant to serve the Jewish people as a transition 
from their own, less morally oriented revelation, and made it, rather than the pure moral 
faith of religion to which it was supposed to lead, the supreme condition of the Christian 
faith.  The sacramental and dogmatic trappings of early Christianity, meant to replace 
those of the Jews and thus to move the Jews closer to the moral faith, were thus seen to 
be the chief matters of religious importance. 
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 In the present context Kant does not tell his reader much about the propensity in 
human nature that is responsible for this religious-moral-social disaster, but, with the 
observations made about human nature in part one in mind, the reader should not be 
surprised by the second half of part four, where Kant takes up the propensity more 
fully.231  The link between the propensity mentioned in Kant’s history of Christianity and 
the critique of religious delusion in part four is clear from the introduction to the latter 
text as follows: “to hold this statutory faith… as essential to the service of God in 
general, and to make it the supreme condition… is religious delusion” (6.168).  So, 
before turning fully to the reform of the Christian church-faith, let us look closely at the 
ground of what makes that reform so necessary. 
 Part four of the Religion, “On Service and Antiservice Under the Lordship of the 
Good Principle, or, On Religion and Popery”, is made up of two parts, the first devoted to 
service and the second to antiservice.232  The second part is further divided into four 
closely related sections, whose overall purpose is to lay out the principle of religious 
delusion and then its manifestation and promotion. 
 Section one, “On the Universal Subjective Ground of Religious Delusion”, 
observes that service to God is usually offered by means of festivals, public games, 
penances, and pilgrimages.  That service is offered in these ways shows “the propensity 
 
231 The structure of the Religion is in some way reminiscent of the structure of Leviathan, with part four of 
the latter taking up the “Kingdom of Darkness” and part four of the former taking up the similar theme of 
popery.  Much of the argument of part four of Kant’s book is already present by implication, and 
sometimes more, in earlier parts, and yet the extensive treatment given in part four is too large to have 
worked it into the middle of part three.   
 
232 The first part, divided further into sections on Christianity as a natural and as a learned religion, have 
been treated in chapters two and three of the present study.   
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to a procedure which in itself has no moral worth” (6.169).  Kant calls this delusion, since 
we suffer from it whenever “in our opinion we put to this [procedure] the worth of the 
purpose itself” (6.170; cf. 6.168n).  Whenever men put on a festival or go on pilgrimage 
they act according to a “maxim” by which they accept this reversal, and the resulting 
delusion manifests “a hidden inclination to fraud”, so called because we put it in our 
heads that one thing is another and try to pass it off as such; we defraud ourselves about 
the worth of these actions.  Again, with this mention of fraud, we are reminded of part 
one of the Religion and its connection with radical evil.  Unfortunately, man cannot 
completely avoid the danger of delusion, for he cannot avoid the anthropomorphism that 
leads to it.  Anthropomorphism seems inevitable in man, whether theoretically (which is 
generally harmless, in and of itself) or practically (which, as Kant warns here, and before 
at 6.65n and 6.168-9, is dangerous).  It is necessary to make a God for oneself, for only 
then can one judge whether a being claimed by someone else as God is in fact worthy of 
reverence.  In making this God, however, we are prone to make Him in such a way as to 
be undemanding in moral matters.  Thus the service of God in religion is thought to be 
not doing our moral duty but instead signifying our utter and “unlimited” subjection to 
the divine will.  If we have a public celebration by which we acknowledge our subjection 
to God we thus expect Him to look on us with favor; if we go on a pilgrimage or make a 
fast we expect the same result.  The less useful, the less morally consequent, the act, the 
more pleasing to God, for there is a nobility in efforts made without any practical purpose 
in mind.  We might even recognize that God has not been served by the act itself, but that 
He recognizes the act as a sign of subsequent obedience.  He will favor us just as the 
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earthly lord looks kindly upon the grovelling of his subjects.  Claiming that in these 
activities themselves, rather than in the good life conduct (against which they are not 
necessarily opposed and might even promote), is to be found the supreme condition of 
religious practice, members of a church suffer from delusion.  As has already been 
indicated, the suffering from delusion is not limited to the individual moral dispositions 
of the churchmen in questions – which would be bad enough, from Kant’s point of view 
– but, insofar as a church is a visible public entity, translates into public life.  This 
becomes increasingly clear in the second and third sections of Religion 4.2. 
 Section two, “The Moral Principle of Religion Opposed to Religious Delusion”, 
has premises and conclusions that are familiar to the reader of earlier parts of the 
Religion.  New to the considerations, however, are the observations he makes along the 
way, including distinctions between enthusiasm and superstition; an objection to the 
traditional distinction between nature and grace, which leads to unfortunate religious 
expectations; and a more explicit levelling of religious practices among different 
churches and faiths.  The chief consideration of section two springs from Kant’s assertion 
that, while some mystery of divine wisdom might well make men fully well-pleasing to 
Him, it would be “a dangerous religious delusion” for a church to “proclaim” that the 
mystery in question has been revealed to it.  It is dangerous because part of that church’s 
faith would become the cognition of that mystery as superior to good life-conduct, 
something which “sincere” members of the congregation would be unwilling to accept 
into their very moral disposition.  The church would thus promote its central teachings by 
fear and by condemning to damnation all those outside the church who were unable to 
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gain knowledge of the mystery by their own reason.  To this opening consideration Kant 
adds the unsurprising point that faith is subject to the Willkur as soon as one moves away 
from the “principle” of good-life conduct as the service of God.  Nothing, whether one 
sacrifices through mumbled prayer, tithing, or offering oneself in monastery life, is an 
offering to God as long as the moral disposition itself is not offered.  Therefore all 
offerings of service to God apart from moral service are of equal worth or worthlessness.  
Churches are also responsible for originating and encouraging two other religious 
delusions, enthusiasm and superstition, the latter of which is only indirectly a moral 
problem since its purpose may well not conflict with morality.  The section concludes 
with the necessary observation that the delusion of religion can be avoided or corrected in 
a church only if the church professes, in addition to its statutory articles of faith, the 
principle of “bringing about the religion of good life conduct as its true goal” (6.174).  
This is not easily accomplished, as the next section indicates, for the opposition from 
within the church is not merely from ignorant and intransigent traditionalism but one of 
the more unfortunate manfestations of moral evil itself. 
Section three, “On Popery as a Rule in Antiservice of the Good Principle”, is a 
narrowing of the moral critique of section two, for here the chief culprit is clearly in 
view.  With this section Kant makes thematic the problem of the priest in his doctrine of 
religion, but the presence in Kant’s mind of this problem has been noticeable from the 
start; the complaint with which part one begins is associated with the priest-religion, and 
references have also been made to actions and offices of priests that are to Kantian eyes 
immoral.  In the priest one seems to find the worst tendencies of human nature as regards 
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morality and religion, and because of the public presence of a church, the priest is at the 
center of immoral social and political life.  The precise meaning of Kant’s “priest,” 
however, is not immediately clear: he belongs to no one denomination but is a universal 
type apparently found in all religions at all times.  In the second edition of the Religion, 
Kant adds an explanatory footnote to the word “popery” in the title of section three.  
Aside from an appearance in the alternate title of part four (6.151), this is the only place 
in the book where Kant uses the word, whereas he has often used Priest and Geistliche.  
For this reason an explanation of what is meant by popery is necessary: 
This name characterizing merely the authority of a spiritual father (papa) obtains 
the meaning of blame only through the accompanying concept of a spiritual 
despotism, which can be met in all churchly forms, so those announced as 
unpretentious and popular.   [6.175] 
 
The notion of fatherhood is thus not problematic (though if it were Kant could quickly 
invoke Christ’s injunction to “call no man father”).  Instead, “spiritual despotism” is the 
danger, and one found in “all churchly forms.”  Although it calls to mind the papacy or 
“popery,” it is a danger common even to the lowest of the churches.  Whether it is 
identical to the priest-religion, or whether the Pfaff, or “papa” or “pope” (this noun does 
not appear, however) is identical to the priest, is not yet clear.   
The meaning of “spiritual despotism” is the theme of the section to which the 
preceding comments are an introduction.  The section begins with Kant pulling away 
from his development of the concept of religion from moral principles in favor of looking 
at the “natural” (cf. 6.106 and note) origin of church-faith – or, more precisely, of the 
“slavish service” (6.176).  The origin provided reminds of several passages in Leviathan 
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that pertain to religion, as Kant explains the beginning of this service in the Verehrung 
that was “extorted from helpless men through the natural fear grounded on the 
consciousness of his impotence.”233  As a result, the reverance for “mighty invisible 
essences” by means of service historically precedes a religion.  As soon as the service 
took on a “certain public-legal form” it became a “temple-service” (cf. 6.106) and then 
became a “church-service… only after the moral formation of men gradually was bound 
with these laws.”  Even after a degree of “moral formation” (in which there is already 
some crucial transformation, i.e. from temple to church, from priest to divine) there 
remains the presence of what have elsewhere been called statutory laws.  It would seem 
that a further step, which Kant is attempting either to further or to initiate, is required to 
make even the second morally legitimate: “an historical faith lies at the ground of both, 
until one finally has begun to see these merely as provisional, and [to see] in them the 
symbolic portrayal and the means of furtherance of a pure religious-faith” (6.176).  This 
observation contains nothing new to the argument of the Religion, but in recalling the 
claim that an historical faith that possesses the “consciousness of its contingency” and is 
attached as a guiding means to pure religious faith may be “called” a true church (6.115), 
Kant prepares the way for a more devastating, and more political, critique of historical 
church-faith. 
 This critique, which relies upon and further develops distinctions already made, 
begins with the observation that, “in manner,” there may exist a “mighty distance” 
 
233 From Leviathan 1.6.36: “Fear of power, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, 
[we call] Religion…” 
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between “heads” or “leaders” of different faiths, such Tungus shaman and a European 
prelate who rules both church and state, and between different “tendencies of faith,” such 
as the “wholly sensuous” Wogulite and the “sublimated” Puritan.  (One would think that 
Kant would elevate the Puritan because of his rigorized moral code and simplified 
theology, but there still remain Puritan statutory laws.)  There is no difference, however, 
in the important matter of “principle,” for they commonly set God-service in things that 
are (from Kant’s point of view) not sufficient to “constitute a better man.”  The following 
point is where Kant begins to sharpen the earlier distinctions into a more direct critique: 
“The one intention that they all have is to steer to their advantage the invisible power, 
which has control over the destiny of men.”  The man, therefore, who uses morally 
indifferent actions as a “means” of acquiring God’s “immediate pleasure” “stands in the 
delusion of possession of an art to bring through wholly natural means a supernatural 
effect” (6.177).  This is “fetishism” (cf. 6.193).  At the bottom of fetishism is an 
“absurdity in its concept,” for it holds that man “supposedly works on God and makes use 
of Him as means to produce an effect in the world” (6.177).  On the other hand, it is not 
immediately absurd to supplement his “active disposition to good life-conduct” with 
“certain formalities” in order to render himself more “receptive” to possible divine 
assistance, for he makes no claim to work on God (6.178).  But since even “the wickedest 
man” can be equally adept in working these formalities – which include formulas of 
appeal, confessions of wage-faith, and churchly observances – one deludes himself in 
relying on these “natural” and morally indifferent actions, for it amounts to thinking that 
he can “conjure up, so to speak, the support of the divinity” (6.178). 
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 “Whoever” makes this error – for instance by giving precedence to statutory laws, 
by requiring revelation for religion as a condition of pleasing God, or by preferring 
historical faith to striving to live a good life – “transforms the service of God into a mere 
fetishism, and exercises an antiservice, which makes all the work [cf. 6.106 and 124] 
toward true religion retrogressive” (6.179).  And what is the ultimate principle of 
fetishism?  It is a principle of radical evil as discussed in part one, now put with dramatic 
emphasis and with religious language: “So much lies, when one wishes to combine two 
good things, on the order in which one combines them!” (6.179).  Ironically, the problem 
in human nature, which church-faith is directed toward overcoming, is given further 
strength and amplification as it perverts that very church-faith.  A “yoke” is thereby 
“imposed,” which  
that it as unconditional necessity to believe something that only can be cognized 
historically, and therefore can not be convincing for everyone, is a yoke still more 
difficult for a conscientious man than the whole heap of piously imposed 
observances may ever be, while it is sufficient for these [observances] that one 
celebrate them in order to match with an established church community, without 
that someone needs internally or externally to lay out the confession of his faith 
that he holds it for an ordination founded by God: because through this especially 
the conscience is annoyed.  [6.179; cf. 6.105, 108]234 
 
Kant thus summarizes: “Popery is thus the constitution of a church, insofar as a fetish-
service rules in it” (6.179). 
Excursion: Further Analysis of the Priestly Character 
 
234 For a further explication of conscience – “the moral faculty of judgment, passing judgment upon itself” 
– and its relation to religion and church-faith, see section 4 of 4.2, titled “On the Guiding-Thread of the 
Conscience in Matters of Faith.” 
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Kant concludes the criticism of popery by moving from the moral to the political context 
of corruption.  Before looking at this conclusion, however, it would be useful to go 
further into the details of Kant’s critique of the priest as it appears throughout the 
Religion,235  particularly because it will stand in helpful contrast to the heroic picture of 
the philosopher-pedagogues discussed in the next chapter. 
The priests of the churches in Kant’s day continue in the tradition of the 
priesthood that has its origins before recorded history.  Despite their existence over a 
period of several millennia, the priest of Kant’s time shares noticeable traits with his 
predecessors in history and also across the dogmatic separations of different creeds.  The 
Kantian depiction of the priest can be taken as his characterization of the religious man 
par excellence – that is, the man who accepts the dogmas of a faith and pushes them to 
their logical limits, thus obliterating a proper grasp of the moral and physical worlds as 
they appear not only to philosophers but also to common men.  Kant’s analysis of the 
priest is therefore a penetration into the core of the antihuman and immoral nature of 
religious faith once it is corrupted. 
 As can be seen from the list of negative traits constitutive of the priest – e.g. 
dishonesty, insincerity, and fetishism – Kant’s analysis and critique of the priest is 
grounded not only on his prior moral writings but on his interpretation of radical evil as 
well.  While religion serves as the response to and rejection of original sin but yet (in its 
historical forms as a church-faith) embraces it wholeheartedly, the priest is the 
exemplification in the individual man of this embrace.  In accord with his moral 
 
235 It would be further useful to compare it with Rousseau’s very tough critique in the Social Contract. 
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philosophy in general and with his teaching on radical evil in human nature in particular, 
Kant connects the evil of the priest to the evils of insincerity and dishonesty – the core of 
radical evil itself: the priest is the man whose natural propensity to evil has been allowed 
to flower and to pervert him fully.  While it would seem that religion, or rather church-
faith, is capable of good, the priesthood is a manifestation of evil.  Yet, just as the need 
for religion is ineradicable as radical evil, the priesthood is a tendency in human nature 
that might be channeled through a certain kind of education.  In fact, Kant’s attempted 
reform of religion has the taming of the priest as its Archimedean point. 
 Before outlining the priestly education proposed by Kant – which is in large part 
the practical and immediate goal of the Religion – it is necessary to work through Kant’s 
analysis itself of the priest.  By examining their most noteworthy characteristics, in light 
of radical evil, it will be possible to identify the nature of the priest and to examine what 
in this nature makes him as he is.236  Furthermore, it is necessary to ask Kant’s purpose in 
examining the character of the priest: is Kant merely yet another Enlightenment-era 
anticlericist, or does he, as already suggested, have in mind not simple rebellion but 
rather a plan of active reform? 
Kant’s analysis of the priest is difficult to examine on two counts.  The first 
difficulty is that, like other topics touched upon in the Religion, it is not done 
systematically; rather, one has to gather many scattered references, take account of their 
different contexts, and find common threads that illustrate a basic idea.  The second 
 
236 This examination will not be complete without a reading of “The End of All Things,” the essay 
published shortly after the Religion. 
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difficulty is more particular, as it concerns a matter of terminology: Kant refers 
sometimes to der Priest, other times to die Geistliche, and yet the two meanings seem 
interchangeable.237  The one occasion in which Kant uses both so as to suggest a 
distinction is not very helpful. 
This distinction appears in one of Kant’s several histories of the development of 
faiths and churches.  He finds “in the labor of men toward a common ethical essence” 
both the priest and the divine.  Priests are “consecrated custodians of pious practices,” 
while divines are “teachers of the pure moral religion” (6.106).  It would seem that the 
priest is the villain and the divine is the hero,238 but since the passage occurs well into a 
book whose terminology changes as the argument develops, one must be wary that here 
the “divine” is not the Lutheran or even Pietist divine but rather a convinced Kantian.  A 
look at other examples of Kant’s use of die Geistliche will bear this out.  For example, 
only a “vernünftige Geistliche” (rather than any Geistliche) will prevent his charges from 
absorbing “histories from the hellish Proteus” (6.87).  So this examination of Kant on the 
character of the priest will, at least in the beginning, assume the identity of the two terms 
while preserving Kant’s difference of usage. 
As far as political life is concerned the most notorious and the most fatal 
characteristic of the priest is his unbridgeable distance from the world as it is: the priest 
hates the present world and sees no redeemable future for the world, and thus he escapes 
 
237 Kant uses der Priest in the following passages: 6.19, 100, 106, 120, 125, 130; die Geistliche in the 
following passages: 6.8, 87, 106; and der Kleriker in the following passages: 6.69n, 113, 122, 164, 180, 
200. 
 
238 If this were the case, Kant would be making the Hegelian elevation of Lutheran Protestantism to the 
position of true and full teaching of Christianity. 
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into eschatology and the hope not for a world of the future but rather for the future world.  
In the priest is found the desire opposite that of the early modern philosophers – the 
heavenly city not on earth but in heaven.  This priestly hatred of the present world and of 
human temporality is an ineradicable element of his psychology and is the motivation 
behind his actions in political life.  Taken in combination with his tendency toward 
dishonesty, this psychology of the priest magnifies the evil principle in man and poses 
serious challenges for moral and political progress, and this spite for the world in the 
priest is a prime target in Kant’s doctrine of religion. 
 The hatred of the priest for the world may be divided into hatred for the world as 
it is and hatred for any attempt to improve the world as it is. 
 The Religion presents early evidence of the first kind of hatred, and echoes it 
many times, for the “complaint” of the priests in their religion.  “All allow, nevertheless, 
that the world began from good… But they allow this happiness to vanish as a dream” 
(6.19).  In the recesses of the human culture itself is the conflict between two basic 
principles – this ancient complaint, and the priest-religion of the golden age which utters 
the complaint and which shares its antiquity.  Linked, therefore to the image of the 
golden age is the impression (conveyed by Kant’s suggestion) that, even if it once 
existed, it was never recognized by man at the time.  Something intrinsic to man’s 
history, or at least to the priest’s, whose religion is the link between these two elements, 
poses both an ideal and its simultaneous negation.   
 Kant’s discussion here is unclear, for he writes that “all” grant the goodness of the 
world in the beginning, but it is not certain whether the “they” who “soon let this 
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happiness disappear as if a dream” is the “all” of the preceding sentence or the priests of 
the first sentence.  Kant indicates the priests by suggestion, insofar as the complaint is 
conterminous with the priest-religion, and also because, in other parts of the Religion, to 
be a priest largely is to be one who complains.  Assuming this link between the complaint 
about the descent of the world into evil with the antiquity of the priest-religion, then the 
problem of the priest ever wishing to obliterate the “now” with his condemnation is a 
crucial theme of the Religion; the priest is the key to interpreting the argument as 
introduced by this opening of part one.  The focal point of the priest in the history of 
human culture and religion is echoed in the same terms later in the book: 
But at all times the priests complained more than the moralists, that is to say, 
loudly (and under the summons of the authorities to steer the mischief), about the 
neglect of divine service, which was introduced so as to reconcile the people with 
heaven and to repel calamity from the state… [6.120] 
 
The connection of the priest with the antiworldly complaint is more explicit here.  With 
the insistence of the priest for the observance of the cultus, of divine service, Kant 
uncovers the direct connection between the priest and the evil principle, the 
predisposition to evil: he talks at one point “the propensity of [man] to a divine service of 
religion (cultus)” (6.106). 
 In a political light, the priest’s complaint against the world, as well as against 
attempts to improve it, has obvious ramifications, is the most dangerous element of the 
priest’s character – although it is necessarily connected to those other traits that make up 
his nature.  Kant’s concern with the priest is not one of simple political pragmatism – 
whereby he would be satisfied with the priest’s private immorality so long as the priest 
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left politics alone (of course this would run counter to the priest’s own nature in the first 
place).  Yet, precisely because there exists, or should exist, no absolute barrier between 
the moral and the political for Kant, and because political evil is a clear indication of 
moral evil, Kant must deal with religion on the political as well as the purely moral level.  
Kant’s critique of the priest is necessary because the moral evil embraced by the priest 
results in political evil, which itself further binds man to moral blindness and immaturity.  
With the exception of the few, man will not be freed by the arguments of the first critique 
or even by the essay on enlightenment, but he will gain moral freedom and maturity if the 
priest can be tamed by the Religion. 
 The priest, as history shows, is not content with dishonest rule in the confessional 
or with spinning fictions from the pulpit: 
… how in the east, where the state itself, in a laughable way, concerned itself with 
the articles of faith of the priest and popery, instead of holding [the priests] within 
narrow limits of a mere teaching position (out of which they at all times are prone 
to trespass into ruling), how, I say, this state finally had to become the loot of 
external enemies who at last made an end to the faith that lorded over it; how in 
the west, where faith had erected a throne independent of worldly power the civil 
order was rattled and made weak, together with the sciences (which maintain it) 
by a pretending office-holder under God… [6.130-31] 
 
With the hatred of the world comes the spiteful wish to do away with it and with 
those who would assert its goodness and capacity for (non-apocalyptic) improvement.  
Particular targets of this animus are philosophers, scientists, and moralists – in short, all 
those agents of culture and progress. 
 In less explicit but equally important conflict with Kant’s moral and religious 
vision are several other varieties of the priestly dishonesty and insincerity.  The most 
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immediately condemnable type of priestly dishonesty is that which marks the priest’s 
unwillingness to perform the duties as he has promised.  At first, the tendency of the 
priest toward deception appears to result from the rigorous moral and spiritual doctrine 
which he represents, as he is forced to choose between adherence to a strict norm and 
giving comfort to a man who has failed to live according to that norm.  For instance, a 
Geistlich, in facing a dying sinner, “will have to hold out to him the hope of not being 
punished at all” (6.69n) – even though the pledge “to transform him in a hurry into a man 
well-pleasing to God” offends the basic principles not merely of Kantian but also 
dogmatic Christian morality.  In the very discharge of a duty crucial to his vocation, the 
priest granting last-minute absolutions acts dishonestly and misrepresents God’s moral 
call.  This “shimmering sophistry” is “ultimately found out as a disadvantage for 
morality” (6.71n).239  The fault lies with the priest for cowing in the face of his moral 
responsibility and with the dogmas of his church for placing him in an untenable position 
in the first place. 
The situation is again discussed in a footnote to the second edition, and this 
passage reiterates the implicit and dishonest agreement between the Geistlich and the 
dying sinner.  The intention of the latter is “to have a comforter” at “the end of life,” 
rather than a judge.  Rather than “stirring up” the guilty conscience toward a last gasp of 
moral striving, the Geistlich instead offers “opium to the conscience” (6.78n), by offering 
the comfort that “All’s well that ends well.”  Kant is not condemning the comfort given 
to a dying man, but rather only the comfort that comes at the expense of moral 
 
239 Cf. 6.118 bottom and 6.120 middle. 
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exhortation.  By releasing the sinner from the moral consequences of his sins – and thus 
thwarting the moral claims of God’s justice (even if such a thing does not exist, 
objectively speaking) – the Geistlich exemplifies the radical evil of dishonesty that mars 
human freedom and brings immorality to religion.  One could object that a priest lying to 
a dying man (or releasing him from the condemnation of sins for which he has not 
repented or repented sufficiently) is a minor or negligible evil, say, for the greater good 
of pastoral care.  It is precisely Kant’s point, however, that these little, seemingly 
harmless, deceptions amount to a wholesale and conscious rejection of the importance to 
the moral law and a cheapening of that which is worthwhile in religion.  This is the 
complaint of the moralists, that “the priests have made it easy for everyone to be 
reconciled with the godhood over the grossest vices” (6.120). 
One can easily find another sort of priestly dishonesty at the other extreme as 
well, namely the priest who affirms the beliefs of his church without admitting to himself 
that he cannot honestly know if they are true.  Insofar as the priest acts not only as a 
private confessor but also has an active role in political life, this element of his character 
is cause for concern.  Using the somewhat extreme example of the medieval inquisitor,240 
Kant displays the combination of the priest’s insincerity with political influence, and 
although he did not experience the force of the medieval inquisitors in his time, it was not 
hard to discern that theological censors in Kant’s time took their lineage from this source.  
Appearing late in the final part of the Religion, the passage discussing the inquisitor 
 
240 Nowhere in the passage does Kant identify the inquisitor as a priest or divine, but clearly the example 
stirs up that image to any reader’s mind.  Furthermore, the picture of the inquisitor will match the character 
of the priest. 
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follows the now familiar pattern of the priest being forced to enforce a rigid orthodoxy 
which he himself asserts to be true, and doing so at the expense of an innocent victim. 
One takes, for example, an inquisitor who holds fast to the exclusivity of his 
statutory faith to the point of martyrdom, and who had to judge a so-called heretic 
(otherwise a good citizen)… it is certain that to take the life of a man on account 
of his religious faith is unjust: unless (to make room for an extreme situation) a 
divine will, becoming known to him by extraordinary means, had ordered 
otherwise.  But that God has expressed this terrible will touches on historical 
documentation, and is never apodictically certain.  Revelation, after all, has come 
to him only through men and is interpreted by them… [6.186-87] 
 
In previous examples Kant had depicted men of the church acting dishonestly against 
their duty, motivated by an unjust mercy for a sinful man who did not merit it.  Here the 
opposite occurs, as the inquisitor, in accord with his duty, deals out harsh punishment – 
on intellectually and thus morally unclear grounds – to an “otherwise good citizen.”  That 
Kant identifies the victim not as a good man but as a good citizen indicates the length of 
damage done by the inquisitor and the faith which he represents: the crime is not only 
moral, as in the case of the confessional, but explicitly political as well.  In enforcing the 
dictates of orthodoxy when their truth cannot be demonstrated, the inquisitor “acts 
without conscience” (cf.6.189-90).  Aside from serving as another example of the 
opposition to the truth on the part of the priest-type, the passage also indicates both the 
explicit means of the priest’s dishonesty and the key to reforming the church and 
eliminating – or taming – the priest.  To tame the priest-inquisitor, one must take the 
“revelation” that informs his actions and alter the interpretation of the “historical-
documents” by which that revelation is transmitted.  As the analysis of the priest 
proceeds, the means of this alteration will become clearer. 
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In addition to these banal examples of priestly dishonesty there are more 
explicitly serious examples which not only make possible but encourage the lesser ones 
as well as create serious moral and political problems.  This characteristic of the priestly 
dishonesty is also the first commented upon in the Religion.  From the beginning of part 
one Kant has accused the priest of dishonesty, and at the heart of his dishonesty is “the 
oldest among all fictions, the priest-religion” (6.19).241  The mark of the preist-religion is 
the fiction, as in depictions of a past Golden Age, or paradise, or communion with 
heavenly beings.  The purpose of these fictions is not immediately clear, but their 
function has been to illustrate, by virtue of the increasing distance from the hallowed 
past, the ever-accelerating decline of human and natural history into destruction, and their 
effect according to Kant has been to make the realization of this destruction quite 
possible in thought if not in reality.  The suggestion is that these fictions were devised 
intentionally for the destruction of the world.  How this is so is a crucial matter for 
extended analysis. 
 First, however, it is clear that there exist more concrete motivations for the priest 
to invent and promulgate their fictions: they provide means of giving to the priest the 
power over moral and political (including cultural and scientific) life.  The fact of 
churchly faith as means of political control is well documented in Kant as well as in 
history.  We have Kant’s testimony on the subject from not only the essay on 
enlightenment but also throughout the Religion, for religion supplies not only a harness 
 
241 It is provocative that Kant uses the word “religion” here, rather than “faith,” due to his revision (or 
resuscitation) of their respective meanings.  One might suggest that “Priesterglauben” would be a better fit, 
until considering the later analysis of priestcraft: the priest-religion is an anti-religion rather than merely 
one among many faiths. 
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on the many by the secular ruling power, but also on both of these by the churchly 
powers.  The rule, spiritual (i.e. ultimately moral) and temporal, of the laity by the clergy 
is a problem yet to be overcome.  Particularly offensive to Kant is the rule of the scholar 
and the university by the clergyman and the churches.242  The basis of this rule is the 
promulgation of and belief in the fictions invented by the priest. 
 After dropping the theme for many pages, Kant picks it up again later in the book, 
this time more explicitly discussing the priest’s purpose in the making of fictions.  The 
opportunity for renewed discussion arises as Kant appeals to the history of religion as 
proof that churchly faith takes its full meaning from pure religious (i.e. moral) faith 
(6.109-110).  He begins by stating that, to maintain a link between a moral faith and an 
“empirical” faith (“which to us seems to have been dealt to our hand by chance” – a 
crucial statement), one needs to employ an interpretation of a particular sort – “that 
harmonizes with the universal practical rules of a pure rational religion” (6.110; cf. 6.12).  
“This interpretation may often appear to us as forced, in view of the text (of revelation)” 
and yet is preferred to a literal interpretation that works against or does not promote 
morality.  So far, Kant has called into question the divine nature of the revelation and 
proposed a single interpretive method, which though forced and not necessarily literal, is 
valid for all religions.243  Setting this foundation, he returns to the theme of the priest and 
his fictions.   
 
242 This theme is central to the next chapter. 
 
243 A detailed examination of his biblical hermeneutic, and the means by which he presents it, will be found 
in the following section. 
  209  
 In a more particular manner, however, the label of priest is also meant to apply to 
some known individuals in Kant’s time, individuals who had gained ascendancy in the 
present rule of Prussia and especially in its power of censor.  The most notorious enemy 
of Kant’s in this regard was Wöllner, who eventually succeeded in getting from the ruler 
of Prussia the command for Kant to refrain from writing on religious matters.  So not 
only is there a psychological component to Kant’s critique of the priestly type but also an 
immediate and personal one; Wöllner exemplified the perverted excesses of radical evil. 
Let us return from our excursion to Kant more focused criticism of popery in part 
four of the Religion.  As far as we have yet seen, this critique has been primarily moral 
only remotely political in nature, but in concluding his argument against it Kant brings 
his concern to politics.  After summarizing the argument thus far – from the choice of the 
“highest binding principle” to the loss of the mass of its “moral freedom” and the 
resulting “despotic” constitution of the “clergy” (6.180) – Kant examines the result on the 
laity (which includes “the head of the political community”): 
… at last the church lords over the state, not through force but rather through 
influence over minds and also through the false appearance of ultility which the 
state could ostensibly draw from the unconditional obedience to which a spiritual 
discipline has accustomed the thinking itself of the people; but, unnoticed, the 
custom of hypocrisy undermines the honesty and fidelity of the subjects, sharpens 
them in the seeming service also in civil duties and, as with all erroneously 
adopted principles, produces the direct opposite of what was intended.  [6.180] 
 
 But Kant has not finished his historical presentation of the victory of the good 
principle, for in the realization of the scandalous history of Christianity the Christian faith 
has consciousness of its role as a vehicle for true religious faith.  Implicit in the 
continuation of the presentation is the gradual replacement of critique with plan for 
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reform.  Because of the “germ of the true religious faith… already in Christianity… but 
not publicly”, the “present [jetztige] time” is “the best” of “church history” (6.131; cf. 
6.19).  Since reason “has wriggled loose from the load of a faith constantly exposed to the 
Willkür of the interpreter” (6.132) and has “accepted” two principles, one of reasonable 
moderation in claims of revelation and one of sacred narrative always being employed to 
promote morality.  It is the duty of rulers not to hinder public spread of these principles 
(6.133); the argument for this duty is striking: “very much is thereby wagered… 
encroaching on the way of divine providence, favoring certain historical church doctrines 
and…  exposing the consciences of the subjects to temptation” (6.133-4).  As a result 
there occurs “the damage which thereby occurs to a freedom that is in this case holy can 
hardly make good citizens” (6.134.) 
 The remainder of the “historical presentation” is less historical than prophetic – 
or, as Kant notes, “This presentation of an historical narrative of the future world, which 
is no history, is a beautiful ideal” (6.135). 
The kingdom of heaven is finally presented, as concerns the guidance of 
Providence, in this history not only as a lingering at certain times, but never a 
wholly unbroken approach, but also in its entry.  One can now interpret it as a 
mere symbolic presentation aimed at stimulating greater hope and courage and 
effort in achieving it, if to this narrative there is attached a prophecy… of the 
consummation of this great cosmic revolution, in the image of a visible Kingdom 
of God on earth… so that the end of the world makes the conclusion of history.  
[6.134] 
 
Yet, since this is a natural procession “on a moral way,” there is “nothing mystical” about 
it (6.136).   
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E. The Reform of Church-faith: Scripture Interpretation and Divine Worship 
Three elements are crucial to Kant’s proposed reform of the Christian faith and are all 
related to the pernicious influence of the priest and his fictions on moral and political life.  
First, since Scripture is the basis of a church-faith and furthermore its teachings influence 
the beliefs and actions of the congregation, the interpretation of Scripture must be 
restricted in a certain way.  Second, in order to cultivate in the public the tendency toward 
the pure moral faith and the life of virtue, the reformed church must sponsor suitable 
preaching and sacramental life.  Third, and most difficult, the training of the clergy must 
overcome the propensity to popery and instead predispose its divines to the practice of 
and exhortation to the moral rather than cultic life.  Although Kant could hardly 
guarantee that a moral or political transformation would result from these reforms, they 
certainly remove serious impediments to a moral conversion.  One should note about 
these reforms that most of them are not presented as reforms but rather appear as 
necessary and, in part, unquestioned elements of the doctrine of religion itself; this is to 
see, however, that the doctrine of religion in this regard is not merely an abstract set of 
principles but rather also a putting into work those principles already.244   
 The first reform, that of scriptural interpretation, is treated implicitly throughout 
the Religion.245  In addition to several lengthy passages that offer substantial presentation 
of Kant’s position on this matter there are smaller references that fill out the larger 
 
244 Cf. Bielfeldt’s discussion of the “systematic critique of Christianity, which Kant undertakes in three 
main areas: (a) the Bible, (b) religious dogmas, and (c) religious worship” (p. 172ff). 
 
245 For a comparison of Spinoza and Kant on this matter, see Yovel, pp. 3-26.  See Fortin, pp. 107-16, for a 
helpful discussion of Spinoza and Augustine on the question of hermeneutics. 
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discussions.  After examining Kant’s treatment of the character and then the use and 
misuse of the scripture, we shall examine in detail his principles for and applications of 
the proper interpretation of scripture. 
The Religion lacks a detailed treatment of the character itself of scripture in 
general or the Bible in particular, but several of its characteristics inform Kant’s account 
of its use and interpretation.  First, as it is “come to human hands” (6.107), it is of an 
unclear origin.  Because it claims to display the truth of divine objects as they reveal 
themselves to men they are presented in the manner of a history.  Among the varieties of 
revelation, scripture, as opposed to spoken tradition, takes on a special and lasting 
authority because it is written: 
A holy book gains the greatest respect even among those (and those most of all) 
who do not read it, or at least can make no coherent concept of religion from it; 
and all sophistry does nothing against the powerful dictum knocking down all 
objections, Thus it is written.  [6.107] 
 
Kant does not here explain why this is so, but later gives a reason: 
Every faith which, as historical faith, grounds itself on books has need of the 
guarantee of a learned public, in which it could be controlled, through scribes as 
contemporaries, who stand in no suspicion of special arrangement with the first 
propagators and whose connection with our present scribes are unbroken. [6.129] 
 
A link thus exists between the original revelation of the truth and the men to whom it 
currently is presented, and the preservation of this link is the responsibility of those who 
understand it in some way.  This suggests that an immediate sense of scripture, i.e. one 
that is communicated to readers of different times, places, and intellectual abilities, is not 
possible.  This is especially true when scripture tells of something like the Holy Trinitiy: 
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For the rest, the theoretical profession of faith in the divine nature in this threefold 
quality belongs to the mere classical formula of a church faith, so as to distinguish 
it from other ways of faith drawn from historical sources, [a formula] with which 
few men find themselves combining a distinct and determinate concept (not set 
out in the open for confusion); its examination pertains rather to teachers in their 
relation to one another (as philosophical and learned interpreters of a holy book), 
that they may agree on its sense, not all of which is for the general comprehension 
or to the needs of the time, while purely literal faith ruins rather than betters the 
true religious disposition.  [6.147] 
 
Also because it is written it and the faith which it grounds can survive, as “history 
proves,” “devastating political revolutions” (6.107).  Were one determined to eradicate a 
church-faith he would not be able to do it by eradicating its founding documents (6.107).   
Although reason and scripture (the record of an “alleged revelation”) are clearly 
separate, they are not irremediably opposed; that is, there is not only “compatibility” but 
also “unity” between them, “so that he who follows the one (under the guidance of moral 
concepts) does not fail to meet up with the other also” (6.12-13).  Much later in the 
Religion (in the first part of part four), in commencing a study of the Christian religion as 
a natural religion on one hand and a learned religion on the other, Kant, echoing this 
proposal, indicates the necessity of taking up historical examples of revealed religion: 
But we could do no better than to take, as an intermediate for the explanations of 
our ideas of a revealed religion in general, some book which contains such 
[historical] instances, especially such a book which is interwoven with ethical and 
consequently with rationally relevant doctrines, [a book] which we then hold 
before us as one of various books which treat of religion and virtue under the 
credit of a revelation, as an example of this practice, useful in itself, of seeking 
out what in this [book] may be for us a pure and thus rational religion, without 
thereby wishing to interfere in the business of those to whom the interpretation of 
the same book as the embodiment of positive revealed doctrines, thereby 
challenging their interpretation which is founded on scholarship.  [6.156-7] 
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For this reason the scriptures themselves are suitable only for the few, as already pointed 
out in the conclusion to part three (6.147).  Because it grounds a church-faith, and 
because the church-faith as subject to human sensuousness is prone to corruption, the 
wrongful use or misinterpretation of scripture has negative consequences.  A chief 
concern is the orthodoxy that is promoted by “self-styled interpreters” of scripture (6.107, 
164-5).  Scripture scholarship is the safeguard against their total abandonment of reason 
(6.180).  With these limitations and dangers of scripture in mind, Kant sets out the proper 
understanding of its interpretation and use. 
The use of scripture begins with the happy statement, apropos Kant’s moral-
philosophical analysis of the origin of evil in human nature, that the way of presentation 
which the scripture makes use of… goes very well” with that analysis.  The “history” 
which scripture uses to “present” the “beginning” agrees with Kant regarding the order of 
priority, though using time where Kant uses nature (6.42).  Kant proceeds to read the 
Genesis account of the Fall with the language of moral law, propensity, and maxim, 
successfully uniting the two accounts.  Nevertheless, there are difficulties with the 
scripture account after all, which is striking since it ostensibly was brought in as a 
confirmation of Kant’s own account.  The chief difficulty hinges on what seemed to be 
the crucial point of agreement between the two, that is, the notion of an “origin” of evil 
and an order to the process of origination: 
But we must seek no temporal origin of a moral character for which we ought to 
be judged; this is also so inevitable if we want to clarify its contingent existence 
(thus the scriptures have made it so presented, corresponding to our own 
weakness).  [6.43] 
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Thus, even before Kant introduces the notion of religion (which does not surface 
explicitly until part three) and the need (due to human sensuousness246) to promote the 
moral religion through the vehicular means of a church-faith and the scripture on which it 
is grounded, Kant prepares the reader for that position by using the implications of this 
early passage.  It is further provocative that Kant places the scriptural quotes among 
quotations from Ovid and Horace – other ancient texts regarding gods and human origins 
– as if to suggest a relativity to their accounts and a sheer temporal necessity in treating 
the Christian scripture as opposed to any other document.247  We might also recall the 
connection he made – in the context again of history and fiction – between 1 John and 
Horace at the beginning of part one and between Horace and St. Paul at the beginning 
and end of section three of part one.  (One might object to this observation that Kant is 
simply peppering his arguments with classical quotations, in the manner of a Renaissance 
humanist or an academic pedant, but a look at the choice and placement of Kant’s 
references to classical literature, not only in the Religion but in many of his other works 
as well, demonstrates that they are never done from a desire to adorn, but rather from a 
desire to illuminate further what he has said explicitly.) 
 This is not to disparage scripture unduly, for it can supply what is otherwise 
lacking to us.  A rational account of the origin of the “bad tuning of our Willkür” is 
inconceivable to us, and so it is to our benefit that 
 
246 This is the source of much of the error made possible by scripture.  For example, it can lead to 
anthropomorphism in its presentation of God’s love of man (6.64-5n) and to unfounded assertions on 
supernatural matters like resurrection and ascension (6.128n). 
 
247 Kant chooses to use the Christian scripture at 6.156-7 because it is a good example from history. 
  216  
The scriptures express this incomprehensibility in a historical narrative, which 
adds a more proximate determination of the depravity of our species, that it 
proposes the evil to be at the beginning of the world, though not in man but rather 
in a spirit of our originally more sublime determination… and so for man, who 
despite a corrupted heart yet always possesses a good will, there still remains 
hope of a return to the good from which he has strayed.  [6.43-4] 
 
At this point of conclusion Kant attaches a cautious explanation of what he has just done, 
or rather, of what he has not just done: 
That which is said here must not be seen as if it ought to be scriptural 
interpretation, which lies outside the boundaries of the authority of mere reason.  
One can clarify how one makes a moral use for a historical account without 
thereby deciding whether this is also the sense of the scribe or only our reading 
into it, if this sense is true in itself without respect to all historical proof, and 
thereby the only sense according to which we can derive some betterment from 
the work of a scribe which would otherwise be only a fruitless increase of our 
historical cognition. [6.43n] 
 
Scripture interpretation lies beyond the scope of the Religion; “our sense” or “moral use” 
of this “historical performance” need not be done according to the “sense” of the author 
or with concern for “all historical proof.”  The only requirements for the present activity, 
whatever that activity be called, is that the “sense” be “in itself true” and that it also be 
“for moral betterment.”  Anything else would treat the scripture as a “fruitless increase of 
our historical cognition.”  This amounts to claiming that any interpretation of scripture 
that is within the boundaries of mere reason must be self-evidently true and moral.  At 
this point, because of that important provision, there is nothing controversial here.  The 
remainder of the note, however, furthers the defensive move, as if the author is aware of 
his tenuous position or as if preparing the reader for something more drastic: 
One should not without need come to conflict over something, and over its 
historical prestige, when, however we understand it, it does not contribute 
anything to our becoming a better man, if what can make a contribution in this 
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respect is as cognized without historical proof and must even be known without it.  
Historical cognition that has no inner connection, valid for everyone, to this, 
belongs among the adiaphora, which each may handle as one finds edifying.  
[6.43-4n] 
 
The provision of “within the boundaries of mere reason” both allows the philosopher to 
search for a moral meaning from scripture while also protecting him from any charges 
that he is corrupting or endangering sacred doctrine.   
 The key treatment in the Religion of the interpretation of Scripture, though several 
other brief comments are found throughout, is found in the middle of the first division of 
part three – subsection six, titled “Church Faith has the Pure Religious Faith as its 
Highest Interpreter.”  In about five pages, Kant reiterates the necessity of scripture, 
explains its proper use and principle of interpretation, determines its proper interpreters, 
and considers the public roles of these interpretations.  As a whole this passage may be 
considered not only his guide to the interpretation of scripture but also a plan for the 
reform of church-faith insofar as that faith is grounded on scripture. 
 A church, because of the “natural needs of all men” for a “sensuously tenable” 
“experiential confirmation,” cannot merely preach the “highest rational-concepts and 
grounds” (6.109).  This has already been noted and is the reason for a church-faith as 
opposed to an unassisted pure rational religion in the first place, and so it is not surprising 
that, even when a church-faith is consciously (on the part of a few of its members) a 
vehicle for the latter, the core religious principles animating it are not presented without 
the language and manner of presentation of historical revelation.  This is true even when 
the church-faith in question has not originated self-consciously as a vehicle; left uncertain 
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at this point is whether Kant thinks Christianity or any other historical faith is self-
consciously a vehicle. 
 With this in mind Kant turns to the question of interpretation, the fundamental 
principle of which is that “the theoretical aspect of church faith cannot interest us 
morally, if it is toward the fulfillment of all human duties as divine commands” (6.110).  
Here again is the application of the Kantian understanding of the meaning of religion, as 
opposed to faith, in the first place.  It thus provides a more particular example of the 
religio-moral critique of church-faith.  The roots of the corruption of religion through 
church-faith may thus be traced, at least in part, to the way in which the founding 
documents of that faith are read.  It thus follows that a reform of that faith must spring, 
again, at least in part, from a reform of that reading.  The principle that Kant just offered 
is the manner in which the reform is to be carried out, as we shall see.  If what Kant says 
about religion is true, and if his principle were applied, then “an interpretation of the 
revelation that has come into our hands is required, that is, a thoroughgoing explanation 
of it in the sense that is in tune with the universal practical rules of rational religion” 
(6.110).  Realizing the possible controversies that might result from such an 
interpretation, Kant again (as he has earlier in a brief comment on the Bible’s 
presentation of human evil at 6.43n) admits that “this interpretation may often appear to 
be strained”; the strain, however, is not merely in appearance, but also “often actually.”  
One will see the strain right on the surface of the interpretation, in plain “intention of the 
[scriptural] text,” but the strain is preferable to a “literal” interpretation that either ignores 
morality or works against its incentives (6.110).  A striking example of such a literal 
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interpretation is the “prayer for revenge, which goes to the verge of the horrible” in 
Psalm 59:11-16.  The footnote in which this example is given provides Kant the 
opportunity for a further sharpening of the interpretive problem, reminiscent this time of 
Plato’s Euthyphro: “Here I halt… and ask if morality must be interpreted according to the 
Bible, or the Bible on the contrary according to morality” (6.110n).  The manner in which 
he answers, in which the use of “my ethical principles which stand by themselves” 
answers, reminds the reader of the opening sentence of the first preface, and of all that it 
implies. 
 If this defense of a strained but moral interpretation is not sufficient to calm 
concerns about conflicting moral and literal interpretations of scripture, then there is the 
further historical example that gives the former credence.  “One will also find that it is so 
with all old and new ways of faith, some written in holy scriptures, have been handled” 
(6.110).  Behind these ways of faith have been “rational and well-thinking teachers of the 
people” who through their “explanations” have “brought” the “essential content” of 
historical faith “into tune with the universal moral statements of faith” (6.110-11).  The 
examples of such teachers of people stretch from Greek and Roman moral philosophers 
to Christianity and later Judaism and to Muslims and Hindus.  Behind the manner of 
presentation in popular historical faiths is at least the potential for an “intelligible moral 
doctrine” (6.111). 
 If this is still not enough to assuage the pious reader’s concern, Kant adds to the 
practical and historical defenses of strained moral interpretation the moral argument itself 
which animates the Religion: 
  220  
But that this can be done without ever and again greatly violating the literal sense 
of the popular faith comes to this: long before this faith, the tendency to moral 
religion lay secret in human reason, from which its first raw expressions aimed at 
merely the use of divine service and, for its sake, induced those alleged 
revelations, but they thereby also situated in their fictions, though unintentionally, 
something of the character of their supersensible origin.  [6.111] 
 
This is striking not merely because it goes further in asserting the ontological unnecessity 
and moral obstacle caused by historical church-faith but in also bringing the reader back 
to a consideration of the priest and his fictions.  The conflict between this and the pure 
faith of moral religion is indeed historical and perhaps even prehistorical.  It has all the 
air of a huge mistake that has perpetuated itself, or nearly perpetuated itself, throughout 
human history – until now. 
 Kant goes even further, however, in justifying his proposed method of 
interpretation, for he states – as opposed to the implied moral evil of their priestly 
counterparts – about them the following careful words: 
One cannot charge this interpretation with dishonesty, provided that one does not 
wish to maintain that the sense which we give to the symbols of the popular faith, 
or also the holy book, is entirely as intended by them, but rather let this matter sit, 
and assume only the possibility that the authors so understood them.  The reading 
of these holy scriptures, or the inquiry into their content, has the final intention to 
make men better; but the historical [inquiry] which to this contributes nothing is 
something in itself wholly indifferent, with which one can handle as one wishes.  
[6.111] 
 
Historical faith then is meaningless unless as an intended concession to human ethical 
existence with an underlying moral purpose.  Although this has been implied and stated 
earlier, only at this point does one see how truly “dead” Kant wants it to appear. 
 After a brief paragraph in which he employs scripture itself to reiterate “the 
uppermost principle of all scripture-interpretation” (6.112), Kant moves on to discuss two 
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other pretenders to the interpretation of scripture.  Thus far, he has been arguing on 
behalf of the scripture interpreter; now he will treat first the scripture scholar (who is 
subordinated to him) and then the “man of feeling” (who is subordinate to them both). 
 To introduce the scripture scholar, Kant restates again: 
The prestige of scripture, as the worthiest and in the enlightened part of the world 
now the only instrument of union of all men into one church, constitutes the 
church faith which, as popular faith, cannot be ignored, because no doctrine 
grounded merely on reason would seem to the people to be an unchangeable 
norm; and the people demand a divine revelation, hence also a historical 
authentication of its prestige through the deduction of its origin.  [6.112] 
 
Yet, since all we have on which to rely are very ancient “human reports” in “[old] now-
dead languages,” and further because there are many “unlearned” reading the scripture, 
we have need of scripture scholarship, first to justify and then to interpret the scripture for 
the benefit of the public.  The task of the scripture scholar is thus twofold, and this task 
exists – we should note – because it is not the concern of the scripture interpreter, who 
has a purely religio-moral task.  The first part of the task of the scripture scholar is 
directly related to supporting in its “authority a church grounded on a holy scripture”; this 
“authentication” is sufficiently accomplished if scripture scholarship can show “that the 
origin [of the scripture] contains nothing in itself which would make the adoption of it as 
immediate divine revelation impossible” (6.112-13).  The second part of the task is 
similar and has to do with the “interpretation” of the scripture for the benefit of the 
“unlearned,” who are not certain of the sense of the scripture they read.  That Kant gives 
to this operation the same name (i.e. Auslegung, “interpretation”) that he gives to the 
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moral interpreter248 of the scripture suggests the tricky relationship between the two (cf. 
6.9-10).  The scripture scholar who performed the operation of interpretation shares this 
with the man to whom he is subordinate because he too necessarily employs tools from 
beyond the literal surface of the allegedly revealed text: 
the expositor, who has the foundational language, must also have a wide historical 
knowledge and critical ability, in order to draw the ethos and opinions (the 
popular religion) from the condition of an earlier time the means whereby to open 
up the understanding of the church community.  [6.113] 
 
What, then, is the proper relationship between the two?  Do they serve the same or 
different purposes?  The two seem to be conflated at times, as the following sentence 
shows: “Rational religion and scripture scholarship are, therefore, the properly appointed 
interpreters and custodians of a holy document” (6.113).249  Are the two collapsed into 
one, for all intents and purposes – thus displaying Kant’s full intentions?  It certainly 
appears that Kant suddenly demands on behalf of the subordinate what only the ordinate 
needs. 
When the state concerns itself only that there is not a lack of scholars and of men 
standing in good repute of morality who manage the whole of the church body, to 
whose consciences it can entrust this task, it has already done all that its duty and 
authority bring with themselves.  That he extend this into the schools, and concern 
himself with their conflicts (which, so long as they are not extended from the 
pulpit, leave the church-public in perfect peace), is an imposition, which the 
public cannot make on the legislator without being pushy, for it is beneath his 
worth.[6.113] 
 
Beneath these two – and there is no clear reason why Kant brings up this third – is a third 
“pretender” to the “office” of scipture interpretation.  This unnamed third “needs neither 
 
248 The counterpart of the scripture scholar is the Schriftausleger. 
 
249 Later he states that the same scholarship “sets out toward one and the same purpose as the philosophers, 
namely the morally good”, although they take another road. 
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reason nor learning” and relies instead upon an “inner feeling” in his cognition of the 
“true sense” and “divine origin” of scripture (6.113).  It is impossible to judge the basis of 
his method, i.e. the feeling itself: 
… each man has [feeling] only himself and he cannot impose it on others, thus 
also he cannot recommend feeling as a touchstone of the genuineness of a 
revelation, because it teaches utterly nothing but rather contains only the way that 
the subject is affected in consideration of his pleasure or lack of pleasure, on 
which no cognition can be grounded.  [6.114] 
 
For whatever reason he has decided to do this, Kant quickly dispatches the man of feeling 
as a pretender to the office of scripture interpretation and leaves only two in contention. 
Although seemingly conflating them, or at least certain elements of their 
methodology, Kant now separates again the scripture interpreter and the scripture scholar 
by designating the first an “authentic” and the second “only a doctrinal” interpreter.  In 
so doing, he also indicates the nature of their difference: the scholar acts as the interpreter 
but on a much more particular basis; while the interpreter works to show the religio-
moral core of an historical faith, the scholar attempts to “transform” a particular historical 
church-faith “into determinate and steadily self-maintaining system” (6.114).  Kant thus 
suggests that the scholar is the agent of the interpreter.  And, at the end of this discussion 
Kant emphasizes again the difference between the two, in terms of a danger to what the 
subordinate is prone.  It is undeniable that 
historical faith finally becomes merely a faith in scripture scholars and in their 
insight: which of course does not do justice to the honor of human nature, but 
which can be made good through public freedom of thought, and this is all the 
more justified since only if scholars set their interpretations out to public 
examination, and themselves remain always open and susceptible to better insight, 
can they count on the confidence of the community in their decisions.  [6.114] 
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olitical) matter: 
                                                
The identity of those performing the examination is curiously not noted. 
 That the suggested moral interpretation of scripture is at the heart of Kant’s 
reform of Christianity is clear if we turn again to the conclusion of his “Historical 
Presentation of the Gradual Grounding of the Dominion of the Good Principle on Earth.”  
After relating in a page-long sentence the unfortunate history of Christianity, Kant poses 
the question, “which time of the whole known church history up to now is the best, I do 
not pause for thought” (6.131).  The reason for his instant reply of “the present” (thus 
flying in the face of the “now” of 6.19)250 is that “reason has wriggled loose from the 
load of a faith constantly exposed to the Willkür of the interpreter” (6.132).  Reason 
accepts two principles, that of “modesty in expressions about everything that is called 
revelation” and that sacred history “always be taught and clarified for a moral end-
purpose” (6.132-3).  In the course of this reply it is clear that the interpretation of 
scripture and the spreading of that interpretation is a public (social if not p
Not to hinder the public diffusion of these basic principles in their becoming 
public is the duty of the ruler; on the contrary, very much is wagered and 
undertaken, and at one’s own having to answer for it when interfering with the 
road of divine providence by favoring certain historical church doctrines, which at 
best have in their favor only an appearance of truth to be established by scholars, 
and, through their offer or refusal of certain civil advantages otherwise available 
to everyone, by exposing the subjects’ conscience to temptation – all of which, 
apart from the damage which thereby befalls a freedom which is in this case holy, 
can hardly produce good citizens for the state.  Who… would wish, after thinking 
with the advice of the conscience, to answer for all the evil which can arise from 
such violent interventions and hamper, perhaps for a long time to come, or indeed 
even set back the progress in the good intended by the world’s government, even 
though no human power or institution could ever wholly destroy it?  [6.133-4] 
 
 
250 Here, “the present” is “die jetzige”, calling to mind the “jetzt”. 
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Thus the interpretation and preaching of the scripture must be free and unhindered by 
those in political power.  The character of Kant’s reform of biblical interpretation is thus 
moral but with political or social freedom as a necessary condition.251 
 The second means by which the Christian church-faith may be reformed into a 
more pure vehicle of the rational religion is that of a new understanding of sacramental 
practice which is to be found in the parergon following part four of the Religion.  The 
importance of Kant’s sacramental revisionism is clear from Kant’s speaking of the 
“alleged service of God, when brought back to its spirit and its true meaning, namely to a 
disposition ordained to the kingdom of God within us and outside us” (6.192).  Eight 
paragraphs of introduction precede the analysis of the four sacramental expressions of 
prayer, churchgoing, baptism, and communion.  Kant begins with the general observation 
that the “concept of supernatural intervention… is a transcendent concept” (6.191).  Even 
if “its impossibility… cannot be proven… we cannot make any further use of this idea at 
all” and “keep a respectful distance from it” because “escapes us” and might tempt us to 
“moral passivity” (6.191).  As we have already seen, the “only means of becoming 
worthy of heavenly assistance” is the “endeavor to improve one’s moral nature”; the 
concept of “means of grace” on the other hand is “self-contradictory” and really a “means 
 
251 To the question of what such an interpretation would look like one could point to several examples in 
the Religion.  One such is Kant’s explanation of the meaning of “invisible enemy” mentioned in Ephesians 
6:12 (6.59-60).  Another is the employment of the scriptural account of Christ as support for the depiction 
of the prototype (6.78-84) and the progress in human history of the rational religion (6.159-63).  An 
understanding of the nature of moral religion, church-faith, and scripture can help to explain the purpose of 
miracles in scripture as symbolic rather than historical (6.84).  The scriptural prophecy of the end of the 
world and the apocalypse can serve as a symbolic presentation of the gradual victory of the good principle 
(6.134).  The words of the Lord’s Prayer can be given a moral interpretation (6.195n).  Beyond the Religion 
itself are several essays, such as “The Conjectural Beginnings of Human History” and “The End of All 
Things,” whose use of scriptural passages is with a moral intent. 
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of self-deception” (6.192).  Although it is only the moral service of God that constitutes 
true religion, man needs (for reasons already addressed) to present the invisible by visible 
means, and with the satisfaction of this need comes the great risk of the “delusion” that 
the visible means themselves are the service of God, rather than a concession to the 
demands of human sensuousness (6.192).  The resulting “alleged service of God”  
… can be divided through reason into four observances of duty, to which certain 
formalities, which do not stand in necessary connection with them, have however 
been assigned to correspond to them, because they have from antiquity been 
found to be good sensible means that serve as schemata for the duties, thus 
awakening and maintaining our attentiveness to the true service of God.  They are 
grounded, all together, upon the intention of promoting the ethically good.  
[6.192-3] 
 
It is merely a task of “bringing them back” to their original ethical sense, a task that 
involves eliminating the illusion of a “necessary binding.”  Nevertheless, that this task 
will be difficult is illustrated by the fact that, “even where the conviction has already 
taken hold that everything in these matters depends on the moral good… the sensuous 
man still searches for an escape route by which to circumvent that arduous condition” 
thus leading to “a grace dreamed up in slothful trust, or itself perhaps an instance of 
hypocritical trust” (6.193).  Here again one finds the continuation of man’s original self-
deception.  This constitutes the third of the three “ways of deluded faith” – the first two, 
faith in miracles and faith in mysteries, already having been discussed in parerga two and 
three. 
 The analysis of each of the four kinds of service includes first a depiction of what 
the service is meant “in itself” – that is, from the point of view of morality – and second 
of the manner of corruption of the service in question.  Each corruption springs from self-
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deception and, by the fourth, extends into the social or public world; clearly the abusive 
practice of these services, often known by Christians as sacraments, like historical 
Christianity as a whole, mirrors, builds upon, and extends into public life human 
sensuousness and radical evil.  As Kant notes in concluding his analysis of these services, 
“All such feigned self-deception in religious matters have a common ground” (6.200).  
This “common ground” is the human “appeal” to divine mercy “in order to avoid the 
forbidding condition of conforming to the requirements” of holiness.  To “satisfy 
himself” in the possibility of success in this endeavor, “he usually transfers his 
conception of a man (his faults included) over to the Divinity” and “hope[s] to achieve 
[his goal]… by appealing exclusively to His grace” and thus ignores God’s lacking a 
human way of thinking that even the best human rulers have, by which notions of 
adherence to law, mercy, and justice are “blended” (6.200).  The process of adopting this 
ground should be obvious by now, based upon Kant’s earlier discussions of the delusion 
of anti-service.  The resulting moral crisis is also thus clear: “If the delusion… reaches 
heights of enthusiasm… virtue finally becomes loathsome to him and an object of 
contempt” (6.201).  The criticism concludes with a striking reiteration of the beginning of 
part one: “it is therefore no wonder if it is publicly complained: that religion still 
contributes ever so little to the betterment of men” (6.201).252  The Religion thus ends as 
it begins, with a complaint, but the two complaints are different in that the opening 
 
252 The purpose of all this exposition is not to repeat earlier moral criticism of the Religion but to show that, 
since fetishism (as has already been shown) supports popery and false religion, its reform is an essential 
element to returning man to the pure moral faith of religion.  This is not simply critique but the basis for 
reform. 
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complaint is the vengeful world-hating cry of the priest and the closing complaint is the 
justified charge of the moral educator and philosopher. 
 A brief look at the treatment of the four kinds of service will suffice to show 
Kant’s prescriptions for reform and his method in presenting them. 
 The first kind of service,253 or deluded faith, is private prayer.254  Originally 
prayer was meant to be a means “of establishing this [moral] good firmly within us, and 
repeatedly to awaken in our heart the disposition for it” (6.193).  Now, when it takes on 
the character of “an inner service of God” and thus a means of grace, it “is a superstitious 
delusion” (6.194) because, in the mere “declaring of a wish to a being who has no need of 
any declaration regarding the inner disposition of the wisher” (6.194), does not really 
serve God.  The “spirit of prayer” is a “sincere wish to please God in all our doing and 
nondoings” and is thus “the disposition… to pursue these as though they occurred in the 
service of God… But to clothe this wish in words and formulas… can, at best, only carry 
with it the means for the continual stimulation of that disposition within us” (6.195).  
This means is not necessary to all men; what is necessary is “to endeavor that, through 
progressive purification and elevation of the moral disposition” so that “the spirit of 
 
253 In this section is a useful universal comment: “Besides, men, corresponding to the tuning of their minds 
toward religion, like to transform into court-service whatever has a proper connection only to moral 
betterment” (6.197-8).  Children should be warned away from this, “because otherwise all the devout 
attestations of awe bring nothing other than hypocritical reverence of God instead of practical service….” 
 
254 That this purely internal and individual act should receive the first and the most extensive treatment by 
Kant is explained by its status as the root of the other practices, just as the historical and political effects of 
radical evil must be traced back to nonpolitical source in the Willkür.  Again, the political has the roots of 
its progress or decline in the moral.  Kant’s treatment of the four kinds of service accordingly begins with 
the most private and leads to the most public.   
  229  
prayer alone should be sufficiently stimulated within us, and that its letter… could finally 
fall away” (6.197).   
 Churchgoing began as a means of “propagating [the moral good] externally 
through public assembly on days legally consecrated thereto, in order that religious 
doctrines and wishes (together with wishes of the same kind) be loudly proclaimed and 
thereby fully shared” (6.193).  It is for the purposes of “betterment” – in the sense of “the 
actual betterment of man” whereby “man systematically sets to work, lays firm principles 
deep in his heart in accordance with well-understood concepts, erects thereupon 
dispositions appropriate to the relative importance of the duties connected with these 
principles, strengthens them and secures them against the attack of the inclinations and, 
as it were, builds up a new man as a temple of God” (6.198n).  The restriction placed 
upon this is that “the church does not contain formalities that might lead to idolatry and 
can thus burden the conscience” (6.199).  An example of this abuse is the adoration of 
Christ!  Unfortunately, however, the church-goer is tempted to use this as a means of 
grace, and thus falls prey to the delusion that “might indeed suit the way of thinking of a 
good citizen in a political community.”  The “external propriety” that is found in church-
going “debases” “the quality of the citizen as citizen in the kingdom of God” and “serves 
to hide under a deceptive veneer, from the eyes of others and even from his own, the bad 
moral content of his disposition” (6.199).   
 Rites of initiation, such as baptism in Christianity, were originally a means “of 
transmitting [the moral good] to posterity through the reception of new members joining 
the fellowship of faith, it being a duty also to instruct them in this faith” (6.193).  It is “a 
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solemnity rich in meaning which imposes grave obligations either upon the initiate… or 
upon the witnesses” and it “has something holy for its end (the formation of man…)” 
(6.199).  But, as with the other ways of service in their original purpose, it “is not, in 
itself, a holy action” in the way of a “means of grace.”  The notion of washing away all 
sins through baptism, as claimed the “early Greek church,” is “a delusion that openly 
betrayed its ties to an almost more than pagan superstition” (6.199).  What makes it 
“almost more than pagan”? 
 The fourth kind of service, communion, was meant to be a means “of maintaining 
this fellowship through repeated public formalities which stabilize the union of its 
members into an ethical body – this, according to the principle of the mutual equality of 
the members’ rights and their sharing in all the fruits of moral goodness” (6.193).  
Understood properly, this follows the “example” and preserves the “memory” of the 
founder of the church, and “may well assume the form of a ritual communal partaking at 
the same table” (6.199).  In this way it “has in it something great which expands people’s 
narrow, selfish, and intolerant way of thinking, especially in religious matters, to the idea 
of a cosmopolitan moral community” (6.199).  It is a “good means of enlivening a 
community to the moral disposition of brotherly love which it presents” (6.200).  But: “to 
boast that God has attached special graces” to it, “and to incorporate among the articles of 
faith the proposition that the ritual, though a purely churchly action, is in addition a 
means of grace” – “this is a delusion of religion which cannot but work counter to the 
spirit of religion” (6.200).   
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 In a final comment on communion, which may be taken as a statement regarding 
all the forms of deluded service, Kant notes that “priestcraft would thus be, in general, the 
dominion which the clergy has usurped over minds by pretending to have exclusive 
possession of the means of grace” (6.200).  In raising the spectre of popery, Kant 
indicates a third and the greatest kind of reform necessary to historical Christianity (and 
to historical church-faith as a whole), the reorientation and reeducation of the priest. 
 The greatest suggestion for the reform of the education is the Religion book, as a 
doctrine of religion, itself.  As he announces in the second half of the preface to the first 
edition, 
I even dare to bring in a proposal: whether it would not do some good, every time 
upon completion of the academic instruction in biblical theology, to add by way 
of conclusion, as requisite to the complete equipping of the candidate, a special 
lecture on the pure philosophical doctrine of religion (which could make use of 
everything, even the Bible) according to a guide like this book (or another also, if 
a better one of the same kind can be had).  [6.10] 
 
This will enable the potential biblical theologian to see that he cannot dismiss reason as a 
necessary tool of theology.  Furthermore, because it amounts to a priestly capitulation to 
the point of view of the philosopher-pedagogues, it will also reestablish the prominence 
of the moral matter at the heart of the doctrine of religion –  
the matter itself is contained in the most popular instruction for children or in 
sermons, if even in other words, and is easily understandable.  If only one could 
claim as much about the mysteries of divine nature, which are considered part of 
religious doctrine and are brought into the catechisms as though they were wholly 
popular but must later be transformed into moral concepts if they are to become 
understandable to everyone.  [6.14] 
 
The priest, as the protector, interpreter, and intermediary between historical faith and the 
members of the church community, is – insofar as he is the bearer of the moral worth or 
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unworth of that faith – the pivot of Kant’s reform of Christianity.  The doctrine of 
religion, forming the new enlightened – or at least illuminated – priest, will then be 
transformed to the faithful, and will provide the basis of the moral education for which 
Kant has called, on both a personal255 and social256 level.257  With the presence of a 
religion within the boundaries of mere reason, and which overarches and informs all 
concrete church-faiths and ways of faith, “tolerance”258 is possible (6.123n).  Kantian 
politics is not possible without this moral reform of Christian man’s social existence.   
Yet, as the sudden reference above to the second half of the preface to the first edition, 
there is more to the Religion than noted thus far.  It is appropriate to bring up the 
additional, and ultimate, concern at this point, for it underlies the raising of all of the 
problems treated in the Religion and itself is the cause of the chief “problem” in Kant’s 
professional life.  Found in all the strands of argument in the Religion – religion vs. 
reason, religion vs. morality, religion vs. political life – is the conflict between the 
theologian and the philosopher, that is, the (for Kant) irreconcilable ways of life of faith 
and knowledge.  We shall turn to this central conflict now. 
 
255 See 6.48-9, 182. 
 
256 See 6.105-6, 122-3, 145, 162-3, 175-6. 
 
257 One can also look to Kant’s discussion of the “rational clergyman” in his teaching about miracles (6.87). 
 
258 Verträglichkeit may also be rendered “agreement”. 
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5.  An Example of Obedience: The Religion and the Philosopher 
By laying out the doctrine of religion, Kant has displayed to the reader several important 
divisions – for example, theoretical knowledge versus practical faith; rational versus 
cultic religion; and moral versus churchly faith; -- but there remains one not yet 
addressed, a division that animates all of the doctrine of religion (at least in its 
presentation in the Religion).  This division, its thematic importance underscored by its 
initial treatment in the second half of the first preface,259 is the relationship of the 
philosopher himself to religion and its theologians.260  With this theme the present study 
comes full circle to the questions of the boundaries of mere reason and of reason’s task as 
the judge of religion, only now the questions are posed in more practical terms.  As a 
result, in combination with the philosophical examination of the religious roots of social-
political life (treated in chapter four), this practical depiction of philosophy’s self-conduct 
as a part of that political life,261 one can see that Kant’s book on religion is a work of 
political philosophy in its twofold and full sense. 
 
259 As was pointed out in chapter three, the first half of the preface to the first edition deals with the 
relationship of morals to religion.  The second half commences after a clear break in the text. 
 
260 Karth Barth writes as follows: “Kant… did not first wait for the theologians to declare their attitude to 
his philosophy, but immediately advanced to meet them – in accordance with the careful thought and 
precision he devoted to all his work – by dictating his own terms for peace, i.e. by giving an explicit and 
exhaustive explanation of the way he thought this attitude should be formed.  These terms for peace are 
contained in his philosophy of religion…” (Barth, p. 162).   
 
261 Kuehn: the Religion “was not just a theoretical treatise, meant as a contribution to the philosophy of 
religion; it was also a political act.  In fact, it was primarily a political act.” (p. 371)  I agree with Kuehn 
this far, but suggest that this political act was more than just the following: “Kant hoped (perhaps naively) 
to alter the conduct of his readers, including that of the king.”  This is true, too, but it was furthermore a 
political act in the way in which it presented an act for consideration in the speculative mode: it was aimed 
not only (or perhaps even primarily) reform but rather thought.  Kuehn would be at odds with the earlier 
assertion of Fackenheim: the turn to radical evil “is not due to political considerations of any kind, to a 
desire to appease intolerant theologians or the Prussian censor.  Nor is it due to the encroachment of 
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A.  The Philosopher and the Theologian: The First Preface Again 
Kant’s introduction to the question of philosophy’s relationship to theology262 does not 
begin as such; instead the third preface brings us to this question indirectly, first by a 
summing up of what much of the book will show (and which chapters two through four 
have discussed).  Its tone is half-triumphant, half-cautionary, mentioning first the moral 
necessity and desirability of religion and second the moral and political dangers involved 
with its actual practice: 
If morality cognizes in the holiness of its law an object worthy of the greatest 
respect, at the level of religion it presents an object of worship in the highest 
cause that carries out this law, and thus morality appears in its majesty.  
Everything, however, even the most sublime, is diminished under the hands of 
men whenever they apply its idea to their use.  [6.6-7]263 
 
None of this is new, but one begins to wonder what Kant is up to as the rest of the 
paragraph unfolds: 
What can be truthfully revered only as respect for it is free, is compelled to 
accommodate itself to forms which can obtain prestige only through coercive 
laws, and what of itself exposes itself to the public criticism of all men, must 
submit to a criticism which has authority, i.e. to censorship. [6.8] 
 
 
theological upon philosophical principles” (Fackenheim, p. 20).  He continues in a footnote: “one group of 
critics accused him of seeking to undermine revealed theology, whereas the other group accused him of 
giving a mere theological apologetic in pseudo-philosophical form.  As far as Kant’s intentions are 
concerned, both accusations are equally unjust.  And as regards performance, there may be some justice in 
the former criticism, but (as this paper seeks to show) there is none whatever in the latter” (p. 195). 
 
262 One must keep in mind that religion and theology are not identical. 
 
263 This mention of the hands of men not only recalls the formulation of Rousseau at the beginning of Emile 
but also foreshadows two passages occurring later in the Religion: “The sublime but never fully reachable 
idea of an ethical community diminishes under human hands…” (6.100).  “Lucky! If such a book came to 
human hands and contains, alongside its statutes, as laws of faith the purest moral doctrine of religion with 
completeness…” (6.107). 
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With this introduction of what appears to be legitimate censorship, Kant in turn submits 
himself and his work to the same judgment: if religion itself must obey authority, “it is 
proper for an essay, which is devoted to the determinate concept of [religion] to give 
itself over as an example of this obedience” (6.8).264  At first glance, Kant would seem to 
deport himself in a manner unbefitting the author of the essay, “What is Enlightenment?” 
with its command, “Dare to Think,”265 but at least his obedience is posterior to his 
argument.  Kant’s stated desire to be obedient initiates a discussion, at first noncommittal 
in tone and then darkly prophetic, of the appropriate judge of his efforts. 
 Kant’s discussion of the appropriate censor successfully puts off, for another 
moment, a clash between philosopher and theologian by putting theologians into 
opposition with each other.  In presenting the theologian as the proper censor of books 
such as the Religion Kant merely reiterates the established order, and all but avoids an 
argument justifying the theologian’s right as judge.  To the extent that he does show the 
theologian to be the right censor, it is in terms of his concern for the Heil either of souls 
alone or also of the sciences.  The two different objects of concern allow Kant to make a 
 
264 Kuehn is correct in observing that, if one combines this with the opening of the first half of the preface, 
one finds a clear statement of defiance.  Furthermore, Kuehn observes that “Kant admits that the censorship 
decree is indeed a law, but he suggests that insofar as it is incompatible with the large majority of the laws 
(passed under Frederick, one might add), it is obedience that makes defiance necessary.”  (Kuehn, p. 366). 
 
265 “For this enlightenment, however, nothing is required but freedom, and indeed the most harmless among 
all the things to which this term can properly be applied.  It is the freedom to make public use of one’s 
reason at every point.  But I hear on all sides, ‘Do not argue!’  The officer says: ‘Do not argue but drill!’  
The tax collector: ‘Do not argue but pay!’  The cleric: ‘Do not argue but believe!’  Only one prince in the 
world says, ‘Argue as much as you will, and about what you will, but obey!’  Everywhere there is 
restriction on freedom.”  (8.36-7; Beck trans. Cf. KrV A752/B780.)  Clarke notes in his interpretation of 
this short but deceptive essay that “To put the worst possible construction on it, the famous formula ‘argue 
as much as you like only obey’ seems to purchase freedom of speech at the price of making it politically 
irrelevant.”  As Clarke shows, however, “Kant makes a point of saying that restrictions on the private use 
of reason are conducive to enlightenment” (Clarke, p. 62). 
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distinction of theologians, calling the former “divines” and the latter “scholars.”  Despite 
the distinction both types of theologian share the principle of being biblical 
theologians,266 and yet, because of his membership in a university faculty, it is the 
scholar who has primacy over the divine in matters of censorship.267  That Kant agrees 
with this common practice and shows it in a favorable light once again displays his mode 
of taking the middle way, for it would be rash to assert that no theologian should have the 
authority to judge books on religion and a disastrous concession to put the judgment in 
the hands of a divine who lacks knowledge of science beyond biblical theology.  Of 
course, there is no need for him to think abou
If departs from this rule, so must it finally come to the poitn where it has already 
once been (for example, at the time of Galileo), namely that the biblical 
theologian, so as to humble the pride of the sciences and spare himself the bother 
on them, might break into astronomy or other sciences, the ancient history of the 
earth for example, and take charge of all the attempts of the human understanding, 
just as those peoples who, finding in themselves neither ability nor resolution 
enough to defend themselves against threats of attack, transform all about them 
into a wilderness. [6.8-9] 
 
 
266 In using the label of “biblical theologian” rather than theologian simply, Barth suggests, Kant indicates 
something: he ponders “the possibility of a theology which would be different from the philosophical 
theology he himself was propounding.  He explicitly calls this other theology, which limits philosophical 
theology, ‘biblical theology’, and it is his wish that the affairs of this biblical theology should not ‘be 
allowed to mingle’ with those of philosophy.  He wants rather to form for it a definite distinct idea as befits 
its own peculiar nature.” (Barth, p. 192) 
 
267 The reader is led to wonder how this discussion figures in with the subordination of the scripture scholar 
to the scripture interpreter in part three (6.112-13), wherein is also curiously asserted that “Rational religion 
and scripture scholarship are thus the peculiarly appointed interpreters and custodians of a holy document.  
It falls to the eye that these, in their public use of their insights and discoveries in this field, cannot at all be 
hindered by the worldly arm nor be bound in certain statements of faith; for otherwise the laity would 
compel the clergy to champion their opinion which they have only from their learning from these men.”  
The paragraph concludes by stressing the importance of the state trusting the consciences of moral scholars 
and men with the governance of the church, which thus points to the conclusion of part four, which treats 
conscience. 
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The reference to Galileo is no mere aside, and brings to the reader’s attention the Galileo 
case as a paradigm of the early modern encounters between philosophy and religion.268  
Other philosophers previous to Kant, Descartes for example, point to the Galileo 
precedent as a cause for concern.269  The biblical theologian who for sinister reasons 
would harm the sciences and “transform everything around him into a wasteland” recalls 
the priest who makes the happiness of the Golden Age disappear as a dream.   
Although this seems to be a prudent move, it might also strike the reader that in 
trusting his ability to publish to biblical theologians – even if they be scholars – Kant is 
hanging his hat on a loose nail: what is to prevent even the scholarly theologians from 
giving in to the propensity of the priest?270  That this question is on Kant’s mind as well 
is clear from the passage just quoted, when he refers to the danger not of a divine but of a 
biblical theologian: it is as a biblical theologian, not as a simple caretaker of souls, that he 
poses the threat.  Kant has thus shifted the conflict from theologian versus theologian to 
 
268 Knippenberg observes that, unlike the modern political philosophers, the works of classical political 
philosophers reflect the two aspects of political philosophy “and are inspired by the life and death of 
Socrates” (p. 155).  Kant presents a modern stand-in for Socrates in the person of Galileo. 
 
269 In part five of his Discourse on Method, Descartes obliquely mentions his treatise on The World, which 
“certain considerations prevented me from publishing” – except in the measured presentation in the 
Discourse.  Three years earlier, Descartes had written the following in a letter to Marin Mersenne: “You 
doubtless know that Galileo has recently been censured by the Inquisitors of the Faith, and that his opinion 
concerning the motion of the earth has been condemned as heretical… I know very well that it could be 
said that everything that the Inquisitors of Rome have decided is not for all that automatically an article of 
faith… But I am not so much in love with my own opinions as to want to make use of such exceptions, in 
order to have the means of maintaining them.  And the desire that I have to live in peace and to continue the 
life I have embarked on, taking as my device the motto: he lives well who hides well, means that I am 
happy to be freed from the fear I had of acquiring, by means of my writing, more knowledge than I 
desire…” (April 1634; Ariew trans.)  Whether Kant follows Descartes in his actions, or at least is as 
successful, remains to be seen.  Hobbes alludes to Galileo in the illuminating last paragraph of Leviathan, 
ch. 46. 
 
270 In the Conflict of the Faculties, as Barth (p. 194) observes, Kant is more clear about the theologian’s 
limitations.   
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biblical theologian versus nonbiblical theologian.  We have further confirmation that this 
is Kant’s view if we look at the beginning of the succeeding paragraph, where he presents 
a counterweight not to the divine but to the biblical theologian generally:  “But there 
stands against biblical theology in the field of the sciences a philosophical theology, 
which is a good entrusted to another faculty” (6.9).  Philosophical theology would seem 
to be the hero in this drama, but it would also seem to be subordinate to biblical theology 
anyway, but before addressing that problem, let us examine what Kant says about that 
philosophical theology itself, for he provides a reflection on his own mode of action in 
the Religion. 
For philosophical theology Kant claims perfect freedom of operation in using, 
among other sources, the Bible “toward the corroboration and explanation of its 
statements”, “if only it remains within the boundaries of mere reason” (6.9), thus calling 
to mind the discussion of the concentric circles that he would go on to provide in the 
second preface and exemplify in the argument of the Religion.  To calm the concerns of 
both types of theologians Kant promises that philosophical theology will keep its findings 
to itself for its own purposes, “without carrying these statements into biblical theology 
and its public doctrines, which is the privilege of the Geistliche”: both the pulpits and the 
departments of theology will be safe from the efforts of the philosophical theologians.  It 
would seem that an “essay” determining the concept of religion, if properly conducted, 
would have statements that have no connection or implication to academic or public 
religious life, but this is hard to believe about the Religion, in light of our analysis in the 
previous chapters; certainly they do not read like mere intellectual exercises or puzzles 
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disconnected from moral and political (and, as we see even more now, academic) life.  
Passing over such thoughts in silence, Kant repeats that if the philosophical theologian 
does trespass his boundaries, both the divine and the scholar have authority of censorship, 
though the scholar has primacy because of his membership in a faculty and care for the 
sciences. 
All this talk of trespassing boundaries leads one to wonder further about Kant’s 
image of concentric circles, for if rational religion is a part of revealed religion then there 
is nothing of the former that is alien to the latter: what, then, would constitute a trespass 
of boundaries, and how could one even be possible?  Further, why should theology have 
priority over philosophy?  These very questions are addressed in the next part of the 
preface now under consideration.  After repeating the authority of the biblical theologians 
to censor and the primacy of the scholar over the divine in this right, Kant writes the 
following: 
And indeed in such a case the prime censorship stands with [the theology] faculty, 
not the philosophical; for it is privileged for certain doctrines, but [the other] 
pursues its own business freely, and therefore only [the theological] can wield the 
complaint that its exclusive right has experience damage.  [6.9] 
 
Those “certain doctrines” are, for example, the historical accounts of the miracles of 
Christ, as opposed to the essence of God – the latter a part of both circles and the former 
only of one.  Since biblical theology has every right to address the question of God’s 
essence, philosophical theology has no right of censorship in this matter – but once 
philosophical theologians trespass into questions related to the miracles of Christ, since 
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these doctrines are properly biblical rather than philosophical in nature, the biblical 
theologian has right of censorship. 
The unsettling fact, however, is that Kant has treated of them in his philosophical 
doctrine of religion.271  Is the reader expected to overlook the skeptical or at least 
agnostic treatment of miracles and keep it in mind only when thinking philosophically 
about religious questions?  It is difficult to imagine that this is so, especially since the 
book, or at least the point of view it expresses, can be communicated to everyone, 
including women and children.  Other examples of this problem may be provided.272 
Ultimately, the philosophical theologian’s trespass of theological boundaries is a 
matter not of improper borrowing but of improper importation.273  The importance of this 
distinction is that the philosopher’s borrowing of material belonging to biblical theology 
does not at all harm biblical theology, whereas importing foreign material into biblical 
theology carries with it the possibility of harm – although there can be no absolute 
 
271 See chapter two above for its discussion of the second parergon. 
 
272 See, for example the following, which concludes part one: “That which is said here must not be seen as 
if it ought to be scriptural interpretation, which lies outside the boundaries of the authority of mere reason.  
One can clarify how one makes a moral use of a historical account without thereby deciding whether this is 
also the sense of the scribe or only our reading into it, if this sense is true in itself, without respect to all 
historical proof, and thereby the only sense according to which we can derive some betterment from 
[scripture] which would otherwise be only a fruitless increase of our historical cognition” (6.43-4n).   
 
273 “But doubt on account of the encroachment, regardless of the approach of the two complete doctrines to 
each other, and the concern of the overstepping of the boundaries on the part of philosophical theology, is 
easily to be averted, if one only considers that this nuisance does not happen in that the philosopher 
borrows from biblical theology in order to use it for his own intention (for the latter will itself not wish to 
be in denial that it does not contain much in common with the doctrines of mere reason, and moreover also 
much pertaining to historiography or language scholarship and subject to their censorship); assuming that 
he uses what he borrows from it in a meaning adequate to mere reason but perhaps not pleasing to the 
[biblical theologian]! – but rather only insofar as he brings something into [biblical theology], and thereby 
wishes to set it for another purpose than its setup permits.”  (6.9-10) 
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restriction on importing, since biblical theology itself borrows not only some things held 
in common with philosophy but also history and linguistics.  To insist on an absolute 
restriction would thus force the theologian to avoid trespassing onto philosophical 
property, in short, to operate without the use of reason itself.  Biblical theology, it turns 
out, depends upon reason and thus philosophy, a faculty that would seem to be 
subordinate.  Kant’s argument is therefore directed not toward complete fideists but 
rather toward reasonable (if not fully rational or philosophical) partisans of theology.  If 
the biblical theologian wishes to close himself off from philosophy entirely, 
… one can easily foresee on which side the loss would be; for a religion which 
unthinkingly announces a war on reason will not hold out at length against it.  
[6.10] 
 
Despite the conciliatory tone, this passage indirectly states the authority of philosophy 
rather than its subordination.  Philosophy is the handmaiden carrying the torch rather than 
the coattails. 
Amongst this discussion remains the unanswered question as to Kant’s 
overconfident reliance on the biblical theologians in the university faculty, for how can 
they, even as scientists, be relied upon to prevent the divines and even their priestly 
selves from overzealous censorship of the philosophers?  Now comes the answer: 
I even dare to bring in a proposal: whether it would not do some good, every time 
upon completion of the academic instruction in biblical theology, to add by way 
of conclusion, as requisite to the complete equipping of the candidate, a special 
lecture on the pure philosophical doctrine of religion (which could make use of 
everything, even the Bible) according to a guide like this book (or another also, if 
a better one of the same kind can be had).  [6.10] 
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The culmination of the training of biblical theologians – one would assume not only the 
future scholars but the potential divines as well – would thus be something very much 
like the argument of the Religion book.  Much more likely, therefore, would be the 
sympathy of the theology faculty for the philosophical faculty, but furthermore the 
exposure of the potential divines to even the suspicion cast on the historical accuracy of 
the Bible would seem to liberalize (or corrupt, depending on whom one asks) the new 
generations of divines.  Thus, even if not in doctrine, at least in act, the philosopher in 
Kant’s plan would trespass the boundaries but in so doing would guarantee his safety in 
doing that very thing. 
Kant’s prudential suggestions for seminary education do not stop there, for, as 
outrageous as they are, they must be made agreeable to the most fervent of the biblical 
theologians.  To this end Kant suggest they do what, if we recall the doctrine of method 
in the Critique of Pure Reason,274 will surely lead to their downfall: “Then the biblical 
theologian may be of one mind with the philosopher, or believe that he must refute him; 
if only he hears him.  For thus alone can he be armed in advance against all the 
difficulties which this one [i.e. the philosopher] may make for him” (6.10).275  If the 
 
274 See, especially, “The Discipline of Pure Reason in Regard to its Polemic Use” (A738/B766-
A757/B785).  On this issue see Michael Clark and Stanley Rosen articles. 
 
275 Barth writes as follows: “The contemplation of revelation, or alternatively of the reason which believes 
positively and concretely as such and in itself, has for the philosopher the significance of contemplating the 
border beyond which he feels, declares and conducts himself as one not competent, as a spectator, as a 
member of another faculty which is not qualified to judge of the matter, giving way respectfully and a little 
maliciously to the theologian, not contesting what he says, but not expressing agreement either, interested, 
but disclaiming all responsibility, waiting to see whether the other, the theologian, will find the desire and 
the courage really to take up the position which is his due as the proclaimer of revelation, of religion, that 
is, within and without the limits of reason alone.” (pp. 164-5) 
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philosopher has the stronger argument, or at least the argument that seems the strongest, 
the theologian, if he is to remain faithful to reason, would have to give his assent to it.276  
The second half of the first preface brings to the reader’s attention the possible 
tension between philosophy and theology and more immediately both that Kant’s own 
work – were it itself not an example of obedience – will be an example of and a cure for 
this tension.277  Our examination of other themes in the Religion has also brought out, at 
least implicitly, some examples of this tension.  Most prominent among these examples is 
the striking comparison at the beginning of part one (and thus the starting-point for the 
examination of the relationship of religion and political life) of priestly pessimism and 
philosophical heroism (6.19-20).  Another, which is the capstone to the political analysis 
of the work and the entryway into the more explicitly political essay “Towards Eternal 
Peace,” is the differentiation of philosophical from theological chiliasm (6.32-4). 
We shall continue the investigation of the conflict between philosopher and 
theologian by looking at Kant’s treatment of conscience.  In this text the reader 
encounters a more general conflict, that between a representative of a statutory church-
faith and the heretical but good citizen whom he is charged to judge.  This conflict goes 
out of focus as Kant locates a more profound potential conflict within the churchman 
 
276 Compare the last sentence of 6.10 to KrV A749/B777. 
 
277 This is not to say that peculiar examples of cooperation are absent from the work.  There is, for example 
the Christian improvement on the doctrines of moral philosophers (6.59, 78-82), as well as the harmony in 
ancient Greece of philosophers and myth (6.110-11).  Further, one also reads that the goals of the 
philosopher and scripture scholar may be the same when moral improvement is the question (6.156-7).  In 
all of these examples, however, one sees the Kantian doctrine of religion already reinterpreting the religious 
matters, for the cooperation occurs, or seems to occur, because Kant has restricted the meaning of religion 
already. 
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himself; in proclaiming the moral centrality of consicence, Kant turns the inquisitor 
against himself and in so doing contributes to the liberation of the good citizen who 
simply cannot hold as certain the teaching of a particular church-faith.  Even though the 
situation depicted is not as narrow as that of the philosopher (for this situation pertains to 
every man) it still corresponds to the overall theme of philosophy’s relation to theology 
and church-faith, and furthermore informs a comparison of the second half of the first 
preface to the real political effects caused by the publication of the Religion. 
B. Conscience in Matters of Faith 
 
The last section of part four, and thus the last text of the main body of the Religion, takes 
up the role of conscience in matters of faith.278  The twentieth-century reader might 
expect this treatment to pertain to the relationship of the philosopher to religion and 
political life as has just been discussed, and to expect a doctrine of freedom of conscience 
to be laid out, whereby the philosopher is proclaimed to be free to think and utter 
whatever he think true of faith, whether of the moral or the church type.  These 
expectations will be met in substance if not in letter, for what Kant offers is not a blanket 
allowance for the free-thinker but rather a serious admonition for those who would limit 
that free-thinker.   
 The obvious rhetorical strategy of forcing the believer to grant (or otherwise to 
take the gravest of risks) freedom to the individual rather than of asserting the freedom of 
the individual (at the risk of facing the frustration of that assertion) has been prepared in 
 
278 For a helpful account of the thought of some of Kant’s predecessors regarding conscience, see Fortin, 
pp. 65-84. 
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earlier mentions of conscience.279  To distort or overcome the conscience is to put oneself 
at great moral risk, and so to assert the guidance of the conscience is meant as a 
restriction rather than a liberation – depending on whose conscious is invoked.  So much 
for the foreground of this section. 
 The question at hand in the section on conscience is how it could operate as a 
“guiding thread in the most ticklish moral decisions” (6.185).  To arrive at the answer 
Kant offers, and proceeds from, two statements280 about conscience, but relies more 
heavily on the second in the answer itself.  The reason for this largely seems to be that the 
first statement allows Kant to indicate what conscience is not (i.e. it is not, and it does not 
do the tasks of, either the understanding or practical reason281), whereas the second he 
writes directly about what conscience is.  In exploring the first statement, he utters a 
“moral principle” that “one ought to wager nothing on the danger that he is not right”, so 
as to point out the responsibility we have to determine the rectitude of our proposed 
actions.  Of further interest, however, is the Latin gloss to Kant’s utterance – yet another 
 
279 See especially 6.38, which mentions those self-deceivers who are “conscientious in their opinion” and 
6.120, which states the moralists’ criticism of the priests for attempting to overcome the conscience of the 
faithful.  The importance of conscience is suggested to the reader by Kant’s words “guiding thread of 
conscience” in the section title echoing the earlier “Guiding thread of the ethical need” at 6.98. 
 
280 First he writes that “The conscience is a consciousness that is for itself a duty” (6.185).  This seems less 
a definition than a statement of one of the characteristics of conscience.  After an exploration of the 
question resulting from this statement, Kant offers a second articulation, this one more definitional: “the 
moral power of judgment judging itselft” (6.186). 
 
281 Conscience does not do the work of the understanding: “Whether an action is generally right or not right 
is given to the understanding”, although it is related to understanding in that conscience disposes me to be 
certain (gewiss) of the rightness of my proposed action. 
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classical quotation, this one from a letter of Pliny to the historian Suetonious.282  Pliny 
writes to his client, who is worried about a lawsuit of which he is a party, warning 
Suetonious that his “terrifying dream” is not cause for concern about the outcome of the 
lawsuit.  The lawyer advises his client to turn the dream to a good meaning and thus not 
to be troubled by it, and at this point he gives the advice which is the “precept” offered by 
the “most cautious” persons: “Quod dubites, ne feceris.”  The sense of the quotation, and 
the character of its “most cautious” sources, correspond to the admonition Kant is about 
to give with respect to conscience, so the use of the quotation is illustrative of the point 
about to be made.  But Kant’s use of Pliny may go further: Pliny’s own letter contains a 
quotation from the Iliad, in which Zeus is claimed to be the source of dreams,283 a 
remarkable coincidence in light of what Kant is about to write in the next couple of 
paragraphs.  
 After emphasizing the aspect of duty to be found in conscience Kant turns to a 
more direct consideration of what conscience is and does.  The central point springs from 
a comparison of the relative roles of conscience and freedom, for although they are not 
identical,284 they are related: by conscience reason judges itself, and man judges himself, 
as to whether his reason has properly determined the righteousness of a proposed action.  
Conscience seems to be that by which man and his reason keep themselves honest.  
 
282 C. Plinii Caecilii Secundi Epistularum, I.18. 
 
283 Iliad, 1.63.  Achilles suggests to Agamemnon that he inquire into the cause of Apollo’s anger. 
 
284 “The conscience does not judge actions as cases which stand under the law; for that is what reason does 
so far as it is subjectively practical”.   
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Again we see that for Kant the conscience is a restrictive rather than permissive force in 
human morality.  That Kant wishes to inspire the consciences not of philosophers or 
pedagogues but of the guardians of established faith, and thus to make more free the latter 
by reminding the former of their duty, is suggested by the example he offers. 
 The example is of an inquisitor285 who must judge a “so-called” heretic who is in 
all other aspects a “good citizen”.  Kant asks in his own name whether a death sentence in 
the case reflects the inquisitor’s judgement according to his conscience.  The other 
possibility, that the inquisitor made the judgment without conscience, springs from the 
observation that he cannot be “certain” that he did not act unrighteously: since the basis 
of his judgment is the revealed doctrine supporting his statutory faith, both that doctrine 
and his interpretation of it must be without doubt.  Can the inquisitor be said to be 
“certain” of the truth and meaning of that revelation?  What is “certain” is that unless 
directly instructed by divine will, one cannot put a man to death for his religious faith.  
Further, where is that divine will asserted but in historical documents such as the 
Abraham story – documents themselves which must be interpreted carefully.  Kant 
claims quite categorically: “Thus it is situated with all historical and apparitional faiths: 
namely, that there always remains the possibility to meet an error in it”, and any 
following a like faith in the example would be “unconscionable”.  Human duty is certain, 
divine command not. 
 
285 The German is Ketzerrichter, which has a resonance not in the English to heretic (Ketzer).  The English 
also obscures the “-richter” in the German word, which echoes the verb used severeral times in the 
previous and following paragraphs apropos reason’s estimation of itself and man’s of himself. 
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 Kant takes the truth drawn out of the extreme example of the inquisitor and the 
heretic and extends it into more banal situations, such as clerical expectation of Sunday 
worship and professions of faith by those who do not at all understand the content of the 
profession.  It would seem that any expectation of a churchman as traditionally 
understood has bad conscience at its root.  By replacing the “so-called” security 
maxim286 in matters of faith with a “genuine” one possessing “true moral security”287, 
Kant sets up the inquisitor and every other cleric and priest as the judge of himself rathe
than of his current or would-be con
 Although rather wide in scope in terms of religious practice alone, Kant’s 
thoughts regarding conscience extend into human freedom as it emerges not only in 
church but also in household and state.  Thus we see that in considering religion Kant is 
prompted by necessity to touch on the social and political aspects of human life wherein a 
question of justice is asked.  The present instance occurs in a footnote to the paragraph 
which presents the maxims of security.  In the course of reiterating the distinction 
between the faithful who have made a small step toward the freedom to think and those 
faithful who remain fully under the yoke of priestly faith, Kant offers a note correcting 
the language of this distinction: 
 
286 “If what I profess about God be true, so I have hit the mark; if not true and also nothing in itself 
otherwise prohibited: I have merely believed it superflously, which was not at all necessary, but I have 
merely saddled myself with some trouble, which is no crime” (6.188).  This maxim is in turn grounded on 
the delusion that makes insincerity in religious confessions a principle.   
 
287 “Whatever can be known to me as a means or as a condition of blessedness, not through my own reason 
but rather only through revelation into my profession solely by means of a historical faith, does not 
however contradict pure moral principles, I can in no way believe and assert for certain, but also so little 
can I deny it as certainly false.  Nevertheless, without determining something about this, I figure that what 
beneficial matter it may contain, for me it will come to good insofar as I not make myself unworthy 
through som deficiency of moral disposition in a good life-conduct.” (6.189) 
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I admit that I cannot find myself well in the expression which rather clever men 
use… According to such a premise, freedom will never enter; for one cannot 
ripen to freedom whenever one is not set in freedom beforehand (one must be free 
so as to be able to use one’s powers with purpose in freedom).  [6.188n] 
 
This is not to deny the necessity, depending on the temporal circumstances, of delaying 
the release of men into political, economic, and religious freedom, but to make this delay 
an unending principle is “an interference in the regalia of the godhood itself, which 
created men for freedom.”  To commit such an interference and to achieve success doing 
it may be helpful to the ruler, but whether it is just is at best doubtful – which again 
returns us to the role of conscience and its connection to certainty. 
 Kant concludes his investigation into conscience as guiding thread in matters of 
faith by posing a question for every author of a creed, every teacher of a church, every 
man, and thus (most importantly) every reader of the Religion: “do you dare to affirm the 
truth of those statements in the presence of the knower of hearts, with [the risk of] the 
renunciation of all that to you has value and is holy?” (6.189).  Kant’s concept of human 
nature leads him to suspect that no one, not even the “boldest teacher of the faith”, is 
willing to put his own eternal soul on the line in answer to this question, but he thus 
encounters the puzzle as to why the name of “conscientiousness” is given to insistences 
that ignore the question articulated to every man about the truth of the statements of his 
faith.  Such a confused notion of the conscience at work leads to the punishment of “good 
wills” who claim faith and beg for deliverance from the deficiencies of that faith.  The 
sincerity of the faithful good will is met with deluded claims to service of God, resulting 
in “striking the freedom of man wholly to the ground” (6.190).   
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 Thus, the main body of the Religion comes to a close with the quotation from 
Mark 9:24.  Yet Kant appends a final note to this quotation, and unleashing one of his 
most rhapsodic statements, an encomium to sincerity. 
 Kant’s teaching on conscience connects the essential themes of the Religion 
previous discussed: public reform of church-faith by true religion, the conflict between 
the priest and the philosopher-pedagogue, and dishonesty and delusion in opposition to 
sincerity.  As the final text of the main four parts of the Religion it is the last word and 
thus the conclusion toward which the various levels of the text must lead.  But, as the last 
word and furthermore as a public challenge to the enemies of true religion and moral 
faith, it also provides the terms in which we may understand Kant’s public conflict with, 
and silencing by, those enemies.  Insofar as the discussion of conscience reflects back to 
the second half of the first preface, it can be said to connect that preface to the public 
effect of the Religion as a published book.  Has Kant grounded toleration through altering 
the way of thinking of the priest and his congregation?  For that matter, was this Kant’s 
real intention in the first place?  Before answering these questions let us look briefly at 
the immediate reception to the published Religion. 
C.  The Public Life of the Religion 
In the light of Kant’s own presentation of his doctrine of religion the reader is led to ask 
what fate the book had in the hands of the theological censor.288  This is a question less of 
 
288 Barth, of course one of the greatest theologians of the twentieth century, refers to “the Kant who, upon 
the border between philosophy and theology and in that he was not able to avoid taking half a step over this 
border, did in effect intrude upon theological matters as a philosopher.”  (Barth, p. 192) 
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historical interest than of bearing out our contention that the writing and publishing289 of 
the book is itself an act of political philosophizing.  Before examining parts of the well-
documented publication history of the Religion, we can raise a bit of internal evidence 
from the preface to the second edition, wherein Kant answers a few objections or 
suspicions about the book.  The first of these, which prompted the concentric-circles 
image and the language of experiment, is the suspicion about the title and perhaps the 
whole of the book.  (The grammar of the sentence is ambiguous.)  And this raises the 
question of whether Kant is an esoteric writer: is he concealing something?290 
It can hardly be expected that Kant, who all his life despised liars and devoted a 
great deal of philosophical energy against lying, himself could have engaged in any form 
of literary duplicity.291  But nor can it be denied that a fog of vagueness hangs over many 
of his writings, and that his book on religion is a prime example of a vagueness that is 
even intentional and revealing of something.  In illustrating the perceived distinction 
between one’s conduct in politics as opposed to morals, Kant calls upon the command to 
 
289 In the same way, and more obviously, the writing and not-publishing (for several years) of the Conflict 
of the Faculties is such an act, whereby Kant is, in Isaac Babel’s words, a “conspirator of silence” who then 
shows that conspiracy in print. 
 
290 “His philosophy of religion was written subject to the pressure, or in the shadow, at least, of Wöllner’s 
edict of religion.  We must therefore certainly bear in mind the fact that he was prevented from developing 
a decidedly anti-theological absolutism by restraints imposed from without, too.  But he cannot be 
understood solely from this point of view either, unless we intend to question his character in a way for 
which we have no reason.” (Barth, p. 195)  But Barth interestingly adds a few sentences later: “Perhaps the 
placing of philosophy and theology side by side is after all a matter which cannot be spoken without irony – 
and from the theological side too!” 
 
291 “I would think… that surely nothing in the world is reconcilable more poorly with the aim of 
maintaining a good cause than are insidiousness, dissimulation, and fraud.”  (KrV A749/B777) 
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be wise as serpents yet innocent as doves.292  Especially in the short political works and 
the works on religion this command can be said to illuminate the careful and sly character 
of his writing. 
One might conclude these particular remarks by noting Strauss’ own cautious 
statements about Kant’s manner of writing.  In one book he lists Kant among the many 
philosophical authors whose biographies and even book-titles suggest  
that they witnessed or suffered, during at least part of their lifetimes, a kind of 
persecution which was more tangible than social ostracism.  Nor should be 
overlook the fact, not sufficiently stressed by all authorities, that religious 
persecution and persecution of free inquiry are not identical.  There were times 
and countries in which all kinds, or at least a great variety of kinds, of worship 
were permitted, but free inquiry was not.293 
 
He then continues in a footnote as follows: 
In regard to Kant, whose case is in a class by itself, even a historian so little given 
to suspicion or any other sort of skepticism as C.E. Vaughan remarks: “We are 
almost led to suspect Kant of having trifled with his readers, and of nursing an 
esoteric sympathy with Revolution.” (Studies in the History of Political 
Philosophy, Manchester, 1939, II, 83.)294 
 
In a later essay, however, he makes the following apparent amendment: 
After Lessing, who died in the year in which Kant published his Critique of Pure 
Reason, the question of exotericism seems to have been lost sight of almost 
completely, at least among scholars and philosophers as distinguished from 
novelists.295 
 
292 “Toward Eternal Peace” (8.370); Mt. 10:16.   
 
293 Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988 [1952]), p. 
33.  At the end of this passage Strauss refers the reader to H.S. Reimarus, “Von Duldung der Deisten.” 
 
294 Strauss, Persecution, p. 33 n. 12. 
 
295 Leo Strauss, “Exoteric Teaching,” in The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism, ed. Thomas Pangle 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 67.  In a related essay, “On a Forgotten Kind of Writing,” 
Strauss notes that a critic of his Persecution book “asserts that very careful philosophers like Leibniz and 
Kant have not been very careful readers.  I had not spoken of careful philosophers but of careful writers.  
  253  
                                                                                                                                                
 
The curious phrasing of this last statement reminds us of the caginess of Strauss’ own 
manner of writing, but it remains clear that for Strauss – who is caricatured as able to find 
a secret meaning in everything – Kant is not a completely open book. 
Yet Strauss is hardly the only commentator to mention this element of Kant’s 
writing.  For instance, Ernest Cassirer296 commented on the “character of compromise” 
that especially marks the book on religion.297  This apparent compromise, however, is not 
the result of “the purely accidental limitations of Kant’s personality and character” but 
rather Kant’s “outward consideration for the political and ecclesiastical authorities…”298  
Because of this consideration Kant employed the “method” of Enlightenment thinkers of 
employing esotericism for “pedagogical” purposes. 
A skeptical reader of our time might question whether, as late as the late 
eighteenth century, such a friction existed between philosopher and city.  There is plenty 
of evidence and historical precedent, however, that make certain that that friction, and the 
resultant dangers, did exist.299  A puzzled reader might ask this question: if Kant wrote so 
 
Belavel has not proved that the Nouveaux Essais and the Kritik der reinen Vernunft are carefully written in 
the sense in which the Discorsi sopra la prima deca di T. Livio are carefully written” (OFKW, p. 230). 
 
296 Brian Magee, too, notes that Kant “seems to have regarded the Christian religion as an importantly good 
thing even though insufficient; and of course the insufficiency is never explicitly asserted.”  Confessions of 
a Philosopher (New York: Modern Library, 1999), p. 249.   Schweitzer agrees that we must regret “that 
Kant, forced by unfavorable circumstances, cloaked his up-to-date thoughts in the stiff dogmatic form of 
the church language of his day” (Schweitzer, p. 306). 
 
297 Cassirer 1981, p. 386. 
 
298 Cassirer 1981, p. 387. 
 
299 See Kuehn, p. 365 (on Schulz), and Winter. 
 
  254  
                                                
carefully because of the threat to life and freedom from ecclesiastical or political 
authorities, where is that care?  After all, while he does not write a critique of religion in 
the manner of Nietzsche’s Antichrist, he is not so subtle so as to make the implicit 
conclusions available to any reasonably careful reader.  Furthermore, he was caught and 
forbidden to write on religion again, which suggests either that he wrote very carefully 
and was caught by supersentive esoteric bloodhounds, or he wrote boldly enough such 
that being caught was no real surprise, or (as is claimed of Machiavelli and Spinoza) his 
boldness in writing was a means of concealing, except for a few, a deeper boldness.  One 
more possibility, to use Strauss’ distinction, is that Kant, though he may well be a careful 
philosopher, is not a careful writer.300 
The publication history of the Religion has received a great deal of scholarly 
comment, and so I shall provide only a sketch.301  This history clearly displays Kant 
having full awareness of the dangers of publishing a work such as the Religion in the 
current political and cultural atmosphere, and that he decided to publish anyway leads 
one almost to suggest that he himself forced a confrontation.  Kant originally intended for 
what is now the Religion to be published as four installments in the Berlinische 
Monatsschrift, a publication that had previously carried works authored by him.  Whereas 
the first essay received the approval of the philosophy censor, the second, because it was 
 
300 One cannot claim rhetorical carelessnes overall in Kant’s authorship of the Religion, in light of many 
observations made in this study, or in the face of the nuanced clues to reading it offered by Fenves, 
especially pp. 75-91.   
 
301 The following sketch relies on the detailed accounts provided by Cassirer, Hoffe, Kuehn, and Wood-
diGiovanni. 
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seen to deal with biblical theology and thus come under the examination of the theology 
censor, did not.302  As a result, Kant decided to publish, without substantive modification 
of the essays, them together as a book with only the first essay having a previous 
publication.303  The remaining problem of whether a philosophy or a theology faculty 
(Kant sent it directly to a faculty this time, and not to the censor’s office) should examine 
a philosophical book written on theology was decided in favor of the former, perhaps 
because, the second part notwithstanding, the bulk of the work was philosophical rather 
than theological.  That the book was indeed published signals a happy outcome, but 
Kant’s failure to elude the theology censor in attempting to publish part two as an essay – 
with no substantive or particular criticism ever offered by that censor – no doubt brought 
about the prefatory remarks upon which we have been commenting.  Unlike Descartes, 
however, who was able to maneuver past the inquisition by means of the Meditations on 
First Philosophy,304 it was the Religion itself305 and the short essays306 written about the 
 
302 It should be noted that even the first essay was sent to Berlin, where restrictions were less severe, for 
approval. 
 
303 Kuehn notes that “The [second] article seemed doomed – at least as long as Kant persisted in playing by 
the rules.”  (Kuehn, p. 363) 
 
304 The cause for the writing of the Meditations was ecclesiastical suspicion of Descartes.  See especially 
the prefatory letter to the Sorbonne, which, combined with the meditations themselves, is a masterpiece of 
rhetoric. 
 
305 Kuehn observes that “Part of the book, namely the chapter on the struggle between the good and evil 
principles, had already been banned by the Berlin censors.  Accordingly, its publication could only be 
construed as a slap in the face of Wöllner and his censors.  They could not possibly let this pass… It almost 
appears as if he was trying to force their hand, that he was picking a fight with the censors.”  (Kuehn, p. 
365)  One is reminded of Socrates in the Apology and the Crito, of a philosopher so advanced in age that he 
need fear very little if able to make a point.  And for both men the point was the same, i.e. that the 
philosopher and the city exist in a state of great tension.  Kant, however, moderate Enlightenment man that 
he was, just possibly hoped that a different precedent (not possible until the future) would be prepared for 
by his situation.  For Kuehn, Kant’s publication of the book on religion “meant not only religious freedom, 
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same time that prompted the royal power to prevent him from further publishing works 
related to religion.307  At the end of this forced silence, Kant published the Conflict of the 
Faculties and prefaced it with a defense of the writings that had put him in disfavor.308 
The preface begins with a brief recounting of the situation at the time of the 
Religion.309  From the beginning Kant asserts his bona fides: if he had decided to be 
sneaky, he could have published the work without punishment if he had chosen not to 
sign his name to it.  Because he did not, he received a letter from Woellner,310 which 
until now he kept concealed from the public and to which he responded at once in writing
and only now in public writing.  Kant begins by expressing his “most submissive 
 
but also civil freedom and freedom from any kind of bondage.  One might have expected a swift and 
decisive response from the powers that be” (p. 372).  The question for political philosophy is whether this 
should – ever – come as a surprise or whether it is an ineradicable element of the relationship of philosophy 
and religion/city.  Contrary to Barth’s and Kuehn’s claims about Kant’s boldness we have Saner’s claim 
that “after the death of Frederick the Great, when the political authorities began to curtail his literary 
freedom, Kant let it pass, not without reservations, but in a wholly unheroic posture: ‘When the world’s 
strong men are in a state of intoxication, a pygmy who values his skin is well advised to stay clear of their 
quarrels’” (Saner, p. 2, quoting a letter to Spener).  This is not quite fair to Kant, who, it seems, forced this 
curtailment. 
 
306 Among these is “The End of All Things,” discussed in the next chapter below. 
 
307 This is not to say that the Metaphysics of Morals and “Toward Eternal Peace,” written and published 
during the forbidden time, do not rely on the Religion and illuminate it.  A further essay on the relationship 
of the theology and philosophy faculties, written not long after the Religion was published, was shelved by 
Kant until it became the first essay of the Conflict of the Faculties, itself published after Kant felt the 
prohibition had been lifted by the death of the sovereign. 
 
308 The present dissertation will examine only a part of the preface to this work.  Sensitive readings of the 
Conflict as a whole include those of Shell, Clarke, and Saner. 
 
309 Quotations from this work are taken from Mary Gregor’s translation. 
 
310 Woellner’s phrasing of the charge is interesting.  He has “long observed with great displeasure how you 
misuse your philosophy to distort and disparage many of the cardinal and basic teachings of the Holy 
Scriptures and of Christianity; how you have done this particularly in your book Religion within the Limits 
of Mere Reason, as well as in other shorter treatises… [You] yourself must realize how irresponsibly you 
have acted against your duty as a teacher of youth and against our paternal purpose…”  (SF, preface; 
Gregor trans.) 
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obedience” and then protests that his students have never witnessed his “evaluation” of 
the Bible and Christianity in his lectures.  As for his books, particularly the Religion
though, the defense is more
… I have done no harm to the public religion of the land.  This is already clear 
from the fact that the book in question is not at all suitable for the public: to them 
it is an unintelligible, closed book, only a debate among scholars of the faculty, of 
which people take no notice. 
 
Rather, the higher faculties, with the guidance of the government, are free to present the 
findings of the book – or not – to the public as they desire.  Kant offers the further 
defense that “Since, in the book mentioned, I make no appraisal of Christianity, I cannot 
be guilty of disparaging it.  In fact, it is only natural religion that I appraise.”  Because of 
this, he continues, he did not do anything other than what Michaelis did before him and 
followed the rules that he himself set down in the second half of the first preface to the 
Religion: he borrowed, but did not import.  At the center of the Religion is “the highest 
tribute of respect to Christianity” due to its “harmony with the purest moral belief of 
religion.”  In short, Kant relies on the rhetorical safeguards that he built into the religion 
book but in using them only called attention again to the very elements of the book that 
probably angered Woellner in the first place. 
Although Knippenberg’s paper on the political character of Kant’s philosophy 
does not focus on, or even mention, the Religion, it does examine the political situation 
that resulted in the Religion controversy: 
After the death of Friedrich, the intellectual climate in Prussia changed 
substantially… Where once it had been rather easy for scholars publicly to say 
almost anything they wished, they were now called to account for their writings, 
especially in matters of religion… The age of enlightenment seemed to have come 
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to an end.  The government would no longer ignore the potential political 
consequences of scholarly activity.  As a result of this experience, Kant trod more 
lightly…311 
 
The question that results from this comment is whether Kant provoked his censorship or 
was the mere innocent victim who suffers at the hands of a suddenly repressive 
government.  He was, after all, already aware of the political situation before he 
published the Religion, and the book itself, a strange mixture of caution and boldness, 
presented itself as a challenge to church faith as it existed in Prussia.312  “Kant’s 
insistence on the orthodoxy of his philosophic accounts of Christianity does not seem to 
have fooled anybody in the 1790s”313 – and it is difficult to see how it could.   
 In light of what has been displayed in this chapter we must ask again the question 
of Kant’s political intention in writing the Religion.  The difficulty in answering that 
question is exemplified in the apparent contradiction of the boldness with which Kant 
writes and the external obedience with which he responds to the political response to the 
publication.  Granting Kant’s knowledge of the religious tensions, and the possible 
intensification of them due to Woellner’s ascendency, and considering Kant’s occasional 
small but firm displays throughout adult life of religious nonconformity, it seems 
reasonable to conclude at least that the intention was to provoke and that the response to 
the provocation was expected.  In the short term, then, Kant had no hope of directly 
altering the social-political landscape with respect to religion.  This is not to suggest that 
 
311 Knippenberg, pp. 166-67. 
 
312 Even if the Religion did not provoke, “The End of All Things” most certainly did.  See chapter six 
below. 
 
313 Clarke, p. 65. 
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he had a rather private landscape in mind when writing the Religion, for, as has also been 
seen, far too much of that book extends beyond the private moral life of the individual 
man; the purpose in writing was not limited to individual moral reform but rather to offer 
social criticism in order to bring about – eventually – religious and eventually social-
political reform as a result.  Whether this explains the necessity or prudence in putting his 
ability to write freely at risk is not clear, but perhaps the direct intention was to illustrate 
for his intellectual contemporaries and philosophical descendants the real situation of 
philosophy and religion in political life: that the way of thinking maintained by church-
faith is difficult if not impossible to alter, that philosophy must remain intransigent in the 
face of everything that it intends to study and critique, and that theology and philosophy 
remain in open or concealed conflict, despite the adoption (whether sincere or merely 
crafty) of religion by the latter. 
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6.  Christianity from a Liberal Standpoint: “The End of All Things” 
 
Philosophy has often concerned itself with the obscure but important relationship 
between death and politics, but the investigations of Plato, Rousseau, or Hegel314 do not 
equal the quirky inquisitiveness of Kant’s effort for popular readers.  Despite its obvious 
brevity and apparent simplicity, Kant’s essay on “The End of All Things” is a 
contribution to this investigation and, more importantly for our purposes, to the working 
out of themes presented in the earlier book on religion.  It was published in the same year 
as the Religion (which itself contains in scattered pages what might be seen as fragments 
of the shorter work315).  Clearly, a glance toward the conclusion of “The End of All 
Things” reveals the role of a “religion within the boundaries of mere reason,” and this is 
especially obvious when Kant speaks of liberal Christianity (8.338).  It follows by four 
years the Critique of Judgment whose aesthetic considerations, as noted above, influence 
both the form (in the manner of presentation) and the content (in the manner of specific 
terminology and concepts within the argument) of the essay.  Perhaps most revealingly, 
“The End of All Things” follows the “Conjectural Beginning of Human History” by eight 
years and precedes “Toward Perpetual Peace” by one.  The former is important in light of 
its presentations of a “beginning” (Anfang) and a “conclusion” (or “resolution”; 
Beschluß)316 to “history” (Geschichte); additionally, it employs an odd interpretation of 
 
314 For example, Plato’s Phaedo, Rousseau’s Emile (bk. 5, particularly), and Hegel’s discussions of the 
family and the master-slave relationship, etc. 
 
315 Among others, 6.65,134-36,159-60. 
 
316 8.118. 
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the opening of Genesis, the first book of the Hebrew bible.  “The End of All Things,” in 
contrast, examines neither a beginning nor a conclusion, but an end -- something more 
final than a conclusion; and it turns to Revelation, the last book of the Christian bible.  
This pair of essays thus represents in some way the alpha and omega of Kant’s popular 
writings on the human world, or at least the beginning and end of that for which we can 
hope from past and future history.   
 “Toward Perpetual Peace” is useful for consideration, for in it Kant uses as a chief 
theme, as he does in “The End of All Things,” the physical and moral catastrophes of the 
present and recent past, and several times discloses his bitterness towards patronizing 
religion,317 greedy mercantilists,318 and most notably political rulers.319  I say “most 
notably,” because not only are they the most ringing denunciations in “Toward Perpetual 
Peace,” but they also seem to reveal a desire for revolution, that which Kant is not willing 
to justify.  As “The End of All Things” will show, Kant’s “revolution” is not limited to 
the intellectual; rather, he intends to effect revolution in the practical world, but indirectly 
in religion rather than directly in politics proper.  As I hope will become clear, “The End 
of All Things” is an enactment of the dictum of Sapere aude from the “Enlightenment” 
essay of ten years previous.320  By means of a humorous biblical freeplay, Kant  makes 
possible a new conversion (Bekehrung) (8.332).  Although its argument is popular and 
 
317 8.344,367,385. 
 
318 8.345,351,358-59. 
 
319 8..344,351,354. 
 
320 8.35 
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self-contained, therefore, a reading of “The End of All Things” read in context helps to 
illuminate the whole of Kant’s political philosophy. 
 The argument of “The End of All Things” turns out to be completely different 
upon conclusion from what it is at its beginning.  We can note several obvious changes, 
the most obvious perhaps being the turn from the individual element of the first 
paragraph to the quite political element of the last paragraph.  Similarly, there is a change 
from common speech of religious belief to epistemological hairsplitting, to questions of 
moral right and wrong, to aesthetic principles, and finally to a political reinterpretation of 
Christianity.  While this paper cannot make note of every twist and turn of Kant’s 
argument, it is obviously important at least to make note of the important ones. 
 One last preliminary clue to reading “The End of All Things” remains, and this is 
Kant’s own advice on how to read the essay.  In a letter to his friend Beister written 
shortly before the essay’s publication, Kant claims that it might best be read as “partly 
miserable” (theils kläglich) and “partly merry” (theils lustig).321  Such a hint suggests that 
this essay offers the same mixture of optimism and bitter pessimism which runs 
throughout “Towards Perpetual Peace.”   
An Overview of the Essay 
The essay begins with a common expression (üblicher Ausdruck) from pious language 
(frommen Sprache). A dying man goes “out of time into eternity” (8.327).  Like Socrates, 
Kant wishes to clarify what is meant by this expression and thus to illuminate a 
 
321 Excerpts of the letter are printed in Heinrich Maier’s editorial notes in 8.504-5; the entire letter is found 
in 11.477f. 
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meaningful part of human experience.  Yet Kant’s desire for clarification in this instance 
is not for the sake of the expression itself, but rather as an introduction to a much more 
expansive problem; time and eternity cannot coexist, and so Kant turns ostensibly to 
investigate the question of eternity.322  The following paragraphs of the essay thus 
purport to be an examination of the meaning or significance of eternity.  We cannot 
blame Kant for this sudden change, or for apparently abandoning the common expres
which opens the essay, for he argues that all reasoning Volk find in death the terrifying 
idea of eternity; this transcendental idea is inevitably woven (muß verwebt sein), like 
death, into human experience itself.  As the essay proceeds, however, Kant uses this 
omnipresent idea to his own philosophical and political ends: a concern with eternity fa
away as quickly as the concern for the common expre
 The contemplation of one’s own death, itself a terrible thought, gives way to 
thinking of what happens after death.  The nonscientific common man thinks of after-
death eternity euphemistically but cannot always avoid darker thoughts, which lead to an 
abyss.  For behind the common-expression understanding of eternity is an unending end, 
or a duration without time in nothingness.  Such a thought is dreadful (Grausendes), 
attractive (Anziehendes), and frighteningly sublime (furchtbar-erhaben).  Because of its 
obscurity and simultaneous necessity for human beings, timeless eternity is the object of 
insistent yet fruitless obsessive thought.  Because of its sublimity, however, Kant finds in 
it the traces of a wondrous way (wundersame Weise), for it is a mark of universal human 
 
322 The importance of eternity is not merely a motif on which Kant hangs this popular essay, as a passage 
from the Critique of Pure Reason (A613/B641) shows.  Cf. Critique of Judgment, 5.483f. 
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reason.  Admitting that such thoughts themselves about eternity cannot yield much in 
terms of theoretical cognition, the thinking actions itself yields practical fruit.  Here the 
end (Ende) of things is reconsidered as the purpose (Zweck) of moral actions; we thus 
move from thoughts in terms of the Prolegomena (physical science) to those in terms of 
the Grounding (moral science).  At this point one might turn to the discussions of the 
sublime and of the sensus communis from the third Critique for a further indication of 
what is going on here.   
 Rather from turning to moral and practical considerations immediately, Kant 
wishes to preserve the religious and mythical significance behind the introductory 
common expression.  He begins by restating the inescapable turning to thoughts of death 
and eternity by human beings, this time by using the example of his native language 
(8.328).  The jüngster Tag marks the end of the physical world, and yet because Kant 
points out the incompatibility of time with eternity, it itself can only be the herald of the 
end of time and the coming of eternity.  The jüngster Tag is associated with the physical 
collapse of the world as foretold in apocalyptic writings, but it mirrors Kant’s own 
purposes, springing as it does from originally moral and practical concerns.   
 Following this discussion is Kant’s odd introduction of the systems of the unitists 
(Unitarier) and the dualists (Dualisten), and the moral difficulties of each of them 
(8.329).  Neither seems worthy of moral reasoning, yet Kant accepts for practical reasons 
a reformed version of the dualistic system: he preserves the idea of the salvation of some 
and damnation of many, but collapses the two opposing deities into one.  The reason 
behind this is clear, for the single-deity idea parallels that of Christianity (and, covertly, 
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atheistic Kantianism), while the preservation of moral culpability ensures the necessity of 
rectitude and not mere grace.  Yet there remains a problem for this system due to the 
superficial self-knowledge (oberflächlichen Selbsterkenntnis) of human beings: who, left 
on his own, can really judge himself (8.330)?  A further problem has arisen which Kant 
allows his readers to ignore: this discussion of reward and punishment after death ignores 
the earlier separation of time and eternity.  From a theoretical and speculative standpoint, 
the thought of any such moral system is impossible; again, for practical purposes the 
modified dualism is the more desirable and useful.  From this point Kant returns to his 
chief argument. 
 In investigating the physical end of the world as a contemplation by moralists as 
well as seeming wise-men (dünkende Weise) and philosophers, Kant raises the question 
of why such an end must exist in the first place (8.331).  Again the question of ende 
becomes a matter of zweck; in fact, endzweck, that word of such technical importance in 
the third Critique, now surfaces.323  Without an end-purpose to the world, there would be 
no meaning which humans could give to physical causes and ends.  Furthermore, 
pessimistic moralists have condemned the world to a terrible end because of their view of 
the moral corruption of man.324  The Vorzeichen des jüngster Tages are held by many to 
be catastrophes moral (injustice, poverty, irreligion, war) or physical (earthquakes, 
storms, floods, comets, and Luftzeichen) (8.332).  The moral pessimism of Kant’s 
 
323 Some relevant passages in the Critique of Judgment are found in 5.370f and 425-436.   
 
324 The opening discussion of the Religion expresses Kant’s public teaching on this matter.  Of course, the 
reinterpretation of Genesis in the “Conjectural Beginning” is revealing as well. 
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contemporaries, he thinks, is due to the increase of morals and culture, for the latter 
outruns the former until one day a world judge ascends the throne.  A consideration of the 
necessity of hope and heroic faith concludes the first half of the essay. 
 The second half of “The End of All Things” opens with the admission that the 
first half was mostly the result of “playing” around with an idea so transcendental as to 
have little cognitive possibility for the human mind (8.332).  Yet insofar as this field of 
idea which reason constructs and upon which the author and his reader may play, it is not 
necessarily “empty.”  By viewing the manner in which human beings think about the 
meaning of the end of all things, one might profit from the practical standpoint.  Due to 
its overall cognitive murkiness, however, the idea inspired by the contemplation of death 
and eternity must be broken up from a whole (das Ganze) into three divisions 
(Abtheilung).  While Kant notes that the first of these need not be investigated further, as 
it has already been discussed, it is the natural point of view which illuminates and selects 
the points of analysis in the second and third divisions.  Thus, despite Kant’s claim to the 
contrary, the second half of the essay is determined according to the principles of the 
first; the former is merely disguised in still more mystical and apocalyptic language and 
imagery.  It is easy, however, to determine the smirk on the face of the author in 
discussing these matters even though he does so with the utmost seriousness. 
 Kant’s explication of the mystical or supernatural (übernatürliche) end, which he 
prefaces with the admission that human reason can understand nothing of these matters, 
begins tellingly enough with a quote from the book of Revelation (8.333).  Representing 
a disregard for the end as the purpose of the moral order (as the “natural” understand 
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would eventually have it, i.e. as following the moral order and/or physically necessary 
[8.333, note]), the mystic or supernatural thinker focuses on what is said literally to 
happen according to Revelation.  He seeks not a moral purpose but the divine purpose 
behind der Ordnung der wirkenden Ursachen, which approximates the goal of a perverse 
Aristotelian (thus perhaps a Thomist).  For reasons introduced in the second paragraph of 
his essay (8.327), dealing with such “objects of sense” goes beyond human conceptual 
ability and results in self-contradiction (8.333-34).  The simultaneous presence of an 
eternal “Alleluia!” and a lack of all change is impossible (8.335), is conceptually 
impossible, and because of this mystics lock themselves up in dark rooms, hopefully 
letting themselves be swallowed into the divine abyss.  For Kant this effort is a disaster 
and is the end of thinking rather than the purpose (8.336).   
 The third division of the whole is the contranatural (widernatürliche) or perverse 
(verkehrte) end of all things.  Whereas the division of the natural sense understands very 
well the end for practical purposes, and the supernatural understands nothing of the 
Ursachen, the contranatural end of all things is a result of the misunderstanding of the 
Endzweck.  Rather than resulting in the annihilation of thought as does the supernatural 
view, the contranatural end of all things brings about nothing less than the antichrist 
(8.339).  In less apocalyptic words, the perverse end of all things has political 
significance, resulting as it does from foolish human hands (8.336).  Continuing the 
religious theme of the preceding paragraphs, Kant notes that the most dangerous human 
error is to try to control that which is thought by some to be divine -- when there are 
“projects” (Entwürfe) of making religion simultaneously “genuine” (lauter) and 
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“powerful” (kraftvoll).  With this statement begins the rhetorical and political core of 
“The End of All Things.”  In this final section, by analyzing the conditions of the 
perverse end of all things, Kant lays out his modest (as he claims on 8.337) project for an 
enlightened Christianity and reveals his own status as a neutral liberal thinker (8.338). 
 Nothing in Christianity need be changed, Kant suggests (8.337).  It has the 
“greatest respect” (der größten Achtung) of people because of its irresistable laws 
(Gesetze unwiderstehlich).  This recalls Kant’s discussion in the Grounding of respect for 
the moral law.325  Christianity is Kantianism for the masses; the founding by Christ of the 
moral constitution (sittlichen Verfassung) seems to be the popularization of the rational 
moral law.  For this reason Kant finds Christianity “worthy of love” (Liebenswürdigkeit): 
often known as the religion of love, Christianity is marked by love only inasmuch as it 
earns it by promulgating law.  If not completely unorthodox, this description of 
Christianity strikes one as a departure from its common manifestations of Kant’s day.  It 
is hard to conceive of many people loving Christianity for making life such a burden to 
them.326 
 Kant, seemingly pleased with the current status of Christianity, notes 
disparagingly again those who wish to fortify it -- um es recht gut zu machen (8.338).  By 
adding to it any authority (Autorität) apart from the respect for its laws, evaporates 
Christianity’s worthiness of love, for it creates the contradiction of commanding believers 
to obey happily (thus no need for command).  Here is a second slippery departure from 
 
325 4.400,403,426,428,435,436,439,440, and especially the note on 4.401 
 
326 Cf. 8.331 and 332 -- which do not make an explict connection between Christianity and human misery, 
but suggest it. 
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orthodox Christianity, for Kant now asserts that Christ offers not commandments but 
rather only a promulgator of the creed of practical reason, an assertion that contradicts 
John 14:15,22-23 and 15:10-12 (especially this last verse). 
 Following these two odd points, Kant makes the observation that heavenly 
rewards for good actions are bribes and punishments for bad actions are blackmail (p. 
338); this they are not to be taken seriously as commandments (though the above 
passages from John contradict this assessment), but rather one may see this merely as a 
liebreiche Warnung.  This is necessarily true since it seems that not even God the creator 
can alter the effects of the moral law (8.339).  Certainly there is by now a clear departure 
from Christianity; Kant, not the proponents of a more authoritarian Christianity, is the 
innovator.  This becomes clearer still when Kant mentions liberal thought’s necessary 
interpretation (Auslegung) of the promises of Christianity.  Then follows a further 
diminishment of love’s importance for liberal Christianity in favor of the good will of the 
moral actor. 
 These considerations lead Kant to offer a general political comment on the role of 
Christianity.  Its worthiness of love still shines in the Zeit der größten Aufklärung, die je 
unter Menschen war (8.339).  This is despite the rapid changes of human opinion 
resulting from the possibly corrosive Enlightenment.  The incredulous assertion reminds 
of Kant’s earlier discussion of the hearing given by the community (Gemeinwesen) of the 
two elements necessary for a religion (einer Religion) -- but not necessarily Christianity 
(“the religion” [cf. 8.339]), he implies -- doctrine and reason (8.336).  Clearly Kant 
wishes to reconstitute the founding brought about by Christ.  This is not a hard 
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interpretation to accept once one notes that Kant makes Christianity’s worthiness of love 
contingent rather than intrinsic.  What it might do, rather than what it is, is what might 
destine Christianity to be the world religion.  If Christianity were convinced by violent 
zealots, secretive clerics, or other authorities to turn its back on being worthy of love, 
then rule would be seized by the antichrist, and the perverse of all things would come.  
There would be no physical or material end of the world (although one can never rule out 
a comet or two), but the moral order would be destroyed.  Upon these miserable 
warnings, Kant’s essay comes to a close, but the irony with which it ends is visible, for 
one might already see in Christianity the dictatorship of the antichrist.  Such a possibility 
underlines the practical urgency which animates Kant’s essay; it is not fanciful 
exploration into an abstract idea, but the beginning of a critique of religion. 
 In order to achieve his reformation of Christianity Kant builds upon the efforts of 
his predecessors, Spinoza and Locke; while quoting the bible, he simultaneously alters 
doctrine.  Respect, not love, is the force of Christianity (8.337); Christ suggests and does 
not command (8.338-9); Christianity is worthy of love not inherently but as long as it 
lives up to liberal standards (8.338).  These are the precepts which Kant gives to his 
version of Christianity, and with which he combats the forms of Christianity already in 
existence. 
Philosophy and Religion 
The centrality of religion in “The End of All Things” is obvious from the imagery which 
appears by the third paragraph of the essay (8.328).  The especially apocalyptic flavor of 
Kant’s selective quotations provides still more effect to the evidence of a coming end, for 
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the book of Revelation also contains moral and physical catastrophes such as the 
persecution of the faithful, Armageddon-like wars, and assorted Luftzeichen (8.332).  
Like Kant’s essay, Revelation too is occasionally humorous, inasmuch as it parodies 
itself as well as some of the proclamations of Christian faith.  Due to its connection 
between destruction and salvation, and persecution and rule, the Revelation to John takes 
on the following characteristic: “So I took it out of the angel’s hand, and I ate it and it 
tasted as sweet as honey, but when I had eaten it my stomach turned sour” (Rev. 10:10-
11);327 this is a striking point of comparison with Kant’s essay, especially in light of his 
letter to Beister.  Unlike Kant’s essay, however, Revelation takes seriously Christianity’s 
ultimate victory over Rome and evil generally.  Most importantly, whereas Revelation 
pokes fun at itself, John expressly prohibits others from distorting its teachings: “This is 
my solemn attestation to all who hear the prophecies in this book; if anyone adds 
anything to them, God will add to him every plague mentioned in the book; if anyone 
cuts anything out of the prophecies in this book, God will cut off his share of the tree of 
life and of the holy city, which are described in the book” (Rev. 22: 18-19).  Kant’s own 
“partly miserable, partly merry” retelling of Revelation is therefore an unannounced 
attack on the scriptures.  His blithe selectivity defies the above warning as if to deny for 
certain a divine Gerichtstag. 
 In addition to the inspiration which Revelation provided him regarding the 
 
327 Translations from the bible not found in Kant’s German are taken from The New Jerusalem Bible, ed. 
Henry Wansbrough (Doubleday: New York, 1985). 
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jüngster Tag,328 Kant also draws upon its condemnation of false prophets329 and its 
references to divine secrets.330  Kant’s view of the idea of eternity as leading to an abyss 
also has possible biblical origins.331  Therefore one can see that the book of Revelation 
has itself become an object of freeplay, into which Kant pulls his reader, and out of which 
Kant will reinterpret all of Christian teaching.  The quotations from scripture which are 
meant to illustrate or give authority to either unimportant or purely secular matters is part 
of the humor with which Kant goes about this business.   
 One might object that this is an overinterpretation of Kant himself, yet Kant 
occasionally lets the ropes show for those who want to see them.  The most obvious 
example is his quotation, in the context of Christian rewards, of Matthew 5:12: “Seid 
fröhlich und getrost, es wird Euch im himmel alles wohl vergolten werden” (8.339).  This 
is not odd in itself, but it is in light of the passages which enclose it and which Kant 
omits: “Blessed are you when people abuse you and prosecute you and speak all kinds of 
calumny against you falsely on my account... this is how they persecuted the prophets 
before you” (Matt. 5:11-12).  Kant thus makes himself into a prophet332 whose words 
might open him to persecution.  This quotation takes on further prominence when read in 
conjunction with Rev. 22:18-19. 
 
328 Rev. 1:19-20; 4:1-2; 6:17; 10:7; 14:6-7; 22:10-11. 
 
329 Rev. 2:3,8-9,20; 3:9-15; 19:20; 21:8; 22:15. 
 
330 Rev. 5:1-5; 10:4-5. 
 
331 Rev. 9:1-3; 11:7-8; 17:8; 20:1-3. 
 
332 For Kant as a prophet of the practical, see “Toward Eternal Peace,” 8.368. 
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Philosophy and Poetry 
As a prophet, charged with releasing religious secrets by means of weakening religion, 
and faced with the persecution of the religious and political authorities, Kant must engage 
in a guarded manner of presentation.  In his other popular works, such as “Toward 
Eternal Peace,” he unfolds the distasteful elements of his teaching by means of quoting 
classical poets -- often at apparently inappropriate times and with disconnected meanings.  
This method appears several times in “The End of All Things,” in conjunction with the 
odd use of biblical quotations as explained above, which mirrors the composition of the 
“Conjectural Beginning.” 
 Kant’s first quotation in the present essay is, however, of a modern poet.  
Albrecht Haller, who published the cited poem in 1736, was both a scientist and a poet.  
In his “Imperfect Poems about Eternity,” he contemplates the apparent infinity which 
horribly envelops death, particularly the death of his close friend.  Nevertheless, toward 
the end Haller offers the final resolution of what turns out to be the greatest deus ex 
machina, the Christian God.  Kant, on the contrary, centers on Haller’s depiction of 
infinite eternity which is terrifying and sublime (8.327).333  In another text, quoting a 
more pious segment of a different poem, Kant refers to Haller as a “philosophical poet” 
(philosophischer Dichter);334 here, altering Haller’s teaching, Kant intends to supplant 
 
333 From the Opus Postumum we have the following statement: “Confess to yourself.  To have religion, the 
concept of God is not required (still less the postulate: ‘There is a God’)” (21.81, E. Förster trans.).  
Combined with at least three references to Zoroaster (a.k.a. Zarathustra), this work demonstrates the need 
for the philosopher-poet. 
 
334 6.65. 
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Haller’s as philosopher-poet.  To label Kant a philosophical poet may appear odd, due to 
the alleged prosaic nature of his most well-known works, but can one not say that he 
offers, through the presentation of the noumenal and phenomenal words (and all that goes 
with them) for the sake of moral faith,335 a noble lie?  And further, the importance of 
conflating poetry and philosophy in Kant’s explicitly political writings is clear from 
“Towards Perpetual Peace” -- in which Virgil, the poet who “founded” Rome, helps to 
illustrate the motivation of this modern author (Verfasser)336 to envision a new 
constitution (Verfassung).337 
 Sometimes Kant employs the classical poets as mere illustration or to provide 
ancient authority for his utterances.  An example of this employment of classical poetry 
occurs early in “The End of All Things” when he quotes from Virgil’s Aeneid; there is 
little obvious significance in the passage, possibly because sometimes Kant quotes poetry 
as he quotes the bible -- for the sake of humor.  Yet in the general context from which the 
quoted passage comes is the explanation of ancient religious rituals, which honor 
Hercules’ assistance in the founding of a city.  Kant might be asserting his self-
identification with the poet-founder which he soon repeats in the essay on perpetual 
peace; he might also be using the passage as a comparison with the current religious 
 
335 Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxx. 
 
336 8.343 and 349. 
 
337 I do not intend to say that Kant desired to found a utopia or to effect political revolutions, but that such 
things were possible, within realistic limits, on the basis of individuals in the context of thinking and moral 
action.  His writings, technical as well as popular (or “epistemological” as well as “political”/ “moral”) all 
point in this direction.  “The End of All Things” is so valuable as it makes no programmatic or doctrinal 
plans but operates as pure critique (unlike, say, the Religion book). 
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situation. 
 In other places, however, Kant’s use of poetry is more revealing.  Such is the case 
in his quotation from Horace, which appears midway through the essay (8.332).  Kant 
cites it to give credence to his assertion that, due to the progress of the human race, the 
development of culture outruns the development of morality (Sittlichkeit) until some day 
(dereinst, not any form of Tag, unfortunately -- or revealingly) in the future.  The initially 
slow course of moral development in the world, Kant claims, is like Horace’s 
understanding of poene pede claudo; but the context of this quotation is illuminating 
upon investigation: 
   est et fideli tuta silentio 
   merces: vetabo, qui Cereris sacrum 
   volgarit arcanae, sub isdem 
   sit trabibus fragilemque mecum 
 
   solvat phaselon; saepe Diespiter  
   neglectus incesto addidit integrum, 
   raro antecedentem scelestum 
   deseruit pede Poena claudo.  (Odes, III.2.25-32) 
 
This praise for tuta silentio recalls the secrets of the Revelation of which John makes 
mention.  Kant thus ridicules his own irreligious action of unveiling sacred doctrines; this 
action is done in direct opposition to the actions of the clergy (Klerus), which engages in 
secret undertakings (unter sich genommene Abreden) so as to preserve its political power 
(8.336).   
 A second revealing use of classical texts is Kant’s quotation from the poetic 
historian Livy; this example, too, deals with the immoral and political activities of the 
clergy.  In speaking of Christian punishment through hell, Kant questions whether this 
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can be anything more than blackmail, and therefore pronounces that Christ means the 
threat of punishment only as a “loving warning” (8.338-39).  The power of the law itself, 
rather than any threat of punishment, is enough to guarantee proper conduct, for as Kant 
quotes, lex est res surda et inexorabilis (History of Rome, II.3).   
 Kant, schooled in the classics, does not note the context from which this is taken.  
Livy is in the midst of reporting the betrayal of the recently-established Roman senate, 
planned by a group of youths raised in the manner of princes and not comfortable under 
the new rule.  With aequato iure now established among the citizens, these privileged 
few now felt enslaved.  The statement which Kant cites comes from Livy’s account of the 
feelings of the newly-demoted and treacherous youths, who believed the law to be much 
less powerful, and much less worthy of respect, than Kant’s version purports to be.  Livy 
has no discussion of a rationally-legislated moral law, and, additionally, Kant has 
changed Livy’s leges into lex. 
 Kant employs this reference to compare the casuist evil of the reigning religion 
with the self-gratifying lawlessness of the young princes.  There is no rapprochement of 
Christian authority and aequato iure, Kant admits (8.338-39); the further hint is that there 
is a similar chasm between the pious doctrines (frommen Lehren) and illuminated 
practical reason (erleuchteten praktischen Vernunft) -- which is one basis for aequato 
iure, or at least the “feeling of freedom”(Das Gefühl der Freiheit) -- which Kant insists is 
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absolutely necessary (schlechterdings nothwendig) for a religion (8.336).338  This 
speculation leads back to Kant’s quotation of Revelation 10:3, which he instantly 
corrects so as to ensure that the angel, left in the apparently incapable authorial hands of 
John, does not speak “nonsense” (Unsinn) (8.333): the bible, without illuminated 
practical reason, is nonsense.  The believer of pious doctrine might charge this 
assessment as blasphemous; he would charge that the bible combined with illuminated 
practical reason is no longer The Bible.  It is equally possible, however, that Kant has 
loosened the reader’s faith with a combination of misery and merriment. 
Philosophy, Religion, and Politics 
The goal of Kant’s poetic-biblical Spiel (8.332) is twofold.  First, he intends to undermine 
the reader’s piety and thus his individual allegiance to the clergy; this is accomplished 
first by appealing both to his sense of humor and to his feeling of conscience.339  Second, 
he intends to build upon the success of this first project the experiences of both radical 
utopianism and pessimism then dominating Europe immediately after the Terror;340 this 
is accomplished by bringing into question whether there is any need to believe either in 
an inevitable physical end of all things (8.330-31) or in an inevitable collapse of the 
 
338 Obviously, it is hard to miss Kant’s attitude in this regard toward pious doctrine (frommen Lehren) in 
the first place, for from the opening of this very essay he sets about correcting the error of a common 
expression of pious speech (frommen Sprache). 
 
339 And further, the role of the individual as conscience turns from basic questions of Gericht to even more 
fundamental questions of Urtheil; this is one way in which Kantian moral philosophy ultimately depends 
upon Kantian “aesthetics” (or is at least ultimately aesthetic rather than “legal”).  See, among other 
passages, the interchanging of Gericht and Urtheil, 8. 328 (lines 9-10) and 329 (lines 15,22).  I might also 
include the turn from God as judge on Judgment Day (Gerichtstag, 8.328) to the judgment of “each man” 
(8.329). 
 
340 “Towards Perpetual Peace” has much the same intention. 
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moral order (8.339).  Thus, by means of playing around with an idea of which we can 
have no conception, Kant manages to offer a critique of religious dictatorship as well as 
political anarchy.  He describes his own point of view as follows: “the liberal thinking-
manner -- equally distant from slave-sense and from boundlessness” (8.338); from this 
standpoint he criticizes Christianity, but the question which remains is whether Kant’s 
position does not isolate him a priori from such a critique.  That is to say, by accepting 
the principles of the first Critique, he can only dismiss the possibility of religious 
experience or the validity of dictatorial Christianity.  This is not meant to be the rabid 
objection of an irrationalist, but merely an observation that, even in comparison to other 
rigorous philosophers, Kant’s system is too slippery to allow the Kantian to venture 
outside.  Kant’s argument is convincing on Kantian grounds, and most supporters of 
modern culture and philosophy would no doubt agree with it, wittingly or not (this last 
possibility suggests the obvious fact that one does not have to have read or understood 
the first Critique in order to agree with the argument of “The End of All Things” -- but 
such a person reading the article probably has sympathy for Kant in the first place, or else 
will react as did the censors to Kant’s Religion). 
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7.  Rereading and Rebinding: Summary and Conclusion 
 
This study has splintered the Religion into four or five elements that are different in 
character than its own most explicit division of four parts.   This manner of reading came 
in response to the difficulty of locating a singular and linear argument in the book, 
combined with the appearance of several different starting-points – and thus different 
subject-matter – to the work.  The Religion, nevertheless, is a unity, and so the next task 
is to recombine those elements into one whole that answers the question with which the 
study began, namely, to what extent, if any, can the Religion be claimed as a work of 
Kant’s political philosophy?   
First, then, let us answer the question that initiated this study, and let us begin to 
do so by representing what this study as a whole has shown or suggested about the 
Religion as a whole.  We might a general sketch as follows: the propensity to cult and to 
superstition, and thus to a religion of anti-service (part 4) is countered with moral religion 
(parts 2 and 4), maintained by the grounding of a true church (part 3), thus overcoming 
the influence of the priestly way of thinking (part 1, “End” essay).  This makes possible, 
and is also made possible by, the ability of the philosopher to educate, whether in the 
university, the seminary, or the cultural press.  The political effect of this social-moral 
reform is the (gradual) transformation hoped for in the essay “Toward Eternal Peace”, 
which was published not merely as a replacement for but as a surrogate for further 
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writing on religion.  The political existence of the moral religion and the political mode 
of philosophy are thus combined in Kant’s published doctrine of religion.341 
 Curiously, the notion of religion as presented by the definition (given toward the 
beginning of part four) has no political or social reference; this would give one reason to 
view the Religion as a work of moral philosophy or ethics and nothing more.  Yet this 
view seems insufficient not only because of the context in which the question of human 
good and evil is raised, i.e. in the presentation of the end of the world and the dispute 
between priests and philosopher-pedagogues, but also because of the way in which 
religion is presented in connection with an ethical community or church.  Even though 
religion proceeds from morality, it stops not at the individual moral (or religious) agent 
but is understandable only in terms of public life; the church, one recalls, is presented in 
the context of man as he exists in the company of other men.  Further, the concluding 
discussion of that part of the Religion most directly concerned with religion itself is a 
discussion of the conscience in relation to limits to that conscience that are imposed from 
outside, by other men – men of church-faith if not of true religion.  On the basis of these 
observations one sees the social and ultimately political character and intention of Kant’s 
presentation of the concept of religion.342 
 
341 Strictly speaking, one might admit that the public existence of the moral religion is social rather than 
political, and thus would grant that according to the differentiation offered by Strauss (quoted in chapter 
one) Kant’s work is (in part) social rather than political philosophy. 
 
342 Although it is necessary to raise the evaluative questions of the previous section, the incompleteness of 
the study begun by this dissertation necessitate as well caution in answering them too quickly.  More work 
must be done on the Religion before a final evaluation is appropriate.  For instance, and perhaps this is the 
most glaring example, our focus here has been almost entirely on the Religion, running the risk of making a 
fetishism of the work and operating in willful ignorance of Kant’s larger body of work.  One could also 
deepen the interpretation of the Religion by drawing closer connections between it and the works of Kant’s 
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Assuming that not all believers will be persuaded by Kant’s doctrine of religion, 
one might expect some of them to initiate a refutation.  He would look at the critique of 
reason in the first place, which is no small task.  Much of the Religion is grounded on the 
limitations of what reason can do and the limitlessness of what it wants to do, and 
extending that to ways of thinking that lead to enthusiasm or anti-service.  While looking 
to counter Kant’s criticisms of anti-service would be part of a refutation, it is to what 
those criticisms are based on that one must ultimately turn.  The refutation of the Religion 
would therefore largely consist in a refutation of the Critique of Pure Reason and the 
Critique of Practical Reason.  Even then, the would-be refuter of Kant would be forced 
to acknowledge that Kant does more for the protecting the existence of religion (granted, 
at a distance from the church-faiths that sometimes go by the name of religion) than any 
of his predecessors.  If the Kant refuter does discredit the critical works, he must be 
prepared to face the difficulties for religion (and human life in general) posed by David 
Hume, whom (among others) Kant was intending to answer by authoring the critical 
enterprise.  Ultimately, the believer who wishes to refute the doctrine of religion must do 
battle with modernity itself. 
  
  
 
 
 
predecessors, giving particular attention to David Hume’s Natural History of Religion and the works of 
Rousseau and Lessing that pertain to religion. 
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